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ABSTRACT:
This thesis will extend the current re-evaluation of the presidency of Jimmy Carter 
through a detailed examination of the enduring impact of his Southern Baptist 
Christian faith upon the modem American political discourse. It will show that the 
relationship between Jimmy Carter’s deeply felt religiosity and his political vision is 
primary to an understanding of the lasting legacy of his presidency. Carter 
dramatically reconfigured the relationship between religious faith and the presidency. 
The first president to articulate forthrightly a highly intimate and deeply felt personal 
religious faith to the American electorate, Carter placed spiritual concerns at the 
centre of the American political debate.
I will investigate Carter’s relationship with the forces of conservative Christendom 
with regards to a number of interwoven policy issues deemed by the evangelical 
community to be emblematic of the increasingly liberal, secular humanist nature of 
the American public and political discourse. Specifically, I will explore the issues of 
abortion, the role of religion in private schools, the place of prayer in public schools, 
gay and lesbian rights, Christian family values and the Congressional ratification of 
the Equal Rights Amendment. I will discuss how the policies of the Carter White 
House on these so-called ‘hot button’ issues for religious conservatives acted as a 
catalyst for Christian political activism during the 1970s, laying the basis for their key 
role in American political life thereafter. I will explain how, paradoxically, the most 
overtly evangelical president in American history not only failed to retain the support 
of the conservative Christian community but was integral in the emergence of the 
New Religious, or New Christian Right, as a key Republican Party constituency.
Jimmy Carter successfully reawakened faith-based politics but because his faith did 
not exactly mirror the religious and political agenda of the disparate groups that make 
up the religious conservative movement within the United States, that newly 
awakened force within American politics ultimately used its power to replace him 
with Ronald Reagan, a president who more carefully articulated their agenda.
PREFATORY NOTES
1.1 Sources and Methodology
The arguments contained in this thesis stem in large part from primary archival 
research conducted in 2002 and in 2004 at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and 
Museum in Atlanta, Georgia. This thesis combines research of previously 
unexamined memoranda, personal correspondence, close textual analysis of Carter’s 
public and private Presidential papers alongside the memoirs of members of the 
administration and secondary historical analysis of the Carter presidency. Oral 
Histories, taken as a part of the National Archives and Records Administration Exit 
Interview project, the National Park Service Plains Project and the Carter Library Oral 
History Project held at the Carter Presidential library were utilised. This thesis also 
employs the interview transcripts recorded as part of the University of Virginia’s 
White Burkett Miller Centre Carter Presidential Oral History Project, also held at the 
Carter Presidential Library. Alongside these are Presidential memoranda, reports and 
personal letters from the Gerald Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbour, Michigan. 
Furthermore, I have undertaken a detailed study of the politically motivated literature 
of the early Christian Right. Largely published by evangelical presses, this has often 
been ignored. Further research for this thesis was undertaken at Columbia University, 
New York City.
1.2 Acknowledgements
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1.3 Nomenclature
Within this thesis I use the term “evangelical” to describe Bible-believing, Christ 
centred Christians. I use the terms “evangelical,” “religious conservative,” and 
“conservative Christian” interchangeably. These terms are problematic in part 
because there remains no unanimity amongst those defined as such on matters of 
Scriptural doctrine or even as to the correct definition of each term. I have chosen 
“evangelical” since evangelicalism is an umbrella term that encompasses a diversity 
of fundamentalist, Charismatic, Pentecostal Protestant and socially conservative 
Roman Catholic congregations. It is also the term used most often in the memoranda 
written by Jimmy Carter’s White House staff and quoted at length in this thesis. 
Since many of these memoranda were themselves written by an evangelical pastor, 
the Reverend Robert Maddox, a Southern Baptists Minister from Calhoun, Georgia, I 
have retained it as a general descriptive term. The terms “Religious Right” and “New 
Christian Right” have been used within this thesis to include members of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints despite the fact that a number of Christian 
denominations, including a number of evangelical and fundamentalist Protestant 
churches whose congregations in large part make up the “New Christian Right,” 
would refute the definition of Mormonism as Christian on grounds of doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION:
JIMMY CARTER AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF 
FAITH BASED POLITICS
Since 1985 there have been clear transdisciplinary efforts to revise understanding of 
the Carter Presidency. The first wave of revisionist scholarship was based upon the 
Oral History Project carried out by the White Burkett Miller Centre at the University 
of Virginia. These efforts were given further impetus in 1987 with the opening of 
the Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia. Such work calls for an approach 
that transcends the Neustadt paradigm that defines Presidential power as “the power 
to persuade.” Instead, it calls for Jimmy Carter to be seen as a “non-political 
politician,” in Erwin C. Hargrove’s phrase, a “trusteeship President” in that of 
Charles O. Jones or even, in the words of John Dumbrell, a “Presidential Robert 
Pirsig.”1 Essentially, it presents Jimmy Carter as a figure marking a departure in 
modern Presidential politics. The following work extends this approach through 
highlighting the centrality to Carter’s Presidency of his deeply pious religious faith.
So far initial appraisals of this key phenomenon have been limited. Kucharsky, 
Baker, Ribuffo and others have all either largely focused on Carter as an evangelical 
candidate rather than upon the Carter Presidency as a whole, or they have taken only 
partial steps towards marshalling primary sources in tracing Carter’s relationship 
with religious conservatism.2 To date the most detailed analysis is Ribuffo’s ‘God 
and Jimmy Carter,’ where he argues, “Carter’s religion affected the image of his 
Presidency more than his substantive policies.” Here and elsewhere, Ribuffo 
emphasises contemporary commentary describing Carter as “weird,” “strange” and 
“quirk[y]” and links this to his faith.4 Instead, this work argues that far from being 
superficial or primarily an issue connected to image, Carter’s religion had a key 
impact upon policy, most significantly in terms of what it prevented him from doing. 
Rather than being weird or incomprehensible, Carter was in fact acting as President
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in a manner consistent with the precepts of his Southern Baptist faith. His 
Christianity played a significant role in his electoral success in 1976; however, 
delving into Carter’s Presidential Papers, his public statements and his private 
memoranda shows that his religion was also a factor leading to his rejection by the 
American electorate in 1980, alongside more obviously fundamental factors such as 
the stagflation economy, the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan, the awakening of 
religious fundamentalism in Iran and fragmentation within the Democratic Party.5
By placing Carter within the context of the rightward shift in the American body 
politic during the late 1970s this work shows that his Presidency was a catalyst for 
the re-emergence of Christian conservatism as a dynamic political force in the late 
twentieth century. Carter was a Southern Baptist Christian and to varying extents, 
his faith influenced his policies as well as his relationships with key Democratic 
Party constituents including the leftist evangelical black civil rights movement and 
the gay and women’s liberation movements; it also impacted upon his foreign policy, 
particularly his approach to the Middle East, the Panama Canal and human rights 
more generally.
The 1970s, Spiritual Malaise, and the Carter Candidacy
In 1970s America, Jimmy Carter’s religious fervour and its association with old-time 
traditional American values had great political resonance. What is significant is that 
by the 1970s religious issues had re-entered mainstream politics even though 
conventional indicators register that the 1970s were a less religious decade than the 
1920s or even the 1950s. As E. J. Dionne has noted, both mainline and 
fundamentalist churches were “too busy growing” in the 1950s to be heavily engaged 
in politics.6 The failure of the utopianism of the 1960s meant the nation turned 
inward and the 1970s became in Tom Wolfe’s phrase, the “Me Decade.”7 A 
narcissistic preoccupation which Roof called “the flight into self,” fostered a growing 
interest in personal spirituality as America experienced its “third great awakening,” a
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wave of religious revivalism to match that of the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.8 Lasch wrote that the American people “seem to wish to forget not only 
the sixties, the riots, the new left, the disruptions on college campuses, Vietnam, 
Watergate and the Nixon Presidency, but their entire collective past,” a desire, he 
suggested, that “proves on closer analysis to embody the despair of a society that 
cannot face the future.”9
“New Age” religions gained in popularity, but so too did more traditional, doctrinally 
conservative forms of worship. As conservative political commentator and former 
Presidential speechwriter David Frum suggests, “The truly big news in American 
religion in the 1970s was not the rise of outlandish new religions but the shifting 
balance of power among the old.”10 Schulman notes how the Jewish faith became 
more conservative and Catholicism joined the search for “privatised spirituality.”11 
Most markedly, Protestant evangelical Christianity, defined by an intensely personal 
preoccupation with salvation not of the collective but of the self, and with the 
formation of a highly intimate relationship with Jesus Christ as saviour, appealed to 
an increasing number of Americans.
Schulman has linked the tendency for introspection within American society with the
increase in popularity of the evangelical born-again experience. Rather than a
communal or congregational religious conversion, a “rebirth in Christ” was an
experience of deliverance that came about through acceptance of Jesus as spiritual
redeemer. It emphasised “the individual’s experience of grace, the personal
discovery of one’s own salvation.”12 Furthermore, fears over modern America’s
precipitous downward spiral of morality were matched by evangelical eschatology
that foresaw an impending Armageddon and an imminent Second Coming of Christ.
Thus the 1970s saw a dramatic shift in the balance of denominational power as
1 ^evangelical congregations swelled at the expense of their mainstream rivals. One 
much quoted Gallup poll conducted in 1976 showed that 48 percent of American 
Protestants and 18 percent of American Catholics considered themselves to have 
undergone a “born-again” religious conversion.14 And evangelicalism spread beyond 
its traditional Southern and Western homelands and took root across the country, part 
of what Egerton observed as the “Southernization of America.”15
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During the 1970s, born-again evangelicalism represented more than the acceptance 
of salvation through Christ. It translated into a strict moral code and conservative 
positions on religious-cultural “family” issues. This diverse range of social and 
gender issues included the availability of abortion, the place of religious activities in 
public schools, sex education and creationism within the school curriculum, 
homosexuality, pornography and the Equal Rights Amendment. Deeply concerned 
with what they interpreted as a loosening of traditional social standards and the 
resulting hedonism, sexual promiscuity, materialism, and moral relativism, Christian 
conservatives called for the nation’s moral and spiritual parameters to once again be 
defined by a strict adherence to Biblical absolutes. Though many Christian 
conservatives harked back to the 1950s, the high-water mark of American religious 
piety, they looked further back into history for inspiration to reverse the modem day 
decline. They believed America to be a Christian nation blessed by divine 
providence as one “nation under God” suffering under the yoke of the immoral 
ideology of “secular humanism.” America’s renewal would be realised only through 
reaffirmation of both the nation’s historic Judeo-Christian heritage and its covenant 
with God.
Jimmy Carter brought Christian conservatism back into the political centre in 1976, 
retrieving evangelicalism from the political hinterland to which it had retreated at the 
end of the 1920s. As a self-proclaimed born-again evangelical, he brought an overt 
Biblical spirituality into the American political discourse. His 1976 campaign for the 
White House placed the comparative piety of Presidential candidates under close 
scrutiny for the first time since John Kennedy’s election in 1960. Although 
Kennedy’s candidacy had raised the question of whether a Roman Catholic could 
become President, Kennedy went out of his way to assure suspicious voters that his 
Catholicism would not dictate his politics. “My body went to mass but my mind 
went to Harvard,” he told them.16 As Shogan has noted, although both Carter and 
Kennedy used their character as a background for their candidacy, the Georgian was 
the first to use his character, explicitly expressed through his religious faith, as a 
direct reason for voting for him.17 This is not to say that Carter was the first 
President to co-opt religion as a means of enunciating his vision or to deny that 
Gerald Ford also used evangelical themes in 1976, albeit in a less intimate and 
forceful manner.18 A Christian faith had previously been an unspoken Presidential
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pre-requisite and Presidents had always used Biblical symbolism in their political 
rhetoric to varying degrees. However, no previous President so personalised nor so 
ostentatiously articulated their religiosity as a facet of their political vision as Carter. 
He openly announced his belief that “I’ll be a better President because of my deep 
religious convictions,” and freely admitted that what he called “My deep and 
consistent religious faith” was “the most important thing in my life.”19
Carter’s 1976 electoral campaign was not based on specific issues or, given his status 
as a political outsider, even on partisan loyalty. As Skowronek put it, it was an 
“autobiographical campaign.”20 A vote for Carter was not a vote for the agenda of 
the Democratic Party; it was a vote for who Carter was and what he personally 
represented. What he was, was a man of Christian faith whose public 
pronouncements reverberated with Biblical undertones. And Jimmy Carter was not 
just any Christian. According to Tom Wolfe, he was a member of the “Missionary 
lectern-pounding Amen ten-finder C-major-chord Sister-Martha at the Yamaha- 
keyboard loblolly piney-woods Baptist faith in which the members of the 
congregation stand up and “give witness” and “share it, Brother” and “share it, 
Sister” and “praise God” during the service.”21 Carter actively identified himself 
with born-again evangelicalism.22 He established his Christian credentials with 
thinly veiled rhetorical nods tailored to the sensibilities of evangelical voters that 
called for love, compassion, service and faith. His campaign emphasised the link 
between his small town upbringing and his traditional principles nurtured by his 
Southern Baptist beliefs. Unsurprisingly, his candidacy inspired the evangelical 
community. “Surely the Lord sent Jimmy Carter,” said Daddy King to the 
Democratic Party convention in 1976, “to come on out and bring America back 
where she belongs.”23 “You could almost hear Carter utter the first Amen,” wrote 
one reporter at the convention.24 It was as if, wrote Witcover, “Madison Square 
Garden had been converted into a cavernous Baptist Church.”25
Carter’s born-again faith as expressed during the Presidential campaign has often 
been questioned. More often than not Carter’s faith was a source of suspicion or 
confusion. Glad characterised it as an attention-seeking ploy, a cynical effort to 
energise support amongst the evangelical community, much of which had hitherto 
resolutely refrained from “worldly” political activity. Though he campaigned “above
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politics,” she accused Carter of being “the ultimate politician,” cynically using 
religion for his own political ends by “getting God in his comer.” He manipulated 
his discourse to “wet the appetite” of the media and the electorate, “guaranteeing 
press coverage” and displaying his piety as a means to “quiet apprehensions” about 
what she terms “his darker, enigmatic side.” Witcover referred to Carter as a 
“peanut-farmer Billy Graham” and expressed “a general uneasiness” about “this 
rather strange man who strode boldly onto the political landscape, speaking 
unabashedly about love and compassion and being influenced in his conduct of 
public office by God’s word.”27 Richard Reeves felt Carter’s faith was part of a 
political “act.” He derided Carter as “a phoney...an actor, a salesman.” Liberal 
historian Arthur Schlesinger observed that Carter’s “dominating theme” was “Trust 
me, trust me,” but was profoundly troubled by “the implication that evangelical 
principles can solve social, economic and international perplexities.” Such a belief, 
he cautioned, was “errant sentimentalism.”29 Others were concerned that Carter 
might be a dangerous religious fanatic, bringing a religion of “hell fire and
damnation” to the Presidency.30 Liberal clergyman Malcolm Boyd warned that
"1 1
Carter might possess “a messiah complex.” Others found Carter’s faith bizarre 
because it seemed so unusual. Carter’s press secretary Jody Powell claimed that one 
Boston Globe reporter privately derided Carter during the Democratic primary 
campaign as “a redneck, Baptist, Bible thumper.” The reporter admitted that Carter 
“may win the nomination and he may even make the best President of the bunch,” 
but, he told Powell, “I don’t like it one damn bit.”32 Wooten was even more 
condescending and dismissive, arguing that Carter’s faith made the Georgian not 
only “odd” but “down right peculiar.”33 “The trouble with Jimmy Carter is not only 
is he a Southern Baptist,” said one evangelical President of Christian seminary, but 
“he talks like one.”34
The disquiet as to the explicitly religious aspects of Carter’s election campaign led 
some of his aides to urge the candidate to stop talking publicly about his faith. In 
early May 1976, Stuart Eizenstat, the campaign’s issues and policy director sent a 
memorandum to Carter regarding his faith. He warned Carter, “While those 
[religious] views undoubtedly have helped in many states, they have hurt among 
liberals.” He told Carter to deflect further questions regarding religion. “Do not
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raise the issue,” he said. “We have gathered all of the support we will get from it” he 
warned, “and can expect more negative reaction.” Instead Eizenstat suggested that 
Carter avoid answering further questions regarding religion by saying, “My religious 
views, like yours, are personal and are something I keep to myself. Because of this it 
would be inappropriate for me to discuss in a Presidential campaign my religious 
beliefs.” If questioned regarding the relationship between his religion and his 
political philosophy Carter should respond “My beliefs on religion do not influence 
my decision-making,” it is “my opponents, not I, who continue to make religion an 
issue, when it should not be.”35 Eizenstat was concerned that the peculiarities of 
Carter’s Southern Baptist faith made it difficult to win over voters of a different 
cultural or regional background. This was particularly true amongst non-evangelical 
faith-based voting constituencies, even traditionally Democratic ones, some of whom 
harboured a historical distrust of the Southern Baptist faith. Alexander M. Schindler, 
President of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations admitted Jews “to a 
greater extent than any other group, are troubled by the religious fundamentalism 
expressed by one of the candidates.” This, he said, was “unsurprising” given that 
“much of anti-Semitism had its roots in fundamental Christian doctrine...and so we 
feel and express a certain discomfort when a candidate describes himself to be a 
‘born-again’ Christian.” President Ford’s re-election campaign team agreed that 
Carter’s faith was a political liability. One memorandum from his campaign staff to 
the President listed as a “Negative” the fact that Carter was “A man who wears his 
religion on his sleeve.” This led him to be a “self-righteous” politician who “Lacks 
humility.” The President’s advisers revealed their lack of understanding of Carter’s 
appeal as a Christian. The President could win votes they said by portraying Carter 
as “one who uses religion for political purposes.” Carter should be portrayed to the 
electorate as “an evangelic.”37 As one Catholic letter writer to the Carter White 
House later explained, “By the very fact he was so clearly identified with a religious 
tradition about which...northern and urban people knew little [Carter] started off the 
creation of a kind of uneasiness.”38
The memoranda sent by both campaign teams revealed a misunderstanding of the 
importance of religion as an electoral asset in 1976 and, for his part, Carter did not 
heed the advice. Instead of de-emphasising his religiosity he sought to educate 
Eizenstat as to the precise tenets of his faith. When E. Brooks Holifield published an
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article on Carter’s Baptist faith the Presidential candidate sent a copy to Eizenstat 
and added a note “Stu -  You may want to read and keep this.”39 Carter clearly 
understood that his Southern Baptist faith enhanced his candidacy. Carter’s simple 
Baptist religiosity acted as a guarantee to the American people that he would never 
take on “the same frame of mind that Nixon or Johnson did -  lying, cheating or 
distorting the truth.”40 In the aftermath of Watergate, Carter’s promise to restore 
high ethical standards and moral integrity to government elicited suspicion amongst 
the journalists and commentators following the campaign. “To the cynics of the 
press, an honest man is as unlikely to be found as the Holy Grail,” observed 
evangelical writers Norton and Slosser.41 Yet Carter’s religiosity held a strong 
political purchase. Carter presented himself not as a “Nietzschean hero” but as a 
“Whitmanesque redeemer,” writes Roper, who promised for the first time to bring a 
“spiritual dimension to the moral dilemmas of the country.” As a “faith healer,” he 
promised, as Roper puts it, to be a “president as preacher,” a man “who had repented 
and been saved.”42 John and Betty Pope, two of Carter’s close friends and members 
of his voluntary campaign team dubbed “The Peanut Brigade,” observed first-hand 
the importance of Carter’s faith. They recalled that one question that they were 
asked time and again as they travelled from door to door canvassing for Carter was 
“Is he a good man, is he a Christian?”43 Many of the people they canvassed “tried to 
equate the J.C. -Jimmy Carter and Jesus Christ,” especially, they said, given Carter’s 
interest in carpentry.44 One campaign aide admitted of Carter’s faith, “It may not go 
over well in the suburbs of Washington or in Manhattan or Beverly Hills, but it goes 
over well with the rest of the country.”45 Even Carter’s own campaign biography, 
was published by Broadman Press, a producer of Southern Baptist inspirational 
literature.46 The dust jacket featured two other Broadman publications: “Modem 
Stories of Inspiration” featuring “true stories of people who have heard God through 
the clouds and in the middle of the storm” and, revealingly, “Politics and Religion 
Can Mix!”47
Evangelical Christians expected Carter’s Presidential politics to be profoundly 
shaped by his religious convictions and much of the blame for those perceptions 
must be attributed to Carter himself. Time and again during the 1976 campaign 
Carter went out of his way to raise their aspirations. In an interview with 
representatives of the National Religious Broadcasters he declared “As far as my
decisions as a political leader, they are affected very heavily by my Christian 
beliefs.”48 Interviewed by fellow evangelical Pat Robertson on the televangelist’s 
own Christian Broadcasting Network during the 1976 campaign he discussed the 
imperative “to assure that secular law is compatible with God’s laws,” with the 
proviso that if a conflict developed between the two “we should follow God’s law.”49 
Questioned about his faith and its role in his candidacy he told a reporter, “I’d like to 
exemplify as President, I hope in a humble way and a constantly searching way, the 
kind of life I would like to live as a member of a church or as a Christian.”50 Two 
months later in June 1976 Carter told reporters at Plains Baptist Church “We have a 
responsibility to try to shape government so it does exemplify the teaching of 
God.”51 In an interview with the Catholic News Service in August 1976, Carter 
declared that if elected he would “try to utilise my own religious beliefs as a constant 
guide in making decisions.” Carter also often cited the work of the theologians 
Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr and showed special fondness for Niebuhr’s 
declaration that it was the “sad duty of politics to establish justice in a sinful 
world.”53 In seeking the support of evangelicals, Carter was also helped by the 
popularity of his sister, Ruth Carter, a Christian faith healer. Campaign media 
adviser, Gerald Rafshoon, recalled that Carter took advantage of “mailing lists of 
evangelicals which Ruth helped us get.”54 Through tens of thousands of contacts in 
Christian churches Ruth gave her brother vital access to the born-again community 
that New York magazine called “his original and most loyal network of supporters.”55 
During the primary campaign Ruth Carter sent a letter to addresses on the mailing 
list of her organisation, ‘Behold inc.’ “Dear Friends” she wrote,
My reason for writing you is to acquaint you with a most important facet of 
Jimmy, one that couldn’t possibly be pursued with any depth by the press or 
television, and that is the quality of his deep personal commitment to Jesus 
Christ and his will to serve Him in whatever capacity he finds himself.
As one who knows the importance of Christ in your personal life and who 
I’m sure wants our nation to be under His blessings and guidance -  please 
pray for Jimmy. And if you share my feeling that he is the best candidate, I 
urge you to actively support him.
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Ruth Carter-Stapleton signed the letter “Sincerely in Christ.”56 Schram notes “While 
others tried to sell Carter on the basis of his grasp of governmental issues, she sold 
Carter on the basis of his belief in Christ.”57 Another member of the Carter family, 
Rosalynn, also used religious contacts to help the campaign. She travelled to 
evangelical churches to speak in favour of her husband. She told one church in 
Baltimore that her husband was “a Christian man...we need your help, so that with 
your help and the help of our Lord Jesus Christ, Jimmy Carter can be a great 
President.”58
One time when Carter’s rhetoric conspicuously mirrored the language of born-again 
Christianity was when he gave his infamous interview with Playboy magazine. 
Carter agreed to the interview to convince voters that he was not, as he put it, “an 
ignorant...rednecked Georgia peanut farmer.”59 Carter told Playboy that whilst he 
tried “not to commit a deliberate sin” he recognised that as a human he was 
“tempted,” and, what is more, Christ understood this weakness because he “set 
almost impossible standards.” According to Christ, he said, looking “on a woman 
with lust” was paramount to adultery,” and he admitted to having “committed 
adultery in my heart many times.” Because of this he did not “consider himself 
better” or more Christian than another man.60 The interview reinforced the public 
view of Carter as “odd” amongst secular commentators. But although the 
evangelical community was highly critical of the forum in which Carter chose to 
talk, the imprint of Bible-believing Protestantism on the words he chose were 
unmistakable. One priest declared that Carter’s remarks simply “sound like good 
theology.”61 Fellow Southern Baptist Deacon Jerry Clower agreed and declared in 
typically vivid evangelist language, “Any red-blooded male who says he ain’t lusted 
after a woman he’s seen is just plain out lying. When a woman puts a craving on me, 
it makes me want to run home right then to Mama.” That, he said, was all “Jimmy 
Carter was trying to say.”62
The conviction that Carter represented both a validation of their faith and the 
opportunity to realise their social agenda led those evangelicals who did participate 
in the political process to desert their traditional support for the Republican Party in 
1976. Many who had never voted before did so for the first time. It seemed that the 
prayers of conservative evangelicals had been answered. A Christian group calling
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itself Citizens for Carter took out a full-page advertisement in the evangelical 
magazine Christianity Today to ask, “Does a Dedicated Evangelical Belong in the 
White House?” The group noted, “In this post-Watergate era, people throughout the 
country are disillusioned with the moral corruption and incompetent leadership they 
see in the political arena.” Observing that “America’s problems are the result of a 
spiritual crisis at heart” and calling for “a return to decency and integrity in 
government” the advertisement lauded Carter’s “abiding sense of the importance of 
morality in our national life.” It urged evangelicals to “play an important part in this 
restoration of confidence.”63 The Reverend Bailey Smith, a popular evangelical 
preacher announced, “This country needs a bom-again man in the White House” and 
“his initial are the same as our Lord’s.”64
But despite being a committed member of the evangelical community, politically 
Carter was never, as Wills put it, “an authentic representative of their grievances.”65 
In fact, opposition to the linkage of political authority to religion lies at the core of 
Carter’s own Baptist faith; it is a defining commitment that goes right back to the 
foundation of the Baptist church in America by Roger Williams. In 1639 Williams 
established the first Baptist Church in North America at Providence, Rhode Island in 
reaction to the religious intolerance of the Puritan theocracy that governed the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony. Banished from the Colony because of his radical views, 
Williams established a haven for those whose religious convictions had incurred the 
ire of the Puritan establishment. Dismissing the belief that God had called upon the 
government of Massachusetts to establish a divine kingdom in the New World, and 
protesting the church-state union practiced in the Colony, Williams rejected the right 
of civil authorities to intervene or legislate in personal matters of religion, arguing 
that each individual possessed the right to follow their individual conscience in 
questions of faith. Instead, it was the role of government to defend this principle of 
“soul liberty.” For Williams, any attempt to enforce uniformity of religion was a 
denial of the moral role of the church. It contravened the principles of both civility 
and Christianity, damaging both the spiritual and political realms. As the final 
authority, God stood as ultimate judge between churches, doctrine and man. What 
Williams called “freedom of conscience” should never be influenced or curtailed by 
involvement with secular politics. “Williams”, observed Holifield, “stands as close 
to sainthood as any Baptist ever gets. ...every southern Baptist youngster learns in
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Sunday school the exploits of Roger Williams.”66 As Carter himself put it, “One 
thing the Baptists believe in is complete autonomy...The reason the Baptist church 
was formed in this country was because of our belief in absolute and total separation 
of church and state.”67
A President whose entire political philosophy was moulded centrally by his own 
personal religiosity was an open violation of the doctrine of separation of church and 
state. Once elected, Carter upheld his own church’s historical commitment to the 
exercise of religion free from state involvement, reminding voters of Christ’s 
admonition to “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; render unto God the 
things that are God’s.” This led contemporary commentators to characterize Carter 
as unpredictable, complex and even untrustworthy. Even while announcing his 1976 
Presidential election victory to be a “political miracle” Time commented upon the 
Carter “enigma.” Noting his fondness for quoting Kierkegaard that “every man is 
an exception,” Time said it was “a view that certainly fits him.”69 Subsequent 
analysts have also tended to interpret Carter’s separation of his religion and politics 
as evidence of inconsistency and paradox. While White observed that Carter’s 
personality had two intersecting layers, Strong quipped in response that this 
“probably short-changes him.”70 Mazlish and Diamond felt that Carter fought “his 
own private wars” and that he had a “basic need to embrace contradictions.”71 Those 
same contradictions led William Lee Miller to entitle his biography of Carter “The 
Yankee from Georgia.” Miller called Carter both a “manager” and a “moralist” and 
was left wondering how Carter could be “liberal on Mondays, Wednesdays, and 
Fridays, conservative on Thursdays and Saturdays, mixedly moderate on
72Tuesdays.” According to another observer Carter had “more positions than the 
Kama Sutra.”73
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Religion and its limits within the Carter Presidency
Evangelical Christians helped secure the election of the most avowedly devout 
President in the nation’s history in 1976 and notably, Carter’s vision for America in 
his inaugural address concerned itself much more with faith than policy. The New 
York Times called the speech “less rallying cry than sermon,” as Carter embraced the 
evangelical vision of moral and spiritual renewal and presented a re-affirmation of 
old-time American values.74 In one of the shortest inaugurals ever he admitted that 
he had “no new dream to set forth” but instead wanted to generate “fresh faith” in the 
existing American dream. Invoking the nation’s “inner and spiritual strength,” he 
recited the admonition of the Old Testament prophet Micah (6:8): “He hath showed 
thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, 
and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God.” Carter declared that America 
was “the first society openly to define itself in terms of...spirituality.” The nation 
needed once again leam to “work together and pray together,” to renew its “search 
for humility, mercy, and justice.” America, he said significantly, had learned “that 
‘more’ was not necessarily ‘better.’” What was important was “we simply do our 
best.”75 According to one reporter, Carter presented himself as a leader who like 
Isaiah and Jeremiah would “pronounce God’s judgement” from “the very centre of 
political power.”76 This was truly revolutionary, repositioning a spiritual impetus at 
the core of American civilisation and renewing the spiritual values held to be central 
to both its foundations and future.
In practice, however, Christian conservatives quickly become disillusioned with the 
Carter Presidency. Archival evidence suggests that the Carter White House failed to 
recognise or successfully respond to the growing alienation of what should have been 
the President’s most natural constituency, the evangelical Christian community. This 
happened in spite of repeated advice from within the community itself. In one letter 
Carter was explicit in explaining why, even though he was a devout Southern Baptist 
evangelical, he had let this situation develop. Precisely because he was a Southern 
Baptist, he was committed, spiritually, to the doctrine of separation of church and 
state. In January 1977 Reverend Robert Maddox, a Southern Baptist minister from
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Calhoun, Georgia, contacted the White House advising the President of the growing 
need to build bridges between the administration and the conservative Christian 
constituency. He recommended himself as a liaison to act as a “lightening rod” for
77contact between the two. Maddox wrote to Carter:
It occurs to me that the nations of the world need a pastor. Surely our own 
country needs a pastor...you can speak to that gnawing hunger in the 
American and international spirit by carefully making evident and living out 
who, in fact, you are...There are no easy, slick ways to pastor this 
nation...Mr President, make more evident that spiritual dimension of your 
leadership. Be a spiritual catalyst. Call us to greatness.78
The President declined the invitation, telling Maddox, as he puts it, “thanks but no 
thanks.”79 Carter scrawled that he did “not want a national pastor” on Maddox's 
request. White House aides wrote a routine form letter reply, but Carter rejected it, 
choosing instead to reply to Maddox in person, carefully outlining his response. He 
was at pains to point out the difference between religious leaders like Maddox and 
men of religiosity who held secular office like himself. Although he noted, “it goes 
without saying that I will continue to make my personal witness,” he told Maddox 
“You and I both subscribe to the doctrine of separation of Church and State, and I 
trust that you and others who are not restrained by Constitutional limitations will 
continue to provide leadership in spiritual affairs.”80 When the White House finally 
realised the need to appoint an advisor for religious affairs, and brought Maddox into 
the administration in 1979, the evangelicals were already beginning to turn against 
Carter. By then Maddox observed, Carter was “in pretty bad trouble with a lot of 
religious people.” In particular he was inundated with complaints from evangelical 
groups, even Southern Baptists. They were angered by what they perceived as the 
“insensitivity to the point of animosity from the administration.” Their biggest 
complaint was the lack of access to the White House. “Under Johnson and Nixon 
they could get in and get things done,” recalls Maddox, “but they couldn’t find 
anyone to work with in the Carter White House.” Many had expected that Carter 
would bring Christians into influential positions in government but Maddox recalls 
that they were angry that there were “no evangelicals other than Carter in the 
government. The perception was [that] all the people who he [Carter] had
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surrounded himself with were Godless. They couldn’t speak the language of the 
Bible.” Maddox was especially concerned that members of Carter’s own
denomination shared these complaints. “That frightened me,” he said. “If he was in
81trouble with Southern Baptist leaders, what would he be [in] with the others?”
The Carter White House’s unwillingness to reach out to the religious community, 
especially those on the political right, was a serious error with long-term electoral 
consequences. Ironically that failure was a response to criticism over close 
involvement with Southern Baptists early in the Presidency that had left Carter open 
to the stinging charge that he was blurring the line between religion and politics. 
Carter’s private correspondence reveals that he became progressively more 
uncomfortable with being perceived as allowing his religion to influence his actions 
as President. Early in his Presidency he had invited leaders of the Southern Baptist 
Convention (SBC) to meet at the White House to discuss Baptist missionary strategy. 
Included in the ten invitees was Reverend Charles Trentham, pastor of Carter’s own 
church in Washington. At the meeting Carter mapped out an aggressive 
proselytising strategy for the church’s missionary program. In particular, he urged 
the SBC to create an international missionary corps. He told the guests, “The test of 
a church is not in its building or in its staff, but in the number reached for Christ.”82 
Carter touted the hugely successful missionary program of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) as an example to follow. A week later, Carter 
appeared on videotape at the Southern Baptist annual convention, in which he urged 
the SBC to increase their missionary efforts. “There is an immediate, documented 
need to increase the number of foreign missionaries by 50 percent,” he told the 
convention, “but our official approved goal for the rest of this century is only 2.5 
percent.” Carter pledged “I can and will support a volunteer missionary for two 
years.”83 In direct response to Carter’s urging the SBC Executive Committee revised 
its missionary plans, and voted to adopt the President’s proposed strategy as its 
policy and mission programme for the following five years, pledging to double their 
home and foreign mission force by 1982. Carter called “Bold Mission Thrust” an 
“innovative convention programme designed to expand the global evangelistic effort 
of Baptists.”84 The Southern Baptist Convention was overjoyed at Carter’s 
intervention. One SBC leader wrote to the White House describing it as “the best 
thing that had ever happened to a Southern Baptist Convention.” Carter had
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“electrified the convention.” Another wrote, “It meant a great deal to the Baptists, 
who are very proud of their President, to have him say something to them 
especially.”85
Carter was immediately accused not only of church-state interference but also of 
undue denominational favouritism. Perhaps aware of the difficulties even fellow 
evangelicals had experienced in getting access to the President, Jack U. Harwell, 
editor of the Christian Index and a friend of Carter’s, wrote to the President’s brother 
Jack with an urgent warning that he wanted to be sure reached the President. He 
warned of his “grave concern” that Carter would be “accused of using the White 
House to plot denominational strategy” and of “establishing some kind of Baptist 
Vatican on the Potomac.” He reminded the President that Southern Baptists had 
fought hard against the election of John Kennedy “because they thought he would do 
with the Roman Catholic hierarchy just this very thing.” He reminded Carter that 
Baptists have historically stood as “absolute champions of religious liberty and 
separation of church and state” calling it “our greatest contribution to Christendom.” 
Harwell feared that “to call the denominational leadership into the White House and 
to discuss details of missionary strategy and for the President to make concrete 
suggestions which become denominational policy, throws you and Southern Baptists 
open to some extremely serious criticism.” Chastised, Carter replied personally to 
Harwell. He defended his right to meet with the Baptist leaders, writing “I live at the 
White House, and as was the case at the Georgia Governor’s Mansion, have felt free 
to discuss religious matters with other Baptists.” However, Carter went on “Your 
concern troubles me a great deal” and admitted, “perhaps a meeting place outside my 
public home (in a hotel perhaps) would have been better.” Reaffirming his belief in 
church-state separation he vowed “not to use my authority to violate this in any way” 
because “obviously, I realise that I, as President, have a special influence.” He ended 
his letter, “Jack, I trust your judgement about matters such as this and will be 
careful.” Pledging to consult his own pastor, he promised to ensure “that Baptists
QiT
have no reason to be concerned about my actions in future.” Thereafter Carter did 
not allow himself to be overtly politically linked to the evangelical Christian 
community: in a sense he overcompensated at the expense of the Christian 
conservatives, rejecting their overtures so as to signal that he was a President who 
happened to be a Southern Baptist, not a Southern Baptist President beholden to the
16
edicts of religious fundamentalism. After all, his office as President was defined by 
the Constitution, not by the Southern Baptist faith and message. This manifested 
itself in Carter’s approach to a number of so-called “hot button” Christian 
conservative issues, including abortion rights, religious education, gender equality 
and gay rights.
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TIMMY CARTER AND THE ABORTION RIGHTS 
ISSUE
This chapter will show that a key issue that marked the intrusion of highly 
contentious religious-cultural issues into the political debate during the Carter 
Presidency was abortion. This issue was emblematic of both the engagement of 
religious conservatives in political life in this period and of the limitations of Carter 
as their authentic political agent because Carter responded according to the specifics 
of his faith and not according to the expectations of Christian conservatives. 
Abortion powerfully brings into focus Carter’s seemingly contradictory 
commitments; on the one hand to old-time religious values and their importance in 
the political arena, and on the other, to the maintenance of constitutional separation 
between the affairs of the church and the state. This manifested itself in Carter’s 
approach to a number of so-called ‘hot button’ Christian conservative issues, in 
particular abortion rights. Because he felt constrained by the Constitution, he was 
unwilling to use the executive office to advocate a tightening of abortion laws. For 
Christian conservatives, it was an issue that brought Carter’s failure to uphold 
religious imperatives starkly into focus.
The tension between Carter and Christian evangelicals over the abortion issue was 
ironic in that it had been the Carter candidacy that had done most to politicise 
abortion as an issue for evangelicals in the first place. Though the word ‘abortion’ 
does not appear in the Bible, opposition to abortion was always an issue of faith for 
evangelicals, with a basis in Scripture.1 Critchlow has observed that up and beyond 
Roe vs Wade in 1973, political opposition to abortion rights “remained primarily a 
Catholic issue,” with an anti-Catholic bias keeping evangelical Protestants from 
involvement in the pro-life campaign. Involvement would also have required an 
abandonment of their political non-interventionist position to challenge the United 
States Supreme Court, the ultimate authority of legal jurisprudence in a nation 
evangelicals perceived to have been built around the tenets of their Protestant faith.
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The Carter candidacy was critical in changing their perception. He was not alone in 
catalysing abortion into a political issue but the candidacy of a born-again Southern 
Baptist brought it to the forefront of Presidential politics and greatly energised 
evangelical involvement. Specifically it drew evangelical denominations, especially 
fundamentalist Independent Baptists and the Pentecostal Assemblies of God, into the 
pro-life movement. After observing that the 1976 election re-enfranchised 
evangelical Christians and brought them into the political arena with gusto after 
years of political apathy, O’Connor points out, “Carter and his administration’s 
handling of abortion provided an impetus for further anti-abortion organisation,” an 
impetus that spread nationally to the point where “the evangelical Christian right’s 
opposition to abortion was embraced in the highest places in Washington.”3
A further irony was that Carter was in fact personally extremely conservative on the 
abortion issue. During the 1976 primary and Presidential campaigns, Carter made 
his conservative personal views on the issue obvious to anti-abortion groups. Calling 
abortion “wrong,” he announced that abortion rights as they stood after Roe vs. Wade 
were “one instance where my own beliefs were in conflict with the laws of our 
country.”4 Although he told a meeting of Catholic Bishops in Washington that he 
would act only “under the laws which I would be sworn to enforce” and “within the 
confines of the Supreme Court ruling,” he then went out of his way to say that any 
citizen was entitled to lobby for an amendment to overturn the Roe v. Wade 
decision.5 He also declared his opposition to the routine federal funding of abortions. 
His conservative views on the issue led Carter to clash with pro-choice feminists at 
the 1976 Democratic convention. Disavowing the official, pro-choice party platform 
that declared a constitutional amendment to overturn the Supreme Court decision on 
abortion to be “undesirable,” he reaffirmed his belief that “abortion is wrong.”6
Opponents and supporters alike believed that Carter was vulnerable on the abortion 
issue. President Gerald Ford’s re-election campaign quickly recognised that the 
issue might cause Carter political difficulties and sought to take advantage. 
Campaign aide Pat Buchanan told the President that he should announce “my 
opponent says he dislikes abortion—but will do nothing to stop them...That’s what 
he calls leadership.” Carter’s political positions, he said “are like the weather in New 
England. If you don’t like it, just wait a minute; it will change.”7 One Ford
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campaign memorandum regarding abortion declared that Carter was “vulnerable on 
this issue.”8 Another told Ford that he should “make a very striking contrast with 
Carter” on the abortion issue.9
Concerned Democrats even contacted the Carter campaign in an attempt to help him 
overcome his difficulties with the abortion issue. In mid-September 1976 Barbara 
Nixon, a member of Senator Birch Bayh’s staff wrote to Stuart Eizenstat, “I really 
regretted the governor’s statement on federal funding [of abortions].” She 
counselled Carter to “do as the White House and deny comment.”10 Bayh himself 
also wrote to Carter. Claiming that he had “been picketed longer and been called 
more dirty names on this issue than anyone else in America,” he warned the 
Governor, “this issue will not disappear” and there was “no way you can win votes.” 
Bayh told Carter not to attempt to win the support of “the voters who represent the 
militant right to life group,” many of whom were conservative Christians. It was 
“impossible to gain the support of this group,” he said.11 Another Democratic 
Congressman, William R. Roy also wrote to Carter. He warned, “Do not waffle...if 
you waffle, you lose general creditability and become ‘another politician.’” Roy 
concluded, “Abortion will remain an issue. You cannot ignore it, forget it, not 
mention it, compromise on it, or get angry about it.” Rather, he urged Carter, “you
1 9must have a positive plan to deal with it.” Carter’s own campaign team also
became worried. One memorandum, from two campaign aides to Eizenstat warned
that the press were reporting the abortion issue was evidence of Carter’s “flexibility
under pressure.” “The greatest damage [to Carter]” they wrote, “may be with respect
to voters who could care less about abortion but are concerned about whether he is a
political opportunist because he seems to be trying to come down on all sides of the
issue.” Carter needed to “regain stability on the issue.” To this end they warned, “He
shouldn’t meet any further with anti-abortion leaders...While this approach would
close the door on the votes of the single-issue, pro-life voters, it is worth stemming
1 ^the losses among those voters concerned about his consistency.” Despite their 
advice abortion rights, and particularly the perception that he was inconsistent in his 
position on the issue, continued to be troublesome for Carter.
Once in office, Carter named Joseph A. Califano, a veteran of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations and a devout Catholic, as his Secretary of Health, Education
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and Welfare. The HEW was the department responsible for overseeing Medicaid, 
the health cost assistance program for the poor, and this included the public funding 
of abortion. Carter told Califano that he wanted a “good Catholic” to advance his 
anti-abortion policy. Califano, who believed that Carter’s stand on abortion was 
sincere and a critical factor in his 1976 election victory, held strongly pro-life 
sentiments. Califano argued against the use of federal funds to pay for abortion and 
believed his view to be shared precisely by the President. “Carter never asked my 
views on the subject and I never expressed them,” recalled Califano; the two men 
“simply assumed complete agreement.”14
Given the nomination of Califano and the sincerity of Carter’s evangelical faith, it is 
unsurprising that Carter’s oft-repeated promise that he would be bound by the Roe 
vs. Wade decision received little attention from the evangelical community. 
Certainly his promise that he would remain “within the framework of the decision of 
the Supreme Court” on abortion, made during his infamous 1976 Playboy interview, 
was unlikely to have been widely read by evangelical Christians.15 Blinded by their 
religious expectations, evangelical voters either failed to notice Carter’s theological 
peculiarities or disregarded them as necessary electoral expediency.16 So eager were 
they to elect a born-again to the White House, and so hungry for national acceptance, 
Ribuffo notes that evangelicals “paid scant attention to Carter’s theology and 
overlooked political differences to embrace him as one of their own.”17 Similarly, 
Baker explains that evangelicals quickly, but mistakenly, dismissed his liberal 
statements as “the natural compassion of a Christian heart.” It might be 
“wrongheaded” but was “well intended.”18
As a result abortion became a highly contentious political issue that plagued Jimmy 
Carter. Moreover, according to Rev. Robert Maddox abortion became “the flag 
issue” for religious conservative groups. Maddox observed that the inevitable clash 
was one the Carter White House “walked into.”19 Christian conservatives viewed the 
availability of abortion as indicative of the erosion of modern America’s moral 
consensus over the traditional role of the family. Likewise, federal protection of 
abortion rights was evidence of the depraved influence of secular humanism in 
Washington. The President’s unwillingness to negate the pro-abortion advances 
represented by Roe vs. Wade fundamentally alienated evangelicals. To them, it made
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his professions of Christian piety ring false. Their perception of the Carter White 
House was worsened further by the appointment of the high profile pro-choice 
advocate, Margaret “Midge” Costanza as a Presidential assistant. A former vice­
mayor of Rochester, New York and long time Carter supporter the feisty and 
outspoken Costanza was the first woman to hold the post. She held aggressively
feminist views, leading one Christian to write to Carter to complain that the
20appointment of the “raucously pro-abortion” Costanza was a “slap in the face.” It 
is possible that Carter made the appointment in an attempt to placate pro-abortionists 
infuriated by the nomination of Califano. Whatever the reasoning behind her 
appointment, Costanza’s position proved troublesome in that it internalised dissent 
for the President’s position on abortion within the administration.
This internal opposition crystallised after the President made clear in 1977 his support 
of the Hyde Amendment prohibiting Medicaid financing of abortion except when 
necessary to preserve the mother’s life, prevent severe and long-lasting physical 
health damage, or when the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. Carter was 
concerned that the Hyde amendment’s regulations be strictly enforced so that women 
were not able to use the rape and incest exemption to obtain an abortion deceitfully. 
At Carter’s behest, Califano was indeed strict in his implementation of the 
amendment. His view was clearly outlined in a letter Califano wrote to Daniel 
Flood, chairman of the subcommittee on Labour, Health, Education and Welfare. He 
wrote,
Federal funding of abortions should be restricted to two situations: first, 
where a doctor certifies that in his or her opinion the life of the mother would 
be endangered if the foetus were carried to term; and second, for the victims, 
where such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement 
agency or a health facility.21
Califano supported a highly restrictive interpretation of these regulations. He 
promised to conduct “meticulous audits” to ensure compliance with the “rigorous 
enforcement requirement.” He stated his belief that the 60-day legal limit for the 
reporting of incest or rape should be cut. “In order to reduce the potential for fraud 
and abuse” he wrote, “it may be advisable to reduce that period to a shorter period of
26
time.”22 A memorandum from Joe Onek to Stuart Eizenstat, now President Carter’s 
assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy, confirmed that “Secretary Califano 
checked with the President before he testified on abortion and before [he wrote] to 
Congressman Flood.”23 Jaffe, Lindheim and Lee bemoaned the fact that under 
Califano’s leadership “Indifference to and avoidance of the implications of 
legalisation of a critical, widely sought health service were replaced by open hostility 
on the part of the pre-eminent public health official and agency in the United 
States.”24
The Hyde Amendment prevented many poor women from obtaining abortions given 
that it effectively made abortions available only to those who could pay for the 
procedure themselves. When questioned during a press conference that took place 
after the Supreme Court had upheld the Amendment and ruled that federal funding 
for abortion was not a woman’s constitutional right, the President announced that the 
ruling “ought to be interpreted very strictly.” Carter felt that federal financing of 
abortion “was an encouragement to abortion and its acceptance as a routine 
contraceptive means.” When the President was reminded of the inequity of this 
position he was dismissive, replying simply that “there are many things in life that 
are not fair, that wealthy people can afford and poor people can’t.” It was not the 
place of the federal government to attempt to make “opportunities exactly equal, 
particularly when there is a moral factor involved.”
The President’s position and his apparent insensitivity to the plight of poor women 
incurred outrage from the pro-choice movement as a whole and concern from pro- 
choice advocates within his own administration. Costanza informed the President 
the day after the press conference of the “overwhelming number of phone calls from 
public interest groups, individuals and White House staff members and agency staff 
members expressing concern and even anger over your remarks.” She suggested that 
by expressing his personal views on abortion Carter had “provided negative guidance 
to legislators and governors and interfered in a state process in an unfair way. As the 
Supreme Court ruling does not preclude the states from funding abortions, it was 
hoped by many women’s groups that the question of government support for 
abortion could be successfully raised on a state by state basis.” Costanza observed 
“the strongest and most serious criticism received has been in reaction to your
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comments emphasising the differences in opportunities available to the rich and to 
the poor.” She asked Carter to “reconsider your position and support the use of 
Federal funds for abortions when medically necessary.” Tellingly, archives reveal 
that Carter wrote “no” next to this request and that he also noted acidly in the margin 
“If I had this much influence on state legis [latures] ERA would have passed.” At 
the end of the memo, Carter scrawled “My opinion was well defined to the U.S. 
during (the) campaign.” He concluded, “My statement is actually more liberal than I 
feel personally.”26
Costanza proceeded to organise an extraordinary protest meeting of some 40 high- 
level pro-choice female administration members. Notes from the July 18, 1977 
meeting reveal that the participants “expressed their dismay” with the President’s 
position and wanted to “get a message to the President to express their 
disappointment.” The participant’s demands included that “an impartial study be 
conducted on the impact of the curtailment of abortion/medical funds,” alongside the 
HEW carrying out a “poll of the people affected.” They demanded to know in detail 
“what plans are being developed by HEW to help poor women.” Contrasting 
Carter’s personal approach to abortion to his comprehensive and detailed evaluation 
of other complex decisions, such as defence spending, the attendees were concerned 
that he had failed “to ask the best experts on the issue for information like he did on 
the B-l bomber.” On abortion they believed he was guilty of “legislating his 
personal views.” They suggested that a meeting be set up “composed of poor women 
— the women affected by the President’s decision.”27 Carter remained resolute. “If 
the forty women had listened to my campaign statements they should know my
9 o
position,” he told the cabinet. Similarly, Press Secretary Jody Powell wrote on his 
copy of Costanza’s memorandum, “I believe the President’s position is correct. It is 
also exactly the same position he took during the campaign. Anyone who is 
surprised didn’t pay much attention.”29 Presidential aide Hamilton Jordan was 
particularly irritated. “The perception here was that she had generated the meeting 
instead of reacting to the expression of women in the administration,” Jordan wrote 
to Carter. “That such a meeting had [taken place] after a final decision was made 
and announced by you was of questionable value and inappropriate;
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I told Midge that your public position on the issue should have come as no 
surprise to anyone who had ever read your campaign statements and 
promises...For a group of women who are in high positions because of 
Jimmy Carter to question publicly one of his positions that has been known 
for over a year after he simply restates it borders on disloyalty.
Jordan asked Costanza to “think about her reaction in terms of how she would have 
reacted if several days after you had announced your decision not to build the B-l, 
another member of the staff had hosted a meeting of generals at the White House 
who opposed his decision and made public statements in opposition and circulated a 
memorandum stating that.” Jordan was especially scathing of the widespread belief, 
shared by evangelical Christians, that Costanza acted in favour only of those causes 
which she agreed with politically. He warned her of the “extent that she serves as a 
conduit to outside groups and organisations, the perception...is that she listens to 
persons espousing liberal positions and causes and not to others.” Jordan told Carter 
that the result was a public perception that the President was not in charge of his 
staff. “They work for you...they’re supposed to do your bidding; most importantly,
TOyou are fully responsible for them and their actions” said Jordan. Speechwriter 
James Fallows recalled that, unlike other administrations, “The atmosphere of high 
peril doesn’t exist” in the Carter White House. This was “one hundred percent 
because of Carter” who had “made it clear that people are not going to rise and fall 
by virtue of Machiavellianism.” This meant “People can...attack Costanza, and 
she’s not going to get fired.”31 Gerald Rafshoon was later tasked with instituting 
more “discipline” into the administration “so that you wouldn’t have cabinet 
members going off in different directions” which, he recalled “happened with the 
Midge Costanza thing.”32
Costanza and the flourishing feminist and women’s liberation movements of the era 
can be forgiven for not quite comprehending Carter’s position. To win the 1976 
Presidential election Carter had made a point of courting the liberal woman’s vote, 
creating a bond between himself, a small-town Southerner, and a traditional 
Democratic constituency. He accepted, for example, an invitation to address the 
Women’s Agenda Conference held in Washington in October 1976. He told them, 
“There have been few political developments in America in recent years that have
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impressed me more than the movement of women toward equal rights.” Accusing 
the Ford administration of having “only paid lip service to women’s rights,” of 
offering them only “vetoes, indifference” and “empty rhetoric,” he urged them to be 
“tough and militant and eloquent...and aggressive.” Alluding to the central theme of 
his Presidential campaign, a call for renewed trust in the nation’s political leadership, 
Carter declared, “We cannot expect America’s women to have faith in a government 
that ignores your legitimate needs and aspirations and excludes you.” Carter
33promised “to be the President who will implement your agenda.”
Feminist leaders like National Organisation for Women (NOW) founder Betty 
Friedan and New York Congresswomen Bella Abzug were won over. Abzug 
announced, “I think women can expect a real commitment (from Carter),” while 
Friedan believed that Carter “would do something for women...unless he’s an 
absolute liar.”34 Jimmy Carter’s strong and independent female relatives also 
impressed the movement. His mother Lillian had been an outspoken integrationist in 
a small town once rigorously segregated by Jim Crow legislation. She played a key 
role in forging Carter’s attitude to inequality and injustice. “She would never assume 
an attitude of superiority toward the black women who worked alongside her” he 
said, calling her an “enlightened and progressive Southerner” who was “known in the 
community as the only supporter of the civil rights movement on a public basis.”35 
Carter’s sister Ruth was a best-selling author and figure of national renown long 
before her brother; and his wife Rosalynn was a both a business partner in the family 
farm and a full partner in her husbands political ambitions. When Betty Friedan was 
asked why she was so impressed by Carter during the 1976 campaign, and so sure 
that he would be committed to the cause of women’s rights, she replied, “I had a 
feeling. It was the way he spoke about his mother and wife working. Given that 
the 1976 Presidential election was one of the closest in American history, the support 
of the women’s movement undoubtedly had value.
In his defence, once in power, Carter’s administration did actively seek to include 
women’s perspectives in policy making and not just on direct women’s issues. 
Carter worked energetically in support of the ERA and one of the notable 
achievements of the Carter Presidency was the appointment of more women to his 
administration than any previous President.37 However, Carter’s inflexibility on the
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abortion issue fundamentally damaged the relationship between the Carter 
administration and the women’s movement. Carter was stung by criticism from 
women activists that he had not done enough to advance their cause in making 
female appointments or in working towards ratification of the ERA. After she 
organised the protest meeting over abortion Costanza was first ostracised and then
o o
forced to resign.
Carter chose as her replacement Dr. Sarah Weddington, a lawyer whose most famous 
case had been as lead attorney for Jane Roe in the Roe vs. Wade case. Since 
Weddington was considered pro-abortion rights, it was now the Christian 
conservatives’ turn to feel cheated. They had been led to believe that instead, Carter 
would bring Christian conservatives into government. Carter had promised exactly 
this when interviewed on Pat Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network during the 
1976 campaign. One right-to-life group complained to the White House that Carter 
had met with those female Presidential assistants who opposed his stance on abortion 
and demanded that he also meet with appointees who supported a restrictive abortion 
policy.39 Worried that Carter was receiving pressure from both feminists and 
evangelicals, and concerned by the pro-life movement’s calls for a constitutional 
convention dedicated to overturning Roe vs. Wade aide Beth Abramowitz wrote to 
Eizenstat to warn of the “nightmarish implications of holding the first and only 
constitutional convention of the United States since the constitution was first 
drafted.” A convention on abortion would be troublesome for the President because 
“of its precedence setting nature, the climate of the times, and probable inability to 
control the convention once held.”40 When two Senators contacted the White House 
asking for clarification of the President’s position, Carter’s staff were clearly 
concerned that confusion over his attitude on abortion might cause further 
difficulties. Joe Onek wrote to Eizenstat, “I know you are sick of this,” but the 
“House/Senate Conferees are now meeting on abortion,” and two Senators had 
“sought clarification of [the President’s] position” regarding funding of abortions. 
He wrote a memorandum for Eizenstat to present to the President outlining the 
Senate request. Advocating caution Eizenstat wrote back, “I’ve talked to Califano. 
He feels we should stick with our general position and let them workout [the] 
details.” Abramowitz intercepted the correspondence and added her own warning to 
Eizenstat to “not bother the President” with the request.” Underlining her words for
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added effect she wrote, “For the time being. I think the less the President says about 
the subject the better.” 41
How can Carter’s behaviour concerning abortion be explained? Carter revisionist 
John Dumbrell compares Carter to Robert Pirsig, whose popular book of the time, 
Zen and the Art o f Motorcycle Maintenance, focused on harmonising the conflicts 
present in contemporary American society.42 Certainly Carter wanted to transcend 
political ideology and idealistically, he refused to be constrained in an easily defined 
political pigeonhole. He said in 1976, “I am not an ideologue and my positions are 
not predictable.”43 In Jones’s phrase, he acted “to do what is right, not what is 
political.”44 But instead of finding the political middle ground, he succeeded only in 
alienating both sides of the political spectrum. This was especially clear during the 
debate on abortion in which each side remained utterly adamant that theirs was the 
only conceivably humane position. The key fact is that Carter was not prepared to 
actively use the office of the Presidency to constitutionally suppress abortion rights, 
but neither was he prepared to support federal funding for it. This was a nuanced 
position and one entirely in keeping with his faith. Dumbrell points out that it was in 
fact “logically and constitutionally sound” and furthermore, had been made 
“abundantly clear” during the election campaign.45 Unfortunately, in a debate 
governed by emotive Biblical rhetoric, constitutional adherence carried little weight. 
Carter’s non-interventionist approach to Presidential power, and his vision of the 
President’s role as being above politics, was untenable on volatile issues around 
which neither side could be reconciled. Like Christ, Carter required faith in his 
leadership from his flock and for them to exercise right-thinking of their own free 
will, rather than at the behest of an all-powerful authority. Far from being a post- 
1960s Zen harmoniser, Carter’s Presidential politics were intrinsically Christian, and 
modelled not on Eastern spiritualism but on a Southern Baptist interpretation of 
God’s leadership of a fallen world and the example of his son, Jesus Christ.
Anti-abortion Christian conservatives found Carter’s position unsatisfactory. 
Califano recalled that pro-lifers were suspicious because “Carter’s colours blurred on 
the litmus test of supporting a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion.”46 
Despite Carter’s unequivocal personal disapproval of abortion, his refusal to back a 
constitutional amendment, coupled with his appointment of high profile pro-choice
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Presidential assistants like Costanza, Weddington, and Anne Wexler, meant that, as 
Maddox recalled, Carter soon got into “in deep trouble” with Christian conservatives. 
The mainline clergy “understood the ambiguity of the President’s positions, most 
Southern Baptists did, the religious academic community were with the President. 
But the man in the pew, particularly the more conservative he was, and the 
conservative clergy [they] were really set against Jimmy Carter.” Despite his efforts 
“There was no dealing with them...They were screaming about secular humanism 
and they were gonna get him on abortion,” said Maddox; it was “an out and out 
hatchet job.”47 Faced with this anti-Carter sentiment, Maddox met with religious 
pro-life advocates to try and explain Carter’s position. In one meeting Maddox 
talked with religious leaders who lambasted Carter’s policy on abortion. Maddox 
defended the President, telling them that Carter was “willing to struggle with difficult 
moral questions -  not to just pass a law so abortion will go away.”48 It was no use. 
As one aide to Jerry Falwell recalled, evangelicals simply “couldn’t understand how 
a born-again Christian could ever become an abortionist run wild.”49 When Maddox 
countered that Carter was in fact opposed to abortion, the conservative Christians 
replied that Carter’s “actions speak louder than his words” because he’s got [Anne] 
Wexler and [Sarah] Weddington.” They told Maddox “He can’t be a Christian.” “I 
eventually convinced them that he was,” recalled Maddox, to which they replied, 
“well he isn’t much of one.”50
Carter and the Rise of the New Christian Right
As soon as Carter took office, members of the Christian community attempted to 
warn the new President of the pressing need to reach out politically to religious 
leaders. In February 1977, James Wall, the editor of Christian Century, wrote to 
Midge Costanza to warn her of the need for the President to do just that. “Since the 
key term in relating to the White House is ‘access,’” wrote Wall, “I think it is 
important now to establish an informal relationship with these leaders so that in the 
future mutual concerns could be examined and discussed. It is my understanding
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that under John Kennedy, the White House did relate in this positive fashion with 
Protestant leaders,” but this relationship “broke down over the Vietnam War.” When 
no meeting was forthcoming, Wall wrote again in June. He asked Fran Voorde and 
Greg Schneiders, “Has anyone in the White House pondered strategy for relating the 
President to the religious communities?” Wall wrote, “On any list of priority visits 
to the President, I would have thought key religious leaders would have a priority.” 
Warning, “The Christian community in this country does not possess one voice,” he 
wrote “Now is the time to quietly build bridges to these church leaders.” Carter 
should meet with mainline Protestants, Catholic leaders and evangelicals such as the 
President of the Southern Baptist Convention. Wall concluded, “I hope some overall 
strategy is being considered in this connection.”51
It soon became clear that no such coherent strategy had been formulated. Several 
key memoranda of 1979 plot the Carter White House’s deteriorating relationship 
with the forces of Christian conservatism. They show Carter unable to retain or 
capitalise upon the support of evangelical Christians after the 1976 election, even 
though members of the administration warned of the dire consequences that would 
result. In a memo dated July 27, Religious Liaison Reverend Maddox told Carter, 
“A vast chunk of Christendom that past Administrations have overlooked is the 
conservative, fundamentalist group. Independent Baptists, Methodists, many 
Pentecostal groups and a huge ‘television’ church congregation make up this 40 
million constituency...Their politics tend to be very conservative, even rightist. 
Careful, constructive contact...needs to be developed.” Though Maddox pointed out 
their political incompatibility with the administration, he observed, “Most are 
genuinely concerned about people and the nation.” Contact between them and the 
administration he felt, “could soften their political rhetoric and tap their strengths to 
help realise some of President Carter’s transcendent goals for the country.”52
A second Maddox memorandum, sent in late August 1979, once again strongly urged 
Carter to engage with religious conservative leaders. By now evangelical preachers 
like Jerry Falwell were openly voicing their disillusionment with the President on 
their popular syndicated television shows. Of even greater concern, Maddox warned 
the President of a new development: disparate conservative religious groups were 
beginning to agitate politically. “The coalescing of conservative, evangelical,
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religious groups for political action,” he told the President “is one of the most 
important political phenomenon [sic.] of our day.” He told the President that 
religious leaders felt Carter had legitimated political engagement for evangelical 
Christians: “The left/liberals have been politically active for decades, now the 
conservatives are gathering. The Carter Presidency with its emphasis on religion has 
been a spur to bring these folks together.” They were beginning to ask, Maddox 
said, “If he can be political, why can’t we?” Maddox warned that conservative 
religious groups were rallying around concerns over pro-family issues such the ERA, 
and gay rights and foreign policy issues such as superpower competition with the 
Soviet Union. Some, like Falwell were particularly agitated by Carter’s stance on 
abortion.53 Religious activists that had mobilised on these diverse issues were 
beginning to form into more unified pressure groups and “at least two groups among 
several are emerging: Christian Voice and Moral Majority.” With an eye on the 
1980 election, Maddox told the administration:
As a group they have been to [prospective Presidential candidate John] 
Connally’s ranch in Texas but by their own word came away unimpressed. 
They plan to talk with other Republican leaders. They are fervently anti- 
Kennedy [Massachusetts Senator Teddy Kennedy, another prospective 
candidate] at this time. If I am a judge they are Republican in sentiment but 
so far no Republican has emerged whom they could freely support. Even 
though they have serious reservations about the President -SALT, Prayer in 
Public Schools, Panama Canal, etc., my feeling is they would like to be able 
[underlining in original] to support the President. They have no question 
about his character and Christian faith. Religion for religion they are near the 
President’s own faith -  personal, experiential, politically involved.
Were the administration to actively engage Christian conservative leaders they would 
be “much more inclined to look to him, not only for 1980, but to get behind some of 
the crucial Administration programs right now.” The leaders Maddox urged the 
President to contact included Jerry Falwell (described by Maddox as the “Unofficial 
leader of the group”), Dr Bob Billings (Executive Director of Moral Majority), Dr 
Pat Robertson (host of a popular Christian television chat show, later candidate for 
the Republican Party Presidential nomination), Dr Adrian Rogers (whom Maddox 
said was “conservative, but reasonable”), and Bob Jones III, President of an 
ultrafundamentalist university (described by Maddox as “Extremely conservative on
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every issue).” Maddox concluded by warning, “Several of the men have huge TV 
audiences...they have money and an eagerness to become politically involved. My 
very strong feeling is that the President should talk to these men.”54
Still the White House refused to act. On October 5, 1979 an increasingly desperate 
Maddox wrote to the President and the First Lady. Conservative religious leaders, he 
warned again, “are moving into the political arena” and now they brought with them 
“grave misgivings” about Carter’s policies. Maddox wrote, “Most of them will 
eventually endorse a candidate using their television programs as a forum...If they 
sufficiently mobilize their forces along their stated lines, they will be a significant 
factor in the 1980 election.” Maddox feared that “they will set up a ‘Christian Party 
Line’ insisting that all born-again Christians have to buy into a set of political 
stands.” Despite their concerns, Maddox stressed, “Given half a chance...most of 
them want to support the President” and that “Careful but sustained contact 
with...conservative leaders needs to be maintained.”55
In a fourth memorandum dated October 22nd Maddox and Presidential Assistant 
Anne Wexler renewed the request that the President and evangelical leaders meet “to 
discuss several issues of importance to the men and their constituents.” The most 
pressing issues were abortion, prayer in public schools, and the tax status of private 
Christian schools. The Christian conservatives were adamant about the need to put 
evangelicals in the White House. Maddox and Wexler asked, “Would the President 
seek a politically qualified and clearly identifiable evangelical to be on his senior 
staff?” They admitted that the meeting was a risk, writing, “We take our chances of 
legitimatising these men with a Presidential visit. They can go away saying ‘We saw 
the President and told him a thing or two.’” Yet the two advisors believed that 
Carter’s “Christian faith would come through in such a manner that they would be 
much more inclined to look to him.” Furthermore, they warned Carter that the 
evangelical leaders were meeting with other leading Presidential candidates, one of 
whom was Ronald Reagan. They believed, “to ignore their presence and clout would 
be to ignore a source of political support” but the time to build support amongst the 
evangelical community was growing short.56
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By 1980, Maddox saw his role within the administration as primarily being one of 
“putting out fires” in the relationship between the White House and the Christian 
Right who were by now “deeply set against Jimmy Carter.”57 Typical of such 
“brushfires” was a new book by fundamentalist Tim LaHaye that described Vice- 
President Walter Mondale as being affiliated with the Unitarian Church and accused 
him of being a “Secular Humanist” who Carter “should never have named....as Vice 
President.” Knowing that Mondale was in fact active in the Presbyterian Church, 
Maddox “investigated” and found that he had “a brother who is a Unitarian 
minister.” Although he had called LaHaye, who was now “hastily re-writing his 
book,” Maddox told Anne Wexler he was being forced to “keep...fire extinguishers 
close at hand.”58 In another memorandum to Wexler, Tom Laney and Maddox 
warned, “The anti-abortion people are making a lot of noise again.” A conservative 
Christian group called Intercessors for America had contacted the White House. 
“They trace the moral, military and economic decline of our nation to the Supreme 
Court ruling on abortion” wrote Laney, and “These people are deeply dissatisfied 
with President Carter’s record.”59
Desperate to rectify matters, in August 1980 Maddox tried another tack. He sent 
Rosalynn Carter a memorandum about the urgent need to develop a “Religious 
Strategy.” His recommendations included planning a “Grass roots People’s 
Meeting,” an interview with religious television and a “Briefing and Presidential 
drop by with major religious weekly and monthly magazines and journals.” Maddox 
advised that these “could be an opportunity for them to get his views on the ‘flag 
moral issues.’” Realising that Carter had lost the support of religious conservatives, 
Maddox stressed the importance of allowing “the Christian community to get a 
clearer idea of who the President is and why he has taken certain positions.” In 
particular, Maddox advised that the President attend a prayer breakfast of labour and 
management representatives. He noted their, and perhaps his, sense of frustration 
with the administration: “They have tried for three years to get the President.”60
When White House staff did attempt to build support within faith communities they 
revealed their underestimation of the politically conservative nature of the 
evangelical community. When Carter sought the support of Christians he reached 
out not to conservative evangelists but to liberal church leaders. Typical of this was
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a visit Maddox made to New York in August 1979 to meet religious leaders. He met 
with ministers who supported negotiation with the Soviet Union, unilateral 
disarmament, wealth redistribution and human rights issues. Not one of them was 
theologically or politically conservative, indeed Maddox notes that one, Dr William 
S. Coffin of Riverside Church, was “probably too liberal, or perceived as such, to be 
very effective.”61 Perhaps still fearing that such meetings could be conceived as an 
undue mixing of church and state, when Carter met with a number of liberal 
Christian leaders at the White House in August 1980 a note from Phil Wise to Anne 
Wexler preceding the meetings warned that given their sensitivity the discussions 
should kept ‘Off Record.’62 Still Carter remained unconvinced of the need to address 
politicised evangelicalism. When asked in late 1980 about television evangelists like 
Falwell, Robertson and LaHaye his reply revealed his lack of foresight regarding 
their future electoral impact. “I don't think that over a long period of time” he said,
63“that kind of a religious intrusion into the political process will be significant.”
When Carter did ask Maddox specifically to contact a leading evangelist he once 
again revealed his ignorance of the newly emergent conservative Christian leaders 
like Falwell and Robertson. Instead, Carter asked his Religious Liaison to contact 
Billy Graham. Carter had once led a Billy Graham crusade in Sumter County, 
Georgia, and whilst state governor had told the United Methodist General 
Conference that the evangelist had “had a great impression and impact on my own 
life.”64 Despite this, the two evangelicals were not close. Critics suspected a rift 
between the two because of Carter’s oft-stated admiration for Reinhold Niebuhr, the 
theologian who had been a harsh critic of Graham’s political involvement during the 
1950s. Graham was also wary of further political activity. During the 1976 
Presidential election he had refused to publicly endorse either Carter or Gerald Ford. 
In the face of consistent attempts by the Ford campaign team to utilise Graham’s 
close friendship with the President for electoral gain, Graham wrote to Ford that he 
was “maintaining a neutral position” and praying only that “the man of God’s choice 
will be elected.”65 His association with Richard Nixon had embarrassed Graham. “I 
learned my lesson the hard way,” Graham had said of his support for the disgraced 
former President.66 Graham told the Los Angeles Times that “I would rather have a 
man in office who is highly qualified to be President who didn’t make much of a
38
religious profession,” a statement that some Carter aides, including the candidate
• • 67himself, interpreted as a refusal to support Carter’s overtly religious candidacy.
Maddox sought to meet with the evangelist to try and convince him to publicly 
declare his support for the Carter administrations policies, specifically on SALT and 
the ERA.68 A public announcement by Graham in support of Carter might, the White 
House hoped, placate some anti-Carter evangelical sentiment. Carter’s Presidential 
diary showed a number of private telephone conversations did take place between the 
President and Graham but although the evangelist agreed to meet with Maddox at his 
home in August 1979, he refused to speak publicly in favour of Carter. Maddox 
recalls that “Graham felt he had received the freeze-out treatment from the White 
House,” and he admitted, “There was estrangement” between the President and the 
evangelist. There had been “no thought of inviting him for personal time with the 
President.” He also observed “senior staff members complain about the 
evangelist.”69 As with his efforts to enlist the support of other evangelical leaders, 
Maddox failed to win over Graham. Private correspondence between Graham and 
Gerald Ford revealed the evangelist’s personal and partisan political views. In 
November 1976 he wrote to Ford expressing his “warmest Christian affection” for 
the former President and of his disappointment with the election result, observing 
that “you will go down in history as one of America’s great Presidents,” and that “Mr 
Carter should be asking himself how he came so close to losing.” Carter had been 
elected, he said, “For some mysterious reason unknown to us.”70 Furthermore, and 
unknown to Maddox and the White House, Graham had already expressed support 
for the agenda of the Christian Right. At a meeting with evangelical leaders in 
Dallas he had encouraged them to political action. Adrian Rogers, Pat Robertson, 
James Robison and Bill Bright were present. Graham told them “I believe God has 
shown me that unless we have a change in America, we have a thousand days as free 
nation...three years.” Graham excused himself from direct political involvement 
saying, “I can only pray. I’ve been burned so badly with the public relationships I’ve 
had. I can’t afford it,” but “I care so much.” According to Bright, each evangelist
71committed themselves to political action. “We’re going to get involved,” they said.
On September 8 1980 a final memorandum on religious strategy was sent to the 
President and this time, someone from Carter’s inner circle had begun to listen. With
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the Presidential election just weeks away, Wexler, Maddox and press secretary Jody 
Powell, one of Carter’s closest and most trusted advisers, urged the President to 
shore up his support amongst the evangelical community by conducting an interview 
with a religious television channel. “The interview would focus on you as a man of 
faith” they wrote. They advised the President “Conservative Christians need to hear 
your views accurately and will not without such an interview.” Questions would 
focus on areas of the Presidency of specific interest to evangelicals, such as “How 
has your Christian faith worked itself out since you have been in the White House?” 
and “How do you maintain yourself spiritually? What place does the family have in 
your life?” It would “explore your views on the ‘flag’ moral issues, such as prayer in 
public schools, abortion, homosexuality and the ERA.” They also recommended that 
Jim Bakker and Pat Robertson should “sit in on the interview.” Even though the two 
high profile evangelical preachers were not going to directly participate, by 
associating Carter with Bakker and Robertson, the Presidential advisors felt that 
“their presence on camera would add great strength to the interview.” Perhaps 
because he had belatedly recognised the importance of his reaching out to the by now
79flourishing Religious Right, Carter ticked his approval of the suggestion.
Carter “Unborn” Again
Back in 1976, Carter’s profile as a man of sincere and serious faith held great 
currency for the growing American evangelical community. His candidacy and 
Presidency had galvanised the political mobilisation of evangelical Christians 
through articulation of his own, deeply held religious faith and his interjection of 
openly spiritual themes into the body politic. He had tapped into the rapidly 
expanding evangelical constituency, acting as a catalyst for their widespread re-entry 
into politics for the first time since the 1920s. Unfortunately for Carter, after having 
drawn them into politics, he failed to retain evangelicals’ support. It became 
apparent that Carter’s understanding of the relationship between Christianity and 
politics bore little resemblance to their own. By 1980 it was obvious to Christian
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conservatives that a Democratic President, whether a fellow evangelical or not, was 
not enough to ensure promotion of their agenda on the national political stage. The 
more the Carter administration refused to reverse the liberal advances of the previous 
decade, the more the Christian Right as an organised force mustered political 
strength.
Carter was unwilling to exploit the blurring of the church and state boundary upon 
which his Presidential candidacy had been built. “The religious [Christian] 
community belonged to Carter,” close Carter friend Bert Lance observed, but “They 
were the first to abandon him.”73 Carter was simply not the President they believed 
they were voting for in 1976. Carter was far more politically liberal than had led 
them to believe, and he refused to use the Presidency as a pulpit from which to 
enforce a conservative social agenda. Therefore, Christian conservatives’ initial 
feelings of kinship with the President faded quickly and, as Dionne puts it they “felt 
sold out by Carter.”74 Eventually they came to perceive him as having been “unborn 
again,” as having abandoned his Christian principles in favour of “a deep-seated 
secular humanism.”75 Not least they felt betrayed by Carter’s attitude towards 
abortion. Jack Wilke, the President of the National Right to Life Committee damned 
Carter’s administration as “disastrous.”76 Their bitterness, Maddox recalled, led 
Christian conservative leaders to denounce Carter “as the anti-Christ,”77 and when 
newspaper columnist Bob Novak attended a conference of conservative preachers in 
1979 he observed minister after minister declaring “I was part of Carter’s team in 
1976. I delivered my congregation for Carter. I urged them all to vote for Carter 
because I thought he was a moral individual. I found out otherwise, and I’m angry.” 
At that point Novak realised, “Jimmy Carter’s goose was cooked.”78
The conservative evangelical community, now politically activated as the Christian 
Right, instead turned to Ronald Reagan in 1980, a candidate who more carefully 
articulated their agenda. This was despite the fact that Reagan’s nominal religious 
credentials bore no comparison to Carter’s genuine piety.79 Reagan did not regularly 
attend religious services. He was associated with liberal Hollywood, both he and his 
wife were divorcees and he had no record of commitment to cultural-religious issues 
of evangelical concern. Indeed, as Governor of California he had signed into law the 
nation’s most liberal abortion bill. However his 1980 campaign literature, circulated
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to conservative congregations, openly courted the religious vote. It declared his 
support for private Christian schools and school prayer while attacking both 
homosexuality and abortion. Revitalising the fundamentalist crusade of the 1920s, 
he openly questioned the theory of evolution and asserted the necessity of teaching
the biblical story of creation in public schools. “The time has come,” Reagan
80declared, “to turn to God and reassert our trust in Him for the healing of America.”
When recalling the 1980 Presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter explicitly 
acknowledged the central role of the New Christian Right, observing that the 
politically energised born-again community had “had a very profound effect” on his 
defeat by Ronald Reagan.81 One Harris poll estimated that white, evangelical 
Christian voters accounted for two thirds of Reagan’s 10-point margin of victory, 
while an ABC poll showed that 17 percent fewer Protestants voted for Carter in 1980 
than in 1976. Even within his own Southern Baptist denomination, Carter’s support 
dropped from 56 percent in 1976 to 34 percent in 1980. The Religious Right was 
especially successful in its stated aim of registering evangelical and fundamentalist 
Christian voters. Prior to 1980 only 55 percent of all fundamentalist Christians were 
registered to vote in comparison to 72 per cent of the general public. An analysis of 
electoral returns showed that that changed in 1980, when two million 
fundamentalists voted for the first time, a vital constituency given that Reagan was 
elected by only 26 per cent of the electorate.82
Carter brought evangelical concerns to the heart of American politics, but abortion 
was one of a series of key issues that revealed the contradictory imperatives affecting 
a Southern Baptist President. As an evangelical Christian, he was personally 
opposed to abortion but as a Southern Baptist he was also committed to the principle 
of church-state separation. Because Carter was not prepared to compromise his 
Southern Baptist adherence to that doctrine, he inevitably disappointed the sleeping 
giant of evangelical Protestantism his Presidency had awakened.
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CHRISTIAN EDUCATION AND THE CARTER
PRESIDENCY
This chapter explores the debate regarding the relationship between Christianity and 
education, both public and private, and the issue’s contributory role in exacerbating 
tension between the Carter White House and the conservative Christian community. 
Whilst previous scholarship has portrayed the conflicts surrounding Christian 
education during the 1970s as being covertly about race and as masking a 
fundamentally racist Christian agenda, here I show this approach to be limited, 
unappreciative both of change over time in evangelical political engagement and of 
the larger platform of concerns that motivated Christian conservatives, including 
prayer in schools and curricular reform. The spectacular growth in Christian private 
schooling during the 1970s stemmed primarily from a religious rather than racial 
impulse and by then a religious rather than predominantly racial agenda guided the 
movement’s political engagement. Failing to comprehend this development, in 1978 
the Carter administration attempted to remove the tax-exempt status of private 
schools so as to combat segregated education. Alongside the administration’s 
refusal, because of Carter’s Southern Baptist commitment to the separation of church 
and state, to legislate the return of prayer to public schools, this succeeded in 
alienating a new electoral constituency of burgeoning significance - evangelical and 
fundamentalist Christians. Schooling became one of a series of “hot button” issues 
that prompted both religious and racially conservative evangelical Christians to join 
with secular political activists to form the heterogeneous phenomenon that became 
the New Christian Right.
It has taken some time for the specifics of Christian education and its relationship to 
the Carter Presidency to receive detailed consideration. Carter’s Presidential 
memoir, for example, ran to over 600 pages but mentioned the strained relationship 
between the evangelical community and his administration only in passing.1 Works 
that deal with Carter’s devout religiosity written largely by evangelicals were 
unreservedly enthusiastic but did not cogently analyse the specific faith-based 
policies of the Carter White House that later enflamed conservative evangelical
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opinion.2 The first wave of scholarship on the Carter Presidency from 1980-1987, 
dominated by Betty Glad also did not address the phenomenon and focused instead 
upon Carter’s economic failures and the Iran hostage crisis in order to explain 
Carter’s failed 1980 re-election bid.3 When in 1987, a second, revisionist wave of 
Carter scholarship developed, it presented Carter in a far more favourable light. 
Ribuffo provided the most useful examination of the political impact of Carter’s 
Christian faith, but did not highlight the centrality of educational issues to his 
eventual abandonment by the evangelical community.4 Kaufman focused largely on 
foreign and economic issues and ignored the role of conservative Christianity in 
explaining Carter’s defeat in 1980.5 Dumbrell limited his analysis of the rise of 
Christian conservatism to issues such as women’s rights and the Equal Rights 
Amendment.6 Bourne addressed the evangelical community’s deep sense of 
disappointment with Carter as a born-again President but saw education as only one 
of a number of issues generating evangelical opposition.7
Today there is increasing recognition of the power and significance of the religious 
vote and of the specific importance of the Carter Presidency in the 20th century 
political mobilisation of theologically conservative Christians. The multiple factors 
that brought the New Christian Right to political significance in the late 1970s, 
including abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, gay rights and the broad-based
Q
cultural shift towards popular defence of ‘family values’ have all received attention, 
but what is not yet fully understood is how central schooling was to that mobilising 
process, especially in terms of the two main educational innovations Christian 
conservatives sought at the time: retention of the tax exempt status of Christian 
schools and the return of prayer to public schools.9 However, an understanding of 
education’s significance to Christian conservatives both prior to and beyond the 
Carter years is essential to any explanation of the Carter administration’s loss of 
Christian conservative support and its coalescence elsewhere. For a time, Carter 
appeared to be the Christian conservatives champion in the ongoing struggle against 
the forces of secular humanism, but his determination to perceive schooling in 
fundamentally racial rather than religious terms long after the Supreme Court’s 
Brown vs. Board o f Education decision of 1954 led his administration to persist in
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construing private Christian schools anachronistically as “segregation academies” 
and to alienate the Christian conservative vote.
Whilst it is impossible in the early post-Brown era to disaggregate racism from 
religion with reference to Christian private schools, racism cannot be said to fully 
explain the phenomenon, especially by the time the Christian school sector expanded 
during the 1970s.10 Even so, a number of scholars have described the rapid 
expansion in Christian schooling as purely a racially motivated attempt to circumvent 
court-led attempts to desegregate public schools. According to Lugg white 
supremacist sentiments were the prime motivation behind the emergence of church- 
affiliated private schools. He observes, “White, typically fundamentalist, Christian 
churches played a critical role in the South’s desire to thwart federal [integrationist] 
policy.”11 While acknowledging that many factors spurred the Christian private 
school movement, Wilcox finds “school desegregation efforts” to be the central 
organising factor.12 Similarly, McLaren has highlighted the appeal of “intolerant” 
born-again Christian education to those “who are comfortably male and white.” 
Christian education, he argues, was a key social tool for those who “wish to purge 
America of Blacks, Asians, Arabs and Jews.”13 Rose has also observed that 
schooling was a tool of those evangelicals who “wanted to restore the common 
ground that once belonged to white Anglo-Saxon Protestants” whilst Diamond 
contends that many Christian academies “were formed solely or primarily to evade 
racial integration.”14 Thomas and Mary Edsall go further, contending not only that 
racial prejudice motivated the spread of Christian private schools, but that a defence 
of segregated schools lay behind the emergence of the entire Christian Right. They 
chart the first stirrings of evangelical politicisation to a 1969 lawsuit relating to the 
federal tax exemptions granted to segregated private schools in Mississippi.15 
Dionne agrees, arguing, “Most of the evangelical conservatives [in the Religious 
Right] were white southerners who began voting against the Democrats because of 
civil rights.”16 Bawer observes that “the only reason for these private schools’ 
existence was to serve white parents who didn’t want their children going to school 
with Blacks” and that “Jimmy Carter, as a southerner, knew this to be the case.” 
Bawer too also contends that evangelical political mobilisation was generated largely 
by the IRS attack on segregated Christian schools: “The Religious Right didn't grow 
out of a love of God and one's neighbour” he states, “—it grew out of racism, pure
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and simple.”17 Carter himself clearly attributed the growth of private schools in the 
aftermath of the Brown decision to racial factors. In his 1992 book, Turning Point, 
he wrote, “the education system in the South...has borne the brunt of social change” 
leading to “a mass exodus of white students whose parents could pay the tuition fees 
to enrol in the private ‘segregation academies’ that sprang up in almost all 
communities.” Their continued existence was based “on parental dedication to racial 
segregation.”18 Even Robert Maddox, the Carter administration’s liaison between 
the White House and the religious community had no doubts about the close linkage 
between race, religion, the politicisation of the Christian community and their 
opposition to Carter. Recalling the place that race played in the growth of the 
Christian Right, Maddox observed “Racism was there, right beneath the surface. The 
same kind of mentality that cranked out the anti-nigger stuff in the fifties, cranked 
out the [anti-Carter campaigns] in the eighties. It’s always been there, it submerged, 
but it never has gone away.”19
However, other commentators point out that even though a number of schools were 
established during the 1950s and 1960s in an effort to avoid the consequences of 
court orders to desegregate public education, by the 1970s this “white flight” impulse 
had become less important to Christian parents.20 Instead, the expansion of the 
Christian school sector was motivated not by a desire to retain racial purity but 
instead by a need to defend against the unwarranted intervention of the atheistic 
philosophy of secular humanism. This developed during the late nineteenth century, 
a descendant of the rational doctrines of the enlightenment. Affirming the free will 
and conscious responsibility of rational men, it declared moral values and ethical 
behaviour to be correctly founded on human nature and experience, rather than 
reliance on supernaturalism, theological abstractions or religious emotionalism. It 
stressed the primacy of human reason over divine intervention and a belief in moral 
relativism and situational ethics. It rejected Biblical concepts such as eternal 
salvation, divine redemption or the existence of a supreme creator. The Humanist 
Manifestos (published in 1933) declared there to be “insufficient evidence for belief 
in the existence of the supernatural,” and announced humanity to “begin with man 
not God...no deity will save us; we must save ourselves.”21 It gave rise to liberal 
attitudes to sexuality, crime, drug abuse and education. For America’s evangelical 
and fundamentalist Christian community secular humanism was regarded as the
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overarching source of the godlessness that had eroded the nation’s moral and 
religious principles.
For evangelicals, the centrality of these Christian principles derived from their 
conception of American history that placed the role of God and the Christian faith as 
central to America’s national mission. They believed that the Lord himself had 
blessed America because first the Puritans of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and then 
the Founding Fathers of the Constitution had sought to honour God and the Bible by 
creating in America the ‘New Israel,’ a nation built upon Christian principles: 
“Blessed is the nation whose God is the LORD” (Psalm 32:12). Jerry Falwell wrote, 
“America has reached the pinnacle of greatness unlike any nation in human history
because our Founding Fathers established America’s laws and precepts on the
22principles recorded in the laws of God, including the Ten Commandments.” 
Evangelicals considered the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the 
United States to be nothing less than religious documents and the nation created by 
them to be ‘God’s chosen country.’ Formed to exemplify the righteousness of Holy 
Scripture, Winthrop’s ‘City on a Hill,’ they defined America as “a bastion of 
traditional values and traditional faith in an increasingly godless age; as a citadel of 
righteousness in a corrupt world; as the earth’s only truly Christian nation.”23 Pat 
Robertson agreed. “This is God’s land” he said, “This land belongs to God 
Almighty.”24
Legal acceptance of secular humanism appeared to evangelicals to represent an 
abandonment of America’s historical Christian identity. In particular, three Supreme 
Court rulings, not connected to race, mandated the secularisation of public education 
and brought down the ire of conservative Christians. The first blow came with 
Torcaso v. Watkins (1961), which validated secular humanism as a religion. 
Maryland state law required Roy Torcaso to affirm his belief in the existence of God 
in order for him to be commissioned as a notary public. As a practising humanist, 
Torcaso refused and the Supreme Court subsequently found in his favour holding 
that the requirement for such an oath “invades the appellant's freedom of belief and 
religion.” Presiding Justice Hugo Black declared: “Neither a State nor the Federal 
Government can constitutionally force a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion.” The Black court found that a number of religions did not “teach what
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would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God.” These included 
“Buddhism, Taoism and Secular Humanism.”25 Other court rulings such as Engel v. 
Vitale (1962) removed prayer from public schools and Abington School District v. 
Schempp (1963) confirmed that, in relation to public schools, recitation of the Lord’s 
Prayer was unconstitutional. Murray v. Curlett (1963) outlawed Bible readings in 
the classroom and Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) allowed for private Christian schools 
to be more closely regulated. All of these added to the increasing sense of 
divergence from mainstream culture and political institutions felt by the evangelical 
community, a sentiment only exacerbated by the more widely publicised Roe v. 
Wade (1973) ruling on abortion.
During the 1970s, the Torcaso ruling was publicised by conservative Christian 
leaders such as popular evangelical author Tim LaHaye, Jerry Falwell and Bill 
Bright, the director of Campus Crusade for Christ, as clear evidence of a secular 
humanist conspiracy to infiltrate the ‘American public square.’ They claimed that 
the 1960s Supreme Court rulings enshrined secular humanism in law as a religion 
equal in legal status and validity to Christianity. Falwell warned that humanism 
denied the hand of God in man’s creation: “It teaches that man is not a unique and 
specific creation of God” but rather “the ultimate product of the evolutionary 
process.” As such it was responsible for the moral decay and permissiveness of 
modern society because it favoured “ethical relativism” and “situation ethics” and
projected “man as an animal concerned only with fulfilling the desires of the
26moment.” Moral absolutes that derived from Biblical Scripture had been 
abandoned. Similarly, for LaHaye, the danger of humanism lay in its encouragement 
of mankind’s attempts to understand his world and to “solve his problems 
independently of God.” He traced its formulation back to Greek philosophers who 
believed that “man is the measure of all things.” He identified its five basic tenets as 
atheism, evolution, amorality, autonomy of man and one-world socialism.27 This 
arrogant promotion of man’s rationality over the Almighty’s divine will, evangelical 
leaders claimed, had caused all manner of social ills including the advance in 
abortion rights, gay rights, women’s equality, the spread of pornography, drug abuse 
and a dangerous weakening of America’s global military, political and economic 
hegemony. LaHaye declared, “Much of the evils in the world today can be traced to 
humanism, which has taken over our government, the United Nations, education, TV
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and most of the other influential things in life.”28 Humanism had become, observed 
evangelical authors Hadden and Shupe, the “source of all critical social problems” 
and the “arch-villain” of America’s Christian community.29 In particular, secular 
humanism had infected the American political system. Nesmith observes that many 
evangelicals “increasingly felt that governmental policies are denying traditional
30moral values” and that the “moral fibre of society” was “decaying as a result.” Bill 
Bright declared,
I believe the most dangerous religion is humanism...the greatest threat to 
our Judeo-Christian heritage and is. doing more to destroy the moral and 
spiritual fibre of our society than any other peril. Have you ever 
wondered why our society is becoming more secular, why prayer and 
Bible reading are no longer welcome at our public schools? The religion 
of humanism is largely responsible. Have you ever wondered why 
Americans are much more tolerant today of sexual freedom, 
homosexuality, incest and abortion? The religion of humanism is largely 
responsible.” 1
This perceived attack upon Christianity in schools was particularly keenly felt 
because prior to the 1960s Christians had cherished the fact that the American public 
education system was at least informally Christian. As Harrell put it, until the 
beginning of the 1960s “education remained firmly in the hands of the believers.”32 
In many schools instructors were often clergymen and school priests generally held 
esteemed positions on campus. Bible readings and class prayers were common and 
traditional moral values, founded in the Christian faith, were taught. The 1960s saw 
a profound change including a profusion of sex education courses, the banning of 
prayer and Bible reading, a more liberal attitude to gender equality, homosexuality 
and the teaching of what were perceived as unpatriotic ideas in history classes. For 
evangelicals, the undermining of America’s public schools was part of nothing less 
than a co-ordinated secular humanist plot. For example, in The Battle for the Public 
Schools, dedicated to “awakening American Christians to secular humanism as the 
destroyer of our once-great country,” LaHaye warned that secular humanism was 
being taught as an alternative religion to Christianity.33 Calling secular humanism 
“the official doctrine of public education,” he outlined a fifteen-point description of a 
philosophy that gave humanism “all the markings of a religion...eager to bring the
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nation’s into a one-world government based on socialism”34 “Public education” 
warned LaHaye, “is a self-serving institution controlled by elitists of an atheistic, 
humanist viewpoint” dedicated to “indoctrinating their charges against the
35recognition of God, absolute moral values, and a belief in the American dream.” 
For Christians, the need to raise children in an educational environment of Biblically 
based morality, insulated from the pervasive influences of an increasingly godless 
mainstream society was primary. This motivated the foundation of more than ten 
thousand religious academies during the 1970s. By the time Jimmy Carter took 
office in January 1977 the public education system was a pivotal arena in the 
Christian struggle against secular humanism.
Once again, evangelical disappointment with Carter was magnified because of their 
dashed expectations. Evangelicals in his home state of Georgia would have recalled 
his pledge, made during his 1970 bid for the state governorship, to do “everything” 
he could for private schools.36 “Don’t let anybody,” he said, “including the Atlanta 
newspapers mislead you into criticising private education. They need your 
support.”37 Early in his Presidency Carter appeared to fully support Christian private 
schools. In June 1977 representatives of the Council for American Education 
(CAPE), an organisation of private schools whose members included a large number 
of faith-based groups including the Lutheran Church, the U.S. Catholic Conference 
and the National Union of Christian Schools, met with members of the Carter 
administration. Afterwards, apparently assured by the meeting that Carter strongly 
supported private schools, Robert Lamborn, CAPE’s Executive Director wrote to 
Beth Abramowitz, “I thoroughly enjoyed our meeting - - and came away reassured 
about the Administration’s active interest in the welfare of private schools.” 
Lamborn asked that “Based on the administration’s positive attitude toward private 
schools,” the Carter administration make a “commitment to protect the rights of 
parents in determining the nature of their children’s education” and announce “the 
administration’s intention to maintain the educational options assured by the 
existence of strong public and private schools.” Regarding possible Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) intervention against private schools he also requested “a 
systematic search be undertaken to determine a constitutionally acceptable method 
for providing tax aid to parents whose children attend non-segregated private 
schools.” Abramowitz replied, “Please be assured that we are giving this matter
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serious attention as part of the development of federal educational policy and 
initiatives for this administration.”38
In the same year Jack Harwell, Carter’s close friend and editor of The Christian 
Index wrote to Carter’s son Jack to ask for his help in organising a meeting between 
the President and representatives of Christian private schools. As a result, in 
December 1977 Carter met a delegation of Christian educators at the White House. 
The meeting was described in an internal memorandum as being organised “to gain 
your [Carter’s] special endorsement of the contribution church-related colleges can 
make to our society and to itemise some of the problems facing these colleges.” The 
meeting was clearly a success. Afterwards a representative of the educators, Ben C. 
Fisher, Executive Director of the Education Commission of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, wrote to Tim Kraft, the White House appointments secretary, to thank 
him. The meeting with the President had been “a very significant one for us. It will 
also be encouraging to the millions of church members whom this group represents.” 
Harwell also wrote to Carter personally to express his “deep gratitude.” The 
Christian educators were particularly impressed that Carter agreed to meet them even 
though the Prime Minister of Israel was visiting the White House on the same day. 
“I know you had a hectic day with the Prime Minister of Israel” wrote Harwell, 
“That makes us even more grateful.”39
Carter singularly failed to make good on his promises regarding private Christian 
education to the evangelical community. Instead, action taken by the IRS against 
racial discrimination embroiled the President in a series of battles with the 
evangelical community over Christian schools. Until 1967 the IRS had not 
considered the racial policies of private schools in determining their entitlement to 
tax-exemption, but when the IRS was sued in 1971 on the grounds that the granting 
of tax-exempt status represented a form of indirect governmental assistance to 
‘segregated academies’ it altered its regulations, ruling instead that any “purely 
private schools” which practised racial discrimination would no longer be tax- 
exempt. Even so, IRS regulations remained weak. According to Lugg many 
segregated schools retained their tax-exempt status by merely placing a statement in 
the local newspaper that they did not discriminate or by enrolling a “token Black 
family.”40
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All this changed in 1978 when the Carter-appointed commissioner of the IRS, 
Jerome Kurtz, launched a new crusade against racial discrimination in schools. 
Kurtz recalled his belief that private schools were being created for explicitly racist 
aims. For example, he recalled “There were whole new school systems formed in 
Mississippi [in the wake of desegregation rulings].”41 At his direction the IRS 
moved to require that all private schools, including Christian schools and academies, 
prove they were not instituted as residual havens for segregation or face the loss of 
their tax-exempt status. Under the new guidelines, any school that came into 
existence or suddenly expanded when the public schools in its community were 
desegregated would be subject to investigation and would risk the loss of its tax- 
exempt status unless it had a substantial minority enrolment (a minimum of 20 
percent of the total population of minority students in the surrounding community) or 
was shown to be making a ‘good-faith’ effort to operate a non-discriminatory 
enrolment policy. This meant that although aimed at denying tax-exemption to 
‘segregation academies’ the new regulations encompassed church-affiliated private 
schools, the majority of which had been established by the Protestant evangelical 
community. Looking back to 1978 Carl Anderson, the Reagan administration’s 
religious liaison observed, “Under the guise of getting at a very miniscule number of 
segregation academies” the IRS used “strong arm tactics” against all Christian 
private schools. “We’re not talking about Bob Jones University [referring to the 
ultra-conservative fundamentalist institution] we’re talking about any serious kind of 
Christian ministry through church-affiliated schools.” That, Anderson noted “had a 
very big message for evangelical Christians.”42 The IRS regulations represented the 
unwarranted intrusion of secular government institutions into private, family affairs. 
As Steve Bruce has pointed out, the IRS intervention alerted Christians that “The 
“Bible Belt” had been penetrated by cosmopolitan culture” or, as political analyst 
Kevin Phillips observed, “The world of Manhattan, Harvard, and Beverly Hills was 
being exported to Calhoun County, Alabama, and Calhoun County did not like it.”43 
The actions of the IRS were driven by racial concerns but IRS policy was misguided 
on two counts. The IRS failed to acknowledge that the boom in the private school 
sector in the 1970s was largely unrelated to race. Martin observed of Christian 
schools that “by the mid-1970s integration was no longer a significant factor in their 
continued proliferation.”44 Rather, the growth of explicitly Christian private schools 
represented an effort on behalf of the Christian community to insulate their children
56
from the secular and humanist bias of public schools. The IRS regulatory action, 
although focused upon a very small number of ‘segregation academies’ effectively 
denied legitimate efforts at Christian ministry through private education. Carl 
Anderson recalled that this sent the warning to Christians, “you can run but you can’t 
hide. The reach of the government is going to find you. No matter how intimately 
you view this as part of your ministry, you will be supervised by government.” 
Hutcheson observed of the IRS regulations “While the Carter people saw civil rights 
as the motivation, Christian school activists saw it as anti religious.”45 Christian 
Right activist Connaught Marshner recalled “The bureaucrats were so out of touch 
with real American culture that they assumed racial bias was the only reason 
somebody would want to start a non-public school.” The Carter administration had 
“Not a clue about the real culture decay or about religious belief.”46 When in August 
1978 the IRS proposals to end tax-exemption for schools found to be discriminating 
against minority students were made public “a huge furore arose in the ranks of the 
Christian Right” and their target, observed Shogan, “was Jimmy Carter.”47
The issue of tax-exemption for private schools posed a pointed political dilemma for 
Carter. When he ran in 1976 as a ‘political everyman,’ a candidate far removed from 
Washington politics, he had badly antagonised key Democratic Party constituencies. 
In his December 1976 memorandum on political strategy Pat Caddell warned “To be 
frank, Jimmy Carter is not particularly popular with major elements of the 
Democratic party, whether it be activists, the Congress, labor [sic.] leaders, or the 
political bosses.” Once in office Carter was obliged to shore up his support 
amongst those Democratic interests that had backed him, specifically Black and civil 
rights interests, represented in the form of the Congressional Black Caucus. 
Heinemann writes that Carter’s IRS launched “a new crusade against racial 
segregation” in the form of a move to revoke the tax-exempt status of private 
religious academies explicitly as a means of “seeking approval from the 
Congressional Black caucus.”49 Heinemann’s explanation is conceivable. Blacks, 
without whom Carter would not have won the Democratic nomination in 1976, let 
alone the Presidency, had already attacked Carter for not doing enough to advance 
affirmative action programs, busing and welfare. They were dismayed by the 
naming of Griffin Bell to the Department of Justice and their appetites had already 
been whetted but not satisfied by Carter’s appointment of Black activists to federal
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judicial posts. The Congressional Black Caucus wrote to the President listing their 
grievances, specifically that Carter had not found a solution to the “still 
extraordinarily high Black unemployment rate,” had instigated an urban policy 
“based on providing virtually no new funds,” and had made only “limited Black 
appointments to top positions...particularly [noting] the absences of Blacks in top 
economic positions.” They decried “the failure of the President to make a major civil 
rights speech to the nation.” As regards education policy they declared their belief 
that “The Administration has not been fully sympathetic to the special needs of Black 
colleges” and accused the Department of Health, Education and Welfare of 
withholding funds from two Black colleges.”50 Their criticism was unfair. Carter 
appointed more Blacks and other minorities to his administration than any of his 
predecessors. White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz recalls that the administration 
“really searched out...the qualified Blacks...to make sure that the affirmative action 
goals of the President were met” even though this might mean that “we had to accept 
the fact that we might get the second-best qualified or the third best qualified 
[candidate].”51 Yet segregated education continued to be a highly sensitive issue for 
the Black community because of the detrimental impact on public schools of white 
abstention. After Carter left office Stuart Eizenstat admitted that the President “had 
difficulty with the Black interest groups” who were “never quite satisfied with what 
he did.”52 Hamilton Jordan concurred. He observed that special interest groups like 
Blacks “didn’t feel a part or didn’t feel a stake in the election of Carter” and as a 
result “pursued their own institutional interests.” Black leaders like Vernon Jordan, 
“couldn’t stand up and say we were doing a good job...He had to stand up and point 
out all the shortcomings of the Carter Presidency.” That, said Jordan, was “the story 
of the administration.”53
Regardless of the motives of the Carter White House, for their part, evangelicals 
strongly dismissed the suggestion that racism was an organising principle of their 
schools. Rather, the schools were dedicated to providing a faith-based education. 
Heineman observed “The one thousand students enrolled at the Arlington, Virginia, 
Baptist school were taught to place “God and His Holy Word at the centre” of their 
education. Parents were exhorted “to win your child to Jesus Christ as his personal 
Saviour, and then to train him up for Christian service.”54 Falwell said of the 
accusations levelled at his Lynchburg Christian Academy “There were those who
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thought we were probably starting [the academy] to have a white-flight school...but 
from day one I made it clear that Lynchburg Christian Academy would be for any 
and all who loved Christ and wanted to study under born-again teachers in a 
Christian environment with academic excellence.” Although the school had no 
Black students in its first year because, said Falwell, “none applied,” three Black 
students enrolled the second year. Falwell claimed he had built his Academy not in 
response to the 1954 Supreme Court ruling on education but on two later decisions, 
those of 1962 and 1963 banning prayer in schools, citing his fear that such decisions 
indicated that “the Christian worldview was not only going to be pushed back but 
eliminated.”55
Falwell encouraged evangelicals to write to the White House in protest against the 
IRS intervention. Two Christian parents from New York wrote to Carter, arguing 
that the IRS proposals were “in violation of the principles of church and state...Most 
church schools are sponsored and largely supported by churches, and the government 
has no right to regulate church affairs. We believe that since Congress has not given, 
and cannot give, IRS the powers which it is usurping in this proposal, IRS must not 
tamper with the system which gives tax exempt status to all private schools.” The 
writers also pointed out the economic issues involved to Carter.
All of us who are property owners pay substantial school taxes for the use of 
the public schools. The schools thus enjoy the use of those tax monies 
without having to spend it on the students sent to private schools. Since 
parents have been taxed for their children’s schooling, no matter where they 
go, should they not have the freedom to choose the place where they believe 
the superior education is being given? Parents putting their children into 
private schools are already paying double, and should not be penalised even 
further.
They strongly dismissed accusations of racism. “The several private religious 
schools with which we are acquainted could in no way be called racist. It is not 
economically feasible for them to actively and specifically recruit members of 
minority groups, but they do heartily accept students from such groups.” Another 
evangelical from Carolina wrote to the President to declare, “Our schools are not 
racially discriminatory, and we strongly dislike being placed in the position of being
59
considered guilty until proven innocent. The Constitution has always guaranteed 
people their innocence until proven guilty, and now some people have chosen to 
completely reverse this idea and force their opinion upon many others. This restricts 
our freedom given to us by our Constitution tremendously.” Evangelicals were 
disenchanted because of Carter’s willingness to use his religious faith as a political 
asset in his Presidential campaign. “What happened to all the ‘Christian’ promises 
you made while campaigning?” asked one correspondent. “Why does [Joe] Califano 
and HEW ride white schools and institutions of Higher Learning when 
predominantly black colleges...get federal money? Is this the act of a born-again 
Christian? How do you sleep at night?” One writer claimed that the IRS regulations 
would “destroy the freedom of religion” and “freedom of choice of Christian 
education.” Complaining “We pay over and above our school taxes for special 
Christian education which we feel is necessary since the Bible reading, prayer and 
discipline was taken out of our public schools,” the revoking of tax-exemption was 
“the first step to undermining and destroying our country” because it threatened 
America’s covenant with God. “To continue to destroy the reading of God’s word 
and the teaching of his ways, I feel, will cause us to lose his blessing. At the rate we 
are going in twenty years our country and communism will be hard to tell apart.” To 
reinforce his point, the writer announced that “I have never written to any political 
power before, but feeling the grave importance of killing this proposal and any of its 
kind, I felt I must.”56
The IRS regulations represented more than an ideological threat to Christian parents. 
Whether predicated on racial grounds or religious doctrine, Christian private schools 
relied heavily on the tax deductible charitable gifts of private donors. The end of 
tax-exempt status would seriously endanger the financial well being of most 
Christian schools and parents would be forced to pay both for private tuition and to 
provide tax revenue to support a public education system that their children did not 
use and which spread a secular value system that they abhorred. Jerry Falwell 
quoted the economist Milton Friedman, “The present arrangement abridges the 
religious freedom of parents who do not accept the religion taught by the public 
schools but yet are forced to pay still more to have their children escape
cn
indoctrination.” In sum, tuition fees for Christian parents were to be effectively 
doubled. The fact that the background of the student bodies at Christian private
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schools had changed radically during the 1970s, added to the impact of the 
legislation. Middle-class preserves during the 1960s, by the 1970s sixty percent of
58the pupils came from working class or lower-middle-class backgrounds. According 
to one evangelical minister, the financial implication of the IRS proposals provided 
“the jolt” that generated conservative opposition, as he put it, “When it becomes not 
just a moral or a conservative/liberal issue, but a pocketbook issue, you definitely 
take an interest.”59 Inevitably a number of evangelical ministers organised a 
campaign in response. Robert Billings used his newsletter, Christian School Alert, to 
warn Christians of the IRS threat. Falwell used his popular television show, the ‘Old 
Time Gospel Hour’ to attack it, calling the federal government “sneaky” and 
declaring that it had made it “easier to open up a massage parlour than to open a 
Christian school.”60
As well as bringing together the secular New Right and the conservative religious 
community, the IRS issue played a central role in forging the alliance between the 
New Christian Right and the Republican Party in the second half of Carter’s 
Presidency. The rapid political mobilisation of evangelicals convinced conservatives 
in Congress to join them in battle. Arch-conservative Jesse Helms led the 
Congressional fight in the Senate, vowing that he was “not going to back up one 
inch” in the face of IRS “harassment,” whilst two other conservative Congressmen, 
Representatives Bob Dornan and John Ashbrook lobbied in the House.61 Ashbrook 
wrote to Carter in October 1978 warning that the IRS plan would “set a dangerous 
precedent in this country, creating a “new regulatory network which amounts to 
nothing less than legislation by decree...expanding federal power over private 
schools.” This might “lead to total Federal control of private education. It will not 
be long before the Washington bureaucracy is scrutinising the textbooks and teaching 
of each private school.” As such the plan “poses a serious threat to private education 
in America.” Ashbrook vowed to “not permit any intrusion into the free exercise of 
religion.” He warned
To impose student and faculty quotas on private schools is a treacherous 
intervention into a constitutionally protected activity. By imposing severe 
compliance standards and volumes of paperwork, the Federal Government 
would sign the death warrant of more than half the nation’s religious 
schools...Its arbitrary formula for student and staff recruitment will place 
Federal bureaucrats at the helm of policy formation for private schools...This
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plan violates the Constitutional separation of Church and State...Mr. Carter, 
as a Presidential candidate, you were portrayed as one seeking to become ‘a 
pastor of 230 million.’ You must not desert your religious followers by 
inaction.62
Ashbrook urged Carter to “act now to stop this Federal aggression against religious 
schools. You should order your appointed director of the IRS to rescind its quota 
plan.”63 In response, Stuart Eizenstat wrote to Ashbrook in December 1978. Noting 
that while the administration did “share your concern that implementation of the 
[IRS regulations] be sensitive to religious and academic freedoms,” Eizenstat 
reinforced the administration’s conviction that the issue at stake was racial equality, 
not religious freedom:
This administration is committed to meeting the spirit and letter of the law as 
evidenced by Titles IV and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Brown v. 
Board of Education, and many subsequent Federal Court cases. Under the 
law, private schools that have a racially discriminatory policy as to students 
are not entitled to tax-exempt status.
Despite Eizenstat’s intervention, Ashbrook and Dornan introduced a rider to the IRS 
appropriations bill that prohibited the use of federal funds to investigate or enforce 
alleged violations of IRS regulations by Christian schools.64
In 1976, the evangelical community remained, fundamentalist Reverend James 
Kennedy recalls, “a sleeping giant.”65 To arouse conservative Christians from their 
slumber, they needed to be educated into a political reaction. The evangelicals 
remained detached from modern culture. “Abortion, pornography, homosexuality -  
those are hard for average Christians to relate to” observed one fundamentalist 
preacher, “They don’t read Playboy, their daughters aren’t pregnant, and they don’t 
know any queers.”66 Both historians such as Richard Neuhaus and Robert Shogan 
and Religious Right leaders like Ralph Reed all agree that in Reed’s phrase, Carter’s 
“ham-fisted” intervention against Christian schools was “the greatest spark” for the 
Religious Right because for Christians it represented “nothing less than a declaration 
of war” on their Biblically-centred way of life. Secular New Right leaders such as
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Weyrich, Richard Viguerie and Howard Philips saw in the growing evangelical 
community a potential constituency of grass roots support that could be used to help 
implement their conservative agenda. “It kicked the sleeping dog,” recalled Richard 
Viguerie of the IRS issue, “It galvanised the religious right. It was the spark that 
ignited the religious right’s involvement in real politics.” The New Right 
established political organisations in Washington including The Committee for the 
Survival of a Free Congress, The Heritage Foundation, The National Conservative 
Action Committee and The Conservative Caucus, and used them to make overtures 
to conservative Christians who had so far stubbornly resisted political involvement. 
It was through what Harrell calls this “fortuitous convergence” between New Right 
political experts and conservative evangelicals that the New Christian Right 
emerged.69 In particular, New Right activists provided the political experience, vital 
in mobilising the evangelical electorate that the Christian leaders who had remained 
outside of the political mainstream lacked. Christians were persuaded to abandon 
their attachment to the doctrine of church-state separation, to embrace their secular 
allies, and to engage in what Wilcox calls “the politics of life-style defence” against
7 0the interference of the Carter administration. The key meeting took place in May 
1979. Weyrich, Philips and Viguerie travelled to Lynchburg to meet Jerry Falwell. 
Like Carter, Falwell was a Baptist, and as such held to his denomination’s belief in 
church-state separation, rejecting political engagement and dedicating himself to ‘the 
winning of souls for Christ.’ However, the New Right leaders convinced him of the 
urgent need for a new, visibly Christian political organisation to rally Christian 
conservatives into action, an affiliation they dubbed the Moral Majority.71 Weyrich 
was candid in admitting his partisan political goals. He was not dedicated to 
politicising the Christian vote, only the vote of Christians who supported his 
conservative agenda. “I don’t want everyone to vote,” he said. “Our leverage in the 
election quite candidly goes up as the voting population goes down. We have no 
responsibility, moral or otherwise, to turn out our opposition.”72
Falwell publicly refuted his previous attitude to Christian political activism as “false 
prophecy” and the Moral Majority quickly became the largest and most visible of the
n ' l
New Christian Right organisations. Falwell was a central figure in inspiring 
evangelical political engagement. Hadden and Shupe note that whilst Carter told 
evangelical Christians that it was “all right to get involved in politics” Falwell told
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them “it was their duty.”74 It represented the total abandonment of Falwell’s 
previous adherence to church-state separation. In explaining this change he recalled 
“the future of our nation was at stake...Satan had mobilised his own forces to destroy 
America by negating the Judeo-Christian ethic.”75 If his “Christian brothers and 
sisters could be mobilised to action” then the Moral Majority could “reverse the 
nation’s downward spiral and set America back on the straight and narrow path once 
again.”76 The federal intrusion into private Christian schooling was pivotal in 
Falwell’s conversion. “Back in the sixties I was criticising pastors who were taking 
time out of their pulpit to involve themselves in the Civil Rights movement or any 
other political venture. I said you’re wasting your time from what you’re called to 
do.” But, says Falwell, “Things began to happen. The invasion of humanism into 
the public school system began to alarm us back in the sixties.... It became apparent 
that the federal government was going in the wrong direction, and if allowed would 
be harassing non-public schools. Step by step we became convinced we must get 
involved if we’re going to continue what we’re doing inside the church building.”77 
Falwell became overtly political. He declared the three goals of the Moral Majority 
to be “First, get them converted; second, get them baptised; and third, get them 
registered to vote.”78 Hart notes “Before, evangelicals had not been inclined to 
translate their beliefs into political action,” but were now being convinced of the
7 0imperative of “opposing sin at the ballot box.” The Journal o f Church and State 
observed that conservative Christians were “clearly being led out of the pews and 
into the polls.”80
The White House and IRS were inundated with complaints, including 126,000 
letters, some of which were so vociferous that IRS commissioner Jerome Kurtz was 
forced to seek Secret Service protection. The National Christian Action Coalition 
(NCAC), headed by Robert Billings, organised a massive letter writing campaign. 
He also organised a meeting of preachers who opposed the IRS proposals. “[The] 
potential consequences of this are frightening,” he warned. “If you can tax private 
religious schools...why not tax churches? And why not tax the particular churches 
with which the government disagrees? Why not tax the Quakers for their pacifism 
[or] the Catholics for their opposition to abortion?”81 Billings declared that Kurtz 
had “done more to bring Christians together than any man since the Apostle Paul.” 
Other evangelical broadcasters like Pat Robertson, James Dobson and Jim Bakker
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invited Christian school activists and attorneys onto their television shows to warn 
audiences about the need to resist the new federal regulations. Beverly LaHaye’s 
self described ‘Pro-Family’ organisation, Concerned Women for America implored 
members “WRITE OR CALL your Congressmen and Senators immediately” in 
support of the Ashbrook/Doman amendment and advised “President Carter has 
recommended them for deletion.”83 Ultimately, the campaign generated so much 
complaint that Congress called public hearings to discuss the IRS enforcement plans. 
Held in Washington in December 1978, these were highly charged affairs. 
Opponents attacked the IRS proposals as arbitrary and overly restrictive, a clear 
violation of First Amendment rights. Senator Doman wrote to the President in July 
1979 calling for the resignation of Kurtz and his chief counsel Stuart E. Siegel. He 
accused them of being
...the main architects of the assault on the private schools of this land, 
assuming that private schools were formed solely to escape public school 
integration and threatening their tax-exempt status. Contrary to our Anglo- 
Saxon legal tradition, a party was assumed guilty until proven 
innocent.. .People all over this land are sick and tired of unelected bureaucrats 
engaging in social engineering at the expense of our cherished liberties. [The 
IRS had] proven blatantly unworthy of their trust as government officials by 
blatantly attacking the First Amendment rights of private and religious 
schools.84
The IRS proposals were eventually defeated in the Senate. Then in August 1979 the 
Senate voted to suspend the application of the IRS guidelines for one year and to 
prohibit the allocation of the federal funds necessary for the IRS to determine which 
schools should lose their tax exemptions. The Senate also attacked the guidelines 
themselves, making it, reported the Washington Post, “unlikely that the guidelines
or
would be revived by a future, more sympathetic Congress.” In her history of the 
rise of the Christian Right, Brown observes, “the government plan was pounded so
o r
thoroughly” that “it was never resuscitated.”
It was not until 1980 that the Carter White House finally understood the sense of 
disenchantment felt by the evangelical community over the IRS regulation of private 
schools. By that stage the administration was aware of the need to limit the damage
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done and was purposely avoiding the issue in the face of repeated evangelical 
questioning. In January 1980 Frank White, the Carter administration’s Head of 
Communications, wrote to his deputy Anne Wexler to warn her to brief the President 
against getting drawn into a debate over the IRS at an upcoming breakfast meeting 
with evangelical ministers. White said that the IRS procedures had been quickly 
attacked by “specialised religious schools” which were “afraid of being drawn in, 
even if it appeared they would, in the end, be exonerated.” White warned that the 
issue might come up and advised that the administration’s line should be that; “We 
have kept the White House out of the planning or development of these regulations” 
and that “All inquires should be relayed to the Treasury.” White recommended that 
the President go no further than declaring that he “support[ed] the law of the land.” 
White also advised Carter to plead ignorance and tell the evangelical leaders that he 
was “not really familiar with the issues in dispute.” If the ministers asked Carter to 
help them rewrite the procedures, the President should say, “My policy has been to 
leave administration of the tax laws to tax officials. [The White House] has not 
gotten involved in such matters and I don’t want to begin now.” White was being 
politically disingenuous: the White House was clearly involved in the IRS 
intervention against private schools.87 Archival documentation records that both he 
and Beth Abramowitz of the Domestic Policy Staff met with IRS staff to discuss IRS 
private school regulation at a meeting entitled “Meeting on Private School Revenue 
Procedure” dated February 15, 1979. Also in attendance were Howard Schoenfeld, 
S. Allen Winborne and Lauralee Matthews, members of the IRS Commissioners 
office, and Jim Fuller of the IRS Chief Counsel’s Office.88 Evangelicals continued to 
voice their concerns over the activities of the IRS. A month after the meeting Robert 
Maddox wrote to Ann Wexler to warn of an “intense, growing rebellion among 
denominational leaders across the theological spectrum against IRS.”89
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Prayer in Public Schools
The role of prayer in public schools simmered right from the controversial 1960s 
Supreme Court rulings that banned it, through the Carter years, into the 1980s and 
the question is still with us today. It was another issue on which Carter singularly 
failed to adequately address or fulfil the Christian agenda on education. It is 
important to recognise that prayer in schools engaged a very specific section of the 
evangelical Christian community. Whilst some evangelicals abandoned mainstream 
secular culture and sought refuge in specifically Christian institutions such as schools 
and colleges, others advanced “a strategy of engaged orthodoxy.”90 They remained 
reluctant to abandon all vestiges of “worldly” modernity, and sought instead to act, in 
accordance to Christ’s admonition, “as the salt and the light,” a redemptive, 
transformative force for the salvation of society and culture from within. Choosing 
to engage with the secular mainstream, they worked to strengthen of the role of 
Christianity within the public school system.
Before the 1960s, evangelicals had viewed the American public school system as 
analogous to institutions such as the church and the family, which were perceived to 
be advancing Christian morality. The public school was “virtually a sacred” 
institution, a principal instrument for the cementing of Christian national identity in a 
society conspicuously lacking in the unifying institutions already established in 
Europe. Thus, although the recitation of biblical commandments or non- 
denominational prayer may have seemed innocuous to many non-evangelicals, for 
conservative Christians the removal of prayer from the classroom represented a 
“symbol revolution,” tantamount to “a spiritual betrayal” by the federal government, 
and signalling the dawning of “a dark new day” for America.91 For evangelicals the 
removal of prayer in schools also heralded a precipitous decline in educational 
standards. Jerry Falwell observed the “decay in our public school system suffered an 
enormous acceleration when prayer and Bible reading were taken out of the 
classroom.”92 Pat Robertson recalled that in the Christian community there was “an 
intense...rage against the Supreme Court.” And as he put it, when Christians, “the
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most law-abiding in the society feel that the Supreme Court is their enemy” then 
“you’ve got something significant.”93
Falwell’s organisation, The Moral Majority, was to play a central role in the resulting 
campaign to return prayer to the classroom. Although he claimed that the Moral 
Majority did not endorse any political candidate or party, Falwell left readers of his 
newsletter (dated March 7, 1980) in no doubt of his own political persuasion, 
announcing that “even the President of the United States is against us!” He 
recounted a conversation he claimed to have had with Carter when, along with a 
number of conservative ministers, he had visited the White House. Carter declared 
“I oppose anything that would allow voluntary prayer in public schools, because I do 
not want an atheist or non-Christian child to sit there under pressure because the 
other children are having voluntary prayer.” When Falwell replied, “But what about 
the 99% of children who want to pray and who are not allowed to pray because of the 
1% who oppose the prayer?” he said Carter simply “had no answer.” “Can you 
imagine?” asked an incredulous Falwell. So as to convince Carter of his error the 
newsletter asked members to “flood the President’s desk with one million letters” to 
“force him to listen to the Moral Majority.” To assist subscribers, the newsletter 
included a model letter that read, “Dear Mr President, I am in favour of voluntary 
prayer.” What had especially shocked Falwell was Carter’s affirmation that “he 
would absolutely never sign a bill that would restore voluntary prayer in schools.” 
Alluding to legislation introduced by Senator Jesse Helms to return prayer to schools, 
Falwell claimed Carter had said, “even if both the House and the Senate approve the 
bill, he would veto it when it comes to the Oval office.”94 Robert Maddox recalled 
of the people like Falwell, “TV preachers, the religious broadcasters...they were all 
for Helms thing on prayer in schools.”95 The Congressional bid by Helms and 
Senator Bill Nichols, lobbying for legislation to “bring God back to the public 
schools” through school prayer became interwoven with the evangelical campaign 
and reiterated almost identically its rhetoric.96 In fact, Carter was completely 
consistent in his opposition to a constitutional amendment to restore prayer to public 
schools. During the 1976 Presidential campaign a religious journal had written to 
candidate Carter with a list of questions regarding his attitude to issues of church- 
state separation. One of the questions was “What is your position on the proposed 
amendment to the constitution to permit or require prayer in public schools?” Next to
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the question Carter himself wrote clearly “Do not favour.”97 Carter’s personal 
position was clearly in line with the advice of Jody Powell, given on an attached 
advisory note that “you have a very deep religious involvement...the best place for 
this involvement is in the home and in churches and synagogues rather than public 
schools.”98
Despite his consistent policy, in April 1980, using a letter from an evangelical 
constituent, Nichols forced the Carter White House to hurriedly clarify the 
President’s position on prayer in schools and high-ranking staff personally responded 
in a poorly co-ordinated fashion to the uproar that ensued. Frank Moore, the 
Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison, in response to the constituent, 
declared the President to be “like you...a Christian” and said Carter was “doing his 
best to uphold the ideals in which he believes.” He directly questioned Falwell’s 
account of his conversation with Carter writing, “The President has never said that he 
would veto any legislation passed by Congress providing for the return of voluntary 
prayer to the public schools.” When evangelicals continued to question Carter 
regarding his treatment of Falwell at the breakfast meeting, Patricia Y. Bario, the 
administration’s Deputy Press Secretary, wrote back to explain, “Dr Falwell 
misquoted the President.” Carter had “said he is uncomfortable thinking about a 
Jewish child, for instance, sitting in a room under pressure because of Christian 
prayers being offered.” Bario wrote that “when this misquote was pointed out to Dr. 
Falwell, he apologised and said he would print a correction in subsequent editions of 
his newsletter.”99
The conservative Christian community however, accepted Falwell’s original account 
unquestioningly. For example, James E. Damron, vice-President of the Christian 
radio station WVRC, wrote to the President to tell him of his “shock” in regard to his 
supposed position on prayer. “I simply couldn’t believe it!” Damron wrote, “Moral 
decline is so rampant (as you well know) that we must do something to reverse this 
trend. He asked Carter “Are you not concerned about the spiritual health of our 
nation?” In response Bario wrote to Damron to say that the President was indeed 
“very concerned about the spiritual health of this nation” but he has “a dilemma” 
because the “Constitution is based upon the separation of church and state and he is 
sworn by his oath of Office to respect that.” According to Bario, expressing Carter’s
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own view, the Constitution prohibited the President’s involvement either way. As 
she put it, “The government has no business taking a stand -  pro or con -  on the 
issue” and this was “the way the Constitution wanted it.”100 Similarly, when Jim 
Purks, Carter’s Assistant Press Secretary replied to an evangelical’s threat that 
because of prayer he would not be voting for Carter again in 1980, he wrote that 
“although President Carter is one of the nations firmest advocates of prayer” the 
President “must adhere at all times to the doctrine of separation of church and state.” 
Carter felt, Purks said, that “’government ought to stay out of the prayer business’” 
and not “dictate to school children.”101 Another evangelical complained, “the doors 
of our public schools [are] closed to prayer but remain open to the atheism of 
Communism.” Pleading for Carter to return American schools to the religious 
bedrock upon which he felt the nation had been built, he declared school prayer to be 
the “moral rearmament that we need to inspire our youth and our nation through a 
manifesto of Americanism.” In response Carter press secretary and close 
Presidential aide Jody Powell wrote; “As you know, the President is a very deeply 
religious man” who believes “in the efficacy of prayer.” He would, Powell said in an 
attempt to placate angry evangelicals, “like to explore the possibility of reinstating 
some kind of prayer in the schools, perhaps a moment of silent prayer or 
meditation.”102 When one constituent prompted the President to write back 
personally, Carter actually took the time to reply and did so as the true Southern 
Baptist he was, reiterating his desire to uphold the doctrine of separation of church 
and state. “If Congress were to pass the legislation” he wrote, “it would be up to the 
courts to ensure the constitutionality of such legislation in the light of the separation 
of church and state doctrine”; he would “favour voluntary prayers in schools 
provided that they can be carried out in a manner consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s ruling.”103
Like so many other Christian conservatives, evangelicals wishing to re-instate prayer 
in schools were especially frustrated by their lack of access to the White House. 
Evangelicals remembered Carter’s apparent promise to bring clearly identifiable 
evangelicals onto his White House staff and were angry, as Religious Liaison Robert 
Maddox put it, that there were “no evangelicals in the government.” In fact, many of 
Carter’s staff were religious, including such significant figures Jody Powell, Max 
Cleland, and Charles Kirbo but they were either politically or theologically liberal or,
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like Carter, they held to the doctrine of church-state separation a situation that gave 
religious conservatives the impression, recalls Maddox, that “everybody was 
Godless.” He believed that “overtures should have been made immediately after the 
election in 1977 to begin to bring those kind of people into the White House to even 
more substantially explain the President’s position.” This was not done and by the 
time he had joined the administration Maddox said, “I don’t believe anyone knew 
what bad trouble he was in...on abortion, ERA and prayer in public schools because 
the White House staff was liberal.” They clearly perceived Carter as a devoutly 
religious President and because of that “tended to discount the numbers and the 
intensity that was out there.”104
One group that felt especially marginalised by the Carter White House was the 
Christian Civil Liberties Union (CCLU) an organisation dedicated to “support a 
moment of silence for meditation or prayer in the public schools.” Its President, Rita 
Warren, despite frequent meetings with Congressional leaders and Supreme Court 
justices, made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to meet with the President. A 
Boston housewife, Warren was a highly vocal supporter of prayer in public schools 
and was the author of “Mom, they won’t let us pray” (chapters included a useful 
guide to the terrifying challenges of “Caring and Sharing with an Atheist”). Despite 
writing to the President to warn that “Denial of the existence of God” and “Secular 
Humanism” were being promoted in schools, alongside “sexual 
perversion...violence, obscenities and disrespect for Authority,” the group received 
only an invitation to see a lowly Presidential assistant. Warren and the CCLU were 
furious. “We ‘the people’ have elected Mr Carter to office to serve the American 
people. It seems that he has time to see spokesmen from other countries” but “when 
[the] time comes to see his own people he has no time.” A month later White House 
aide Joyce R. Starr wrote not once but twice to Midge Costanza to warn that the 
CCLU was planning a protest rally at the White House “for the purpose of returning 
prayer to the public schools.” They had requested that the President attend. Starr 
asked, “Do you feel there should be any attempt for us to get involved? She 
reminded Costanza, “Unless you direct otherwise there is currently no plan to meet 
with the group.”105 No member of the administration met with the group. Equally 
upset were people like Mr Blair Johnson, one of host of Christian individuals who 
tried to show the President petitions asking for the return of prayer in public schools.
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Even though these were the very people who had helped elect Carter, once in office 
his “heavy schedule” and his Baptist concern to maintain separation of church and 
state concerns, made him reticent to engage in a Presidential capacity with Christian 
evangelicals.106
Carter’s reticence allowed the Christian Right fundraisers increasing opportunity to 
confront their constituency directly through mail-shots and newsletters with what one 
author calls “rhetorical weapons of mass destruction”, that is, hugely effective,
107fearsome examples of attempts to remove religion from the public square. The 
utilisation of direct mail was vital in the development and funding of the Christian
Right, because, recalled Richard Viguerie, it “allowed conservatives to by-pass the
108liberal media, and go directly into the homes of the conservatives in this country.” 
The Moral Majority’s typical questionnaires asked, “Do you favour the right of 
parents to send their children to private schools?”; “Do you favour the removal of the 
tax-exempt status of church-related schools?”; “Do you favour sex education, 
contraceptives, or abortions for minors without parental consent?”; “Do you agree 
that voluntary prayer should be banned in public schools?”; “Do you favour more 
federal involvement in education?”; “Do you favour a reduction in government?”; 
“Do you agree that this country was founded on a belief in God and the moral 
principles of the Bible? Do you concur that it has been departing from those 
principles and needs to return to them?”109 The answers, recommended Jerry 
Falwell, should be “evaluated in the light of scriptural principles.”110
One Baptist minister sent a questionnaire to the President himself. “We are trying to 
educate ourselves with both the political process and the positions of the candidates,” 
and “enhance our ability to understand everyone’s position on the issues we feel vital 
and will facilitate a wiser vote” he wrote. In reply Robert Maddox was forced to 
reply that although the questions asked were important their complexity meant, “in 
almost every case, legitimate answers cannot be given in terms of a quick yes or no.” 
He was moved to reassure the Baptist minister who had sent the questionnaire that, 
contrary to popular evangelical opinion, the President was “a man of deep faith in 
Jesus Christ” who was “profoundly concerned about the moral and spiritual welfare 
of the nation.”111 Unfortunately for the Carter administration, evangelicals found 
reluctance to address questions in this form inexplicable. Far from being complex or
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controversial, they believed the answers to the issues they posed were obvious to a 
Christian with the most cursory knowledge of Biblical Scripture. That a President 
whose public persona derived strongly from affirmations of Christian piety could 
find questions of such vital importance to be in any way challenging gave rise to 
doubts about his religious sincerity. In response Robert Maddox sought to enlist the 
support of both the President and key administration staff in initiatives to reach out to 
the Christian conservative community alienated by his position on private education 
and school prayer. In November 1979 he requested that the President meet with 
evangelical leaders to allay their fears and end the loss of Christian support to 
political rivals. The request was firmly denied with the response: “NO: bad time.” 
Maddox then tried writing to Fran Voorde, the President’s Deputy Appointments 
Secretary, declaring it “a matter of urgency” that Carter “meets with conservative 
ministers as soon as possible.” The President should answer questions that were 
“exceedingly important to these ministers and their large host of constituents.” 
Maddox noted, “This request was first made in early September. Other political 
persons are making strong overtures to these leaders. We need to get them in before 
the campaign gets too intense and positions and endorsements get set.” Wexler 
added, “This constituency is about 30 million -  we may not get ‘em all -  half would 
be nice.” The request was once again rejected.112
No one single reason can explain such apathy on the part of the administration. It 
failed consistently to comprehend the depth of evangelical disillusionment with the 
President or to sufficiently heed their growing political mobilisation. It may well be 
the case that, not understanding the doctrinal and theological divisions within and 
between evangelical and fundamentalist church-goers, the administration was simply 
complacent about the Christian vote and failed to see how a President who seemed to 
their secular sensibilities to represent the paragon of religious piety could fail to 
retain that support. In effect, they took the evangelical vote for granted. Such was 
the lack of understanding amongst secular members of the administration that one 
aide recalled that he considered it one of his jobs to strike the word Christian out of 
Carter’s speeches.113 This was perhaps unsurprising given that one Presidential 
speech writer admitted the White House speechwriting office “was mostly populated 
by diehard secular humanists.”114 Furthermore, they were taking their cue from the 
President himself. Whilst other members of his denomination were joining the
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organisations of the Religious Right, Carter remained absolutely steadfast in his 
adherence to the Southern Baptist doctrine of church-state separation. Carter feared 
that overt political engagement with fellow evangelicals may have been 
misinterpreted by non-evangelicals as undue favouritism and a dangerous 
intervention of personal religiosity into secular affairs of state.115 Certainly Carter 
did not care for Falwell and Robertson, two figures whose activities clearly 
represented an open violation of church-state separation. Carter’s 1980 re-election 
campaign was characterized by the same dismissal of the political significance of the 
conservative Christian vote. When outlining the Carter re-election strategy in a 
memorandum dated August 18, 1980 entitled “How to win...” pollster Patrick 
Caddell listed the key constituencies whose support the President needed to secure. 
These included liberals, environmentalists, Blacks and Hispanics but revealingly, 
there was no mention whatsoever of the Christian vote.116
A further explanation for Carter’s failure to take advantage of his faith to build 
support amongst evangelical voters might have been his desire not to further alienate 
Catholic voters, a key Democratic Party constituency, many of whom were wary of 
Carter’s devout Protestantism, the Southern Baptist church having long being a 
bastion of anti-Catholic bigotry. This unease was clearly noticeable even before 
Carter took office. During the 1976 Presidential election campaign one Ford 
campaign memorandum explained the root of Carter’s failure to win over many 
Catholics. “Catholics are very privately religious people” it said. “They do not like 
religion flaunted openly, like Carter has done. [Catholics] believe in praying to God 
for help, guidance and salvation but not associating with Him as a business partner.” 
As a result, the memorandum noted, the Catholic vote was “unenthusiastic about
117Carter.” They were particularly concerned with Carter’s position on abortion. 
Another Ford campaign memo observed, “Abortion is of great concern to most
1 1 ftCatholics...those Catholics who do oppose abortion do so strongly.” Carter under 
performed amongst Catholic voters, winning just 54 percent of the vote and allowing 
Gerald Ford to win more Catholic votes than any Republican candidate in modem 
history.119
Once in office, Carter’s Southern Baptist faith, coupled with his failure to appoint 
sufficient Catholics to high-ranking positions within his administration and his stance
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on abortion, led to further Catholic disquiet. In September 1978 Dale Francis, a 
journalist from the Catholic periodical, Our Sunday Visitor wrote to the 
administration. His letter was typical of those received from disenchanted Catholics. 
He warned the administration that Catholics found the appointment of the pro-life 
Sarah Weddington as a Presidential adviser “insensitive.” Francis pointed out that 
when Bishop Thomas Kelly, general secretary of the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops had written to Carter to complain, he had received a routine form 
letter reply, wrongly addressed to ‘Mr Kelly.’ The letter “not only didn’t recognise 
him as an official spokesman for the Catholic Church but by addressing him as ‘Mr 
Kelly’ it in a sense insulted his position.” The journalist wrote, “someone at the 
White House should know” because part of the Southern Baptist’s “bigotry against 
Catholics” had been “the refusal to address clergy by their titles.” Through the 
ignorance of the White House Francis warned, “The appearance is being created, at 
worst, of a kind of bigotry against Catholics or, at best, or a lack of concern about 
Catholics.”120 In the same month another Catholic, Joseph J. Reilly, wrote to Carter 
to complain of the administration’s “systematic exercise of prejudice against our 
Church.” Pointing out that “The only member of a fifty million person religious 
body in your cabinet is Joseph Califano,” Reilly concluded, “You sought Roman 
Catholic support in 1976. You have ignored or insulted the Roman Catholic 
community ever since. I regret your anti-Catholic discrimination and protest it in the 
strongest possible terms.”121 Carter failed to win support from conservative 
Catholics. In fact, when the 1980 Carter re-election campaign aired a commercial 
that showed the President meeting the Pope, conservative Catholic groups 
complained. “In appearing in public with President Carter” said Reverend Virgil 
Blum, President of the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, “the Pope 
was paying his respect to the office of the Presidency.” It was not his intention to 
lend himself to a partisan political campaign.” He accused the Democratic National 
Committee of “abusing a courtesy by including the Pope in a political 
advertisement.”122
The failure of the White House to react sufficiently to the haemorrhaging of 
evangelical support may also be attributable to the fact Carter did continue to enjoy 
the support of a number of high-profile evangelicals, possibly leading some staff 
members, unaware of the political and theological diversity of the evangelical
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community, to believe that the President retained the Christian vote. They would 
have observed that Carter corresponded with religious leaders, including a number of 
evangelicals, throughout his Presidency. In early 1977 evangelist Oral Roberts 
visited the White House and prayed with Carter. Afterwards the President wrote to 
Roberts, “I thoroughly enjoyed your visit and appreciated the opportunity to pray 
together.”123 In January 1980 a member of the National Religious Broadcasters told 
Carter “I am supporting you in prayer (and in the campaign).”124 In February 1980 
Robert Maddox wrote to Anne Wexler to inform her that popular television 
evangelist Rex Humbard had “offered himself and his organisation to us on behalf of 
the President.” Maddox was “talking with his sons, who manage the organisation, on 
ways they can help.”125 Maddox later reported that such contact with fellow 
Christians was paying dividends. “The religious leaders with whom I talked to 
eagerly welcome direct conversation with White House people,” he wrote in a 
memorandum to Anne Wexler, “They will help on issues.” Maddox suggested that 
“Religious leaders in general feel much more favourably inclined toward the White 
House since you opened it to them. Everywhere I go people say...thanks for 
including us.”126 In July 1980 Dr Homer Linsay, minister of a Florida Baptist 
Church received Carter on a visit to the state. The visit was clearly a success, Carter 
writing personally to Linsay to thank him. “Yours is a great ministry” the President
127wrote, “Your efforts are important to God’s kingdom and our nation.” Carter even 
received support from the leadership of the increasingly conservative Southern 
Baptist Convention. Bailey Smith, elected President of the Southern Baptist 
Convention told Maddox in 1980, “Tell the President we pray for him everyday.” 
Calling Smith a “cordial supporter of the President,” Maddox observed in a
memorandum to Rosalynn Carter, “I believe we will be able to work with Dr.
128Smith.” R. Douglas Wead, a conservative evangelical who went on to serve in the 
Reagan administration wrote to Carter to thank the President for his political efforts 
regarding the Christian community.
Your team of Bob Maddox -Tom Laney have operated in a spirit of Christian 
humility and integrity -  a stark contrast to what the layman expects from a 
politician. It is having an impact on evangelical leaders (i.e., Jim Bakker) 
whose ideological and cultural leanings are conservative, but who find 
themselves drawn by the spirit of your team. Its cumulative effect is 
devastating.
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Just how out of touch Wead was with the temper of the evangelical community was 
further revealed when he asked to “congratulate you on your sensitivity to the 
evangelical voter. Though she may be fickle and ungrateful at times, she is coming 
into her own as a political force and may be your best friend in a crisis.” 
Unfortunately, it appears, Carter did not know any better. He wrote in reply, 
“Thanks - 1 agree.”129
Even Maddox himself was guilty at times of overestimating the true level of 
evangelical support for Carter. After meeting with a prominent charismatic layman’s 
group, the Full Gospel Businessmen’s Fellowship he reported directly to the 
President and Mrs Carter, “there is a deep feeling akin to a vision” that “God placed 
President Carter on the scene for such a time as this,” that he “deserves our prayers,” 
and that “as leader of the nation we are bound by the Bible to pray for him.” 
Maddox reported, “This group, Republican and Democrats alike, will support the 
President’s re-election.” Religious groups “regardless of denomination, tell me to 
assure the President of their prayers and support.” Here Maddox even included the 
socially conservative Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. After attending 
the Southeastern Conference of Mormons in Atlanta, Maddox observed, “Leaders 
and congregants alike told me to assure the President of their prayers and support.” 
A speech that Carter had made in Salt Lake City a year before had been “a high 
water mark for the church.”130 After another Maddox bridge-building trip to 
Missouri, the Religious Liaison reported that many Christian women had asked him 
to “Tell the President that many of us...love him and pray for him.”131 As late as 
July 1980 Maddox wrote to Jody Powell that “although the times are very rough 
right now, from my travels around the country, the word comes to tell the President 
to hang in there.” Maddox was encouraged by “the number and quality of American 
religious leaders who are solidly behind the President. They are ready and willing to
132go to work.” Even Pat Robertson remained on cordial terms with Maddox. In a 
letter to the Religious Liaison in September 1980 Robertson gave the impression, at 
least in private, that he accepted Maddox’s apologies for the failure to name 
evangelicals to high-ranking posts within the administration. He conceded 
“undoubtedly there was a great deal of confusion during the formative days of the 
new administration” and signed the letter “Yours in Christ.”133 Throughout Carter’s 
re-election campaign Jim Bakker, another popular televangelist, remained a staunch
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supporter. When he and Carter prayed together on Air Force One, Bakker wrote in 
“warmest Christian love” to thank Carter and called it “the high-light of my life.”134 
Perhaps the White House’s overconfidence was understandable. Even after the 
election, Carter retained the support of high profile evangelists. When Dr. Jimmy 
Allen, President of the Radio and Television Commission of the Southern Baptist 
Convention wrote to Carter with a letter of support, Carter wrote back “I will pray 
for you. May the power of Christ rest upon us.” He signed the letter “Sincerely, in 
Christ.”135
Moreover, the White House retained the impression that Carter remained the 
Presidential candidate of choice for evangelical Christians because of his strong 
support amongst Black evangelical churches. They had been amongst his strongest 
supporters in 1976 when his Baptist faith had lent him significant appeal. One 
memorandum from an organisation entitled “The Committee of Concerned Black 
Churchpersons for Jimmy Carter” to then campaign director Hamilton Jordan 
declared its goal to be reaching “the grassroots support of the Black community on a 
national basis” because “in the Black community it is the Black church that the 
average family looks to for leadership and guidance.” The organisation sought “to 
organise and interrelate all Black religious leaders throughout this country” to create 
“a coalition of religious leaders from all religious faiths, and backgrounds...to 
organise and work for the election of Jimmy Carter.”136 Stuart Eizenstat told the 
Miller Centre Presidency Project that when Carter “would go into a Black church, 
there was a tremendous sense of shared background, of communication. It was really 
tremendously moving to see.”137
And Carter somehow sensed that intellectually and emotionally -  the shared 
Baptist experience. And one really can’t adequately describe what it was like 
to come into the church and hear the Black choir, and then Carter would 
speak and sing along and so forth. There was an enormous sense of shared
138experience.
The Carter campaign clearly believed that they would retain the support of Black 
evangelicals in 1980. In October 1979 Robert Maddox wrote to the President and 
Mrs Carter to tell them that “a major key to securing the Black support and vote is
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the Black pastor of local churches” who “exercise great influence over their 
congregations.” Maddox assured them both that Black ministers “want to support 
the President.”139 This optimism was further strengthened when an organisation of 
Black ministers attacked Falwell’s Moral Majority. An organisation calling itself 
‘The Concerned Clergy for Carter Interfaith Committee’ released a statement that 
declared that a “cross section of leading Black clergy” had joined together to 
“denounce the views espoused by the Moral Majority in their support of Governor 
Ronald Reagan.” They declared,
Our primary focus is to ask clergymen of all faiths to join in an all-out 
campaign to re-elect President Carter. We also challenge the hypocrisy of the 
‘Moral Majority’ Reaganites. We must recognise the danger of this 
movement is not only a threat to the man in the White House; it is a threat to 
the state houses; it is a threat to our houses. These ultra-conservative moral 
majority advocates are a threat to Catholics, Jews, Non-Fundamentalist 
Protestants, and even ‘Born-Again’ Evangelists who happen to disagree with 
their political positions.140
Aside from taking the support of Christians for granted, another explanation for the 
Carter White House’s failure to build political links with the increasingly high- 
profile conservative evangelists derived from a sense of complacency born of 
Carter’s southern Christian background. Regionalism was a clearly a vital part of 
Carter’s appeal in 1976. “The Southern States provide us a base of support” 
Hamilton Jordan wrote to Carter in June of that year, “that cannot be taken for 
granted or jeopardised.” Carter’s faith allowed him to appeal to the South without 
risking his support in other regions. “Southern regional pride can be used to great 
advantage without unnecessarily alienating potential anti-Southern voters” wrote 
Jordan.141 He later observed the South to be “the only region of the country that 
thinks of ourselves as a region and is regarded by other areas of the country as a 
region.” Carter was “the only Democrat in 1976 that could have carried the 
South...to some extent he satisfied the feeling that we’re in the mainstream of 
political life in this country.”142 In particular, Carter’s exhortations of Christian faith 
and his public focus upon his born-again experience owe everything to the emotional 
traditions of his Southern Protestantism. This Bible-belt tendency towards 
hyperbolic piety was clearly present in his political statements. His use of religious
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rhetoric, so-called ‘Jesus Talk,’ was typically Southern. Martin Marty observes of 
Carter’s cultural “Jesusity,” that “For Jimmy Carter to say that he is ‘bom again’ is 
like you or I saying good morning.” There is no threat in those words.”143 Jody 
Powell recalls that, “He, like I, grew up where as a child most of the public speaking 
you heard was preaching, and so without even thinking about it, that becomes part of 
your way of speaking.”144 Political commentator Garry Wills, a former Roman 
Catholic seminarian remarked that Carter “could not avoid Jesus talk, even if he 
wanted to [because of] where he comes from...Jesus talk is, at the least, a kind of 
static in the air.” Wills travelled to Plains to research an article on Carter's southern 
background. “Every twist of the dial...finds a hymn or a sermon” he wrote, “the 
very graffiti in the gas station john mix religious slogans with obscenity.” Overt 
professions of religiosity were a kind of “stickum or social glue.”145 Carter’s 
religious professions endeared him to fellow residents of the region, black and white, 
who might not have previously voted for a Democrat. An administration analysis, 
written just days after the 1976 election victory confirmed that Carter’s success 
amongst white protestants, both in the North and in the South had been 
“exceptionally good” for a Democrat.146 Gerald Rafshoon, Carter’s media adviser 
observed, “The South was our base. We won [the Presidency] because Carter was a 
southerner.” This translated into the expectation amongst the campaign staff that 
Carter would receive the votes of evangelicals in 1980 because, said Rafshoon, as far 
as the administration was concerned “evangelicals were southerners.”147
This led the Carter White House to take evangelical support for granted, a temptation 
only exacerbated by the identity of the Republican challenger in 1980. Stuart 
Eizenstat recalls “There was almost jubilation in the Carter White House over his 
[Reagan’s] nomination...He was not a regular churchgoer; he had been divorced; he 
didn’t teach Sunday school.” In contrast, “Jimmy Carter was a native Southerner, he 
had grown up amongst Southern whites, he was part of that whole background” and 
so, says Eizenstat, “it was very painful to see someone from California, from 
Hollywood, be able to so successfully appeal to this constituency.”148 Another 
Carter adviser, Robert Keefe, observed of the re-election campaign, “The idea was 
still to win the South. His people were counting on the natural attraction of a 
southerner to work for him there in ’80 as it had done in ’76.” However, this time he 
did not receive the support of southern Christians and he “was undercut by
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evangelicals and fundamentalists. Carter’s campaign team didn’t recognise this 
threat early enough and never met it very well.”149 Referring to the Christian Right 
Keefe observed that by 1980 there was “a leadership structure to move great masses 
of voters. Those leaders that emerged were very anti-Carter.”150
A final additional explanation for Carter’s reticence to act on Maddox’s and others 
repeated advice as to the political benefits of engaging with conservative Christians 
was his antipathy towards the traditional process of Washington politics. Carter had 
run as an ‘outsider’ in 1976 and, as it quickly became clear, this was not cynical 
political posturing. Carter’s staff soon realised the dangers of the President’s 
abhorrence of a traditional bargaining style of government. A month into his 
administration Pat Caddell produced a lengthy memorandum detailing the 
requirements of political strategy for the new President. In a clear message to Carter 
he warned of the dangers of divorcing politics from “good government.” He wrote 
“many people instinctively feel that ‘good’ is necessarily apolitical.” However, 
“most times it leads to disappointing the voters and eventual political disaster.” 
Carter himself underlined the phrase “governing with public approval requires a 
continuing political campaign” and wrote “Excellent” on the memorandum.151 
However, a recurring theme that emerges from examination of the White House Staff 
Exit Interview transcripts and those of the White Burkett Miller President Carter Oral 
History Project is Carter’s failure to follow Caddell’s advice and his consistent 
disdain for following a course of action solely for political expediency. According to 
one aide, Carter believed himself to be above the traditional system of political 
bargaining. He recounted,
It was a matter of enormous frustration to some of us that the President didn’t 
particularly like to hear...that a decision was political. It was one of the first 
lessons that I learned in the White House. I can recall one of the first 
meetings attended with the President when I went to the White House in the 
Cabinet Room with other members of the senior staff about a particular issue. 
The President went around the room asking each member what they thought 
he should do on this...issue. When he got to me I started by saying, “Mr 
President, I think that politically...” I got about that far when he shut me 
up...He put me down in front of the whole staff. So I was very careful after 
that to make my arguments, but in a different way...I could not believe that
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anybody who operated in an atmosphere where literally everything’s political 
could take such a view .152
Another member of the Presidential staff, Bruce Kirschenbaum, agreed that “Carter 
was so apolitical...He set an unbelievably apolitical standard. It was known among 
staff that if you had a decision memo on a substantive issue, you shouldn’t go to the 
Oval Office and say, ‘This is going to kill you politically.’” Carter “hated that” and 
the apolitical attitude “filtered down from the top.”153 Patricia Bario recalled 
reviewing numerous memoranda that spelled out choices for the President. “And 
there would be one saying ‘This will cost you politically’ but Carter would note on 
the memo ‘that’s okay.’”154 Another aide put it bluntly: “He doesn’t like 
politicians...He really just doesn’t like them.... He’s an anti-politician.”155 A 
concerned Hamilton Jordan wrote to Carter to warn him against his apolitical stance 
that meant that when deciding policy, “options were being negotiated unilaterally,” 
and vital “political input from the White House staff was very much an 
afterthought.”156 According to Jordan, one example of this lack of political 
awareness that hurt Carter’s support amongst evangelicals was his decision to return 
the Crown of St. Stephen to the Communist regime in Hungary. To evangelicals this 
appeared to represent accommodation with Soviet dominated Eastern Europe. “Our 
policy in the Middle East has cost us the support of American Jews...The Panama 
Canal Treaty has hurt us in the South with conservatives,” Jordan warned. By 
returning the Crown, “we have hurt ourselves...through an action that has very little 
benefit.” It was, said Jordan, “ridiculous” to “sacrifice the moral and political 
authority of your Presidency for such an issue. It is one thing for us to suffer 
domestically with a group of people in pursuit of a major policy that is important to 
us and the world. It is quite another for us to suffer politically for an action that has 
very little -  if any -  redeeming features.” Jordan warned that if those responsible for 
policy decisions within the administration “don’t develop some political sensitivity 
we are going to be in trouble.”157 Even the First Lady failed to convince Carter of 
the need to act according to political expediency. “Our most common argument 
centred on political timing” she recorded in her memoirs, “a question of strategy 
more than substance...on more than one occasion I appealed with Jimmy to postpone 
certain controversies...until his second term.” However, “my pleas always fell on
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deaf ears. “If securing a second term was more important to me than doing what
158needs to be done, then I’d wait,” he would snap at me.”
This style of leadership was motivated in part by Carter’s Southern Baptist faith.159 
Eizenstat observed that Carter’s alienation from ‘pork-barrel politics’ essentially 
derived from his religious faith. He told the Miller Centre Presidency Project;
....that’s a part of the political system which I think the President didn’t feel 
comfortable with, that sense of sort of that implicit horse-trading. And I think 
that that’s something that this President felt particularly uncomfortable doing, 
maybe because of his Christian background, his strong Christian beliefs.160
Mondale confirms that “Carter thought politics to be sinful.” [It] used to drive me 
nuts.”161 Carter came in to office “with a kind of Baptist antagonism as to how the 
real world should respond to his concept of what his faith indicated should be done,”
1 A9he said. As Eric Severaid put it Carter was a “wheeler-healer” who refused to 
become a “wheeler-dealer” in the traditional sense of a political powerbroker. It 
was this relationship between faith and politics that led Erwin Hargrove to call Carter 
“fundamentally a Christian warrior” and Fowler to place Carter’s politics within “a 
framework of biblical stewardship.”164 Jody Powell explained that Carter’s devout 
faith was “integral part of him...and how he viewed his responsibilities [as a 
President].”165 As Powell put it in his memoirs, Carter possessed a “quiet 
determination to do what he saw as right despite the consequences.”166 Carter 
certainly was capable of acting out of political necessity at times, but with their self- 
serving television shows, celebrity status and defence of overt wealthy lifestyles as 
proof of God’s favour, televangelists like Falwell and Robertson represented the 
antithesis of Carter’s pious religiosity. Carter was neither politically nor 
theologically pre-disposed to working alongside them.
For whatever reason, crucially, the Carter White House remained slow to realise the 
need to repair the damage between the Christian community and the President. 
Maddox continually advised that Carter use public events to display his personal 
faith yet Presidential aides repeatedly rejected his advice. One such opportunity
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came in June 1979. Carter was to be awarded a prize from an organisation called 
‘The Peacemakers’ who sponsored a convocation at a Baptist Church in his honour. 
Maddox wrote to Phil Wise to ask the President to tape a message of support for the 
church. The message, Maddox stressed, “need not be a formal statement.” It could 
be “very brief.” Even so, Wise declined the invitation.167 Of greater significance, 
the President and the administration singularly failed to appreciate the importance of 
appearing upon the booming and increasingly influential Christian broadcasting 
networks. For example, in one memorandum, Maddox observed that an interview 
with religious broadcasters such as Pat Robertson’s CBN and Jim Bakkers’ PTL 
“would serve to reinforce President Carter’s standing with many in the 
conservative/evangelical community.” The “main thrust of the interview would be to 
let the President talk about his spiritual pilgrimage since he has been in office.” 
Maddox wrote “Millions in the conservative/evangelical community want to vote for 
the President but need assurances that he is indeed a devoted Christian who relies 
heavily on the leadership of the Lord as he makes his difficult decisions.” 
Subsequently, Carter agreed to interviews with four secular television networks but 
refused “an open invitation for a half hour general interview on PTL.” At the time 
Bakker’s PTL (Praise the Lord) show attracted audiences upwards of 5 million 
viewers. It was an excellent opportunity to circumvent the secular media and reach 
out to Christian voters through their own medium. An aide wrote on Maddox’s 
request that such an interview was “No longer considered a priority to the 
President.” '68
Despite Maddox’s best efforts, the Carter White House repeatedly passed up 
opportunities to prevent the political coalescing of evangelical Christian’s in favour 
of Ronald Reagan. One repeatedly rebuffed organisation was the National Religious 
Broadcasters Association (NRB). In January 1977 Carter was invited to speak at the 
annual convention of the NRB. Having only recently taken office, Carter replied that 
“I deeply regret that the hectic pace of these first days in my new office makes it 
impossible for me to join you” but Carter concluded, “I look forward to an 
opportunity to meet with you in the future.” However, this refusal to accept the 
invitation of a sizeable religious group set a pattern for the rest of his 
administration.169 One memorandum from the NRB forwarded to the White House 
by Executive Director Ben Armstrong pointed out that his organisation reached
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115,000,000 radio listeners and 14,000,000 television viewers every week, a total 
“larger than the entire American weekly church attendance,” with programs 
presented by stars like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. As with so many 
evangelical groups, their disappointment with Carter was heightened by what they 
saw as his failure to reward their support in 1976 with access to the White House. 
Armstrong pointedly reminded Carter that just a few weeks prior to his election he 
had promised to invite a delegation of religious broadcasters to the Washington. He 
now offered Carter an important opportunity to make good on his promise and so 
redeem evangelical Christian’s increasingly negative view of the President. 
Armstrong wrote, “It is my sincere belief that a meeting with President Carter will 
have a salutary effect on the manner in which he is perceived by our ever larger 
evangelical constituency.” Again in December 1979, ‘God’s Angry Man’, TV 
evangelist James Robison wrote to Carter inviting him, and not his rival Ted 
Kennedy, to appear as guest speaker at his Texan Bible Conference. Robison told 
Carter “We are expecting over 30,000 people from at least 35 states,” including “key 
leadership from the Christian community” representing “10 to 15 million people” 
who were “interested in the political future of the country.” Reagan had been 
invited, as had Adrian Rogers, the newly elected President of the Southern Baptist 
Convention who, Maddox had earlier warned was “conservative in his politics and 
theology.” Carter refused.170
Even when Christian broadcasters gave the White House an opportunity to build 
support amongst their viewers by focusing on an area of policy that Carter himself 
was intimately involved, namely peace in the Middle-East, the offer was rejected. 
The Christian Broadcasting Network was rebuffed in May 1978 when they asked 
President Carter to join their campaign for a peace settlement in the region by 
recording a televised ‘Call to Prayer.’ Perhaps by now realising the difficulty of 
convincing the President himself to become involved in such a project, they instead 
contacted his mother, Miss Lillian, asking her to pass on their request to her son. 
Reverend Harald Bredesen of the CBN wrote to White House aide Richard Harden, 
reminding him of a visit that Bredesen had previously made to Miss Lillian’s house. 
Gloria Carter was also present at the house. During the visit, Bredesen wrote, Miss 
Lillian had been so enamoured with the idea of Presidential involvement with the 
‘Call to Prayer’ campaign that she had called Harden then and there and said “You
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know I never tell Jimmy what to do, but this is special.” However, Miss Lillian 
herself recalled the meeting with Bredesen as somewhat less harmonious. She 
warned the White House “I was pressured into this by Gloria and friends from 
Alabama (very rich ones)” and she had agreed to contact the White House because “I 
couldn’t stand another 2 hours of it.”171 Jody Powell replied to Bredesen that 
although it would be “very nice if the President could take part...the demands on his 
time” made it “impossible.”172 Unwilling to give in, Bredesen then wrote to another 
White House aide drawing attention to the favourable political exposure that 
involvement would garner the President amongst the conservative Christian 
community. Bredesen observed that “substantial portions of America’s forty-five 
million evangelicals would be very much for it” and that “Their votes helped put Mr. 
Carter in the White House, and their loyalty could stand some rekindling right 
now.”173 Again White House aides sought ways to decline the invitation. One aide 
suggested that the administration tell the CBN to ask again in ten months time. 
“That should break their stride” he wrote.174
To his credit, Maddox continued to warn his colleagues “religion will be a major 
issue in the 1980 election” but “not like in 1976.” He told Press Secretary Jody 
Powell, “Conservative groups will vote in greater blocks than ever before. The 
television preachers will play a major role in helping their millions of viewers to 
decide on candidates and issues. Many of these conservatives will vote for the 
President only if they are convinced that his stands on certain key issues are 
compatible with theirs.” Although an asset, Maddox warned that the President’s 
Christian faith did not guarantee the support of the evangelical community: “His 
‘born again’ faith raises their expectations and makes him more vulnerable to their 
charges of inconsistency if he does not lift up selected issues.” All was not lost 
however, because “millions want to vote for him and given half a chance they will.” 
Alongside abortion, prayer in public schools was a pivotal electoral issue. “They 
puzzle: How can a born-again Christian be opposed to prayer?” “At carefully 
selected times,” advised Maddox, the President should “re-state his reasons for not 
supporting prayer in public schools.” Then at least, he wisely pointed out, 
“conservatives will have the advantage of understanding his position.”175
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Recalling his efforts to impress upon Carter the urgent need to reach out politically to 
the evangelical community, Maddox said, “It bothered me to think that fifty or sixty
• 176million evangelical Christians might rise up and vote against him.” He highlighted 
five key opportunities. Firstly, he advised Carter to give an interview with the major 
religious television networks. “Reagan,” Maddox observed “has done such an 
interview.” Although, he said, “Some of the executives of these stations are 
Republicans,” their audience viewing figures were “incredibly large” and “they want 
to hear from the President.” Secondly, Carter should address the National 
Convention of National Religious Broadcasters, an association embracing over 500 
television and radio stations. Thirdly, he should accept the Abe Lincoln Award for 
Communications from the Southern Baptist Radio and Television Commission at a 
banquet in Dallas. Maddox also suggested that on the same trip, Carter should 
address the students of Southwestern Baptist Seminary in Fort Worth and explain the 
relationship between his Southern Baptist faith and his political office in the 
heartlands of Christian conservatism. “I recommend,” he said sagely, “this Texas 
double-header.” Fourth, Maddox begged the President to meet with eighteen 
evangelical conservative leaders, warning that already, “they have met with 
[Republican Presidential hopefuls] Connally, Crane, Baker and Reagan.” Maddox 
believed that, because of Reagan’s divorce, either Crane or Jesse Helms would be the 
Christian conservatives favoured candidate. Finally, Maddox said that Carter, as the 
only political leader invited, must address the huge “Washington for Jesus” rally 
planned for late April 1980, organised by the Full Gospel Businessmen’s Fellowship. 
“Hundreds of buses will bring the people to the city” Maddox said: “all hotels have 
been booked for the weekend.” Furthermore, the Fellowship President, Demos 
Shakarian, although a Republican was “a firm supporter of the President.” The 
organisers were inviting Carter “as God’s leader to the nation to address that rally. 
They are prepared to take some criticism for not inviting other candidates.” Maddox 
observed that the Businessman’s Fellowship “has 1700 chapters across the nation 
and around the world. They touch millions of people each year.” Maddox also 
wanted the President to use his links with one of the high-profile televangelists who 
still supported him, the flamboyant preacher Oral Roberts. Significantly, Roberts 
offered the White House the chance to gain political purchase from the enduring 
popularity within the evangelical community of First Lady Rosalynn Carter. Roberts 
suggested that Mrs Carter appear on a number of Christian talk shows and make
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personal appearances on the major preachers’ shows. Roberts even offered to
177orchestrate the appearances “behind the scenes.”
Perhaps the seminal moment when the Carter White House failed to heed Maddox 
and so lost ground to the Reagan camp was at the 1980 National Affairs Briefing 
held in Dallas, Texas sponsored by two of the largest conservative Christian 
organisations, Religious Roundtable and the Moral Majority. As James Robison 
pointed out to Carter, the meeting was the year’s “largest, most significant, political 
and spiritual gathering in the South,” attended by a litany of high-profile leaders of 
the evangelical community including Jerry Falwell, Jesse Helms, Pat Robertson and 
Bill Bright. Although organised in the format of a traditional revival meeting, the 
purpose of the event was the “training of some 20,000 pastors and Christian leaders, 
representing between 20-30 million votes, in political involvement.” Robison told 
the President, “we will be pressing people on to action and how to organise the vote.” 
Carter was offered the opportunity to speak, this time not only to the audience in 
Dallas but by telecast to “100 cities on closed circuit television.” Other speakers 
scheduled to appear included Senator Jesse Helms, Phyllis Schlafly and Paul 
Weyrich. For his part, Maddox was convinced Carter should attend, but he also 
knew that the offer represented a “no-win situation.” “It would be a hostile crowd to 
the President” Maddox warned in an internal memo, but if Carter did not attend “he
178will be soundly criticised.”
In the event Carter failed to attend. Out of the sixty speakers who addressed the 
conference only one spoke in support of the President, and he was roundly booed. 
Ed McAteer, the founder of The Roundtable, one of the earliest New Christian Right 
organisations recalled the Dallas convention as crucial in “Carter’s political demise.” 
McAteer was, according to Victor, “more than any other evangelical leader 
responsible for orchestrating Carter’s defeat” because he introduced Ronald Reagan 
to Jerry Falwell.179 McAteer recalled, “From the beginning, I just knew that the 
Presidency surpassed Carter’s abilities. It was too big a job for him. He never 
understood how to govern a country like America and he never understood that any 
political mandate is God-given and God-inspired.”180 Asked to attend the Dallas 
meeting, Carter, said McAteer, “decided not to attend the rally because his advisors 
told him that he should court the mainstream votes and not pander to his fellow bom-
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agains.” He explained, “I got a call from one of Carter’s advisors who told me that 
they had no intention of playing a ‘ring around the roses’ game with the Christian 
Right.”181 In stark contrast Reagan was only too happy to attend and to deliver 
perhaps his most famous address of the entire electoral campaign. His words went a 
long way towards convincing Christian conservatives that he, not Carter, was the 
candidate whose theological sensibilities were most in tune with their political 
ideology. Dexterously, he referred to the official evangelical philosophy on church-
state separation and told the enthusiastic crowd that even though he knew that they
182could not endorse his candidature, “I want you to know that I endorse you.”
Reagan attacked government restrictions on “the independence of religious 
broadcasting” and stated sarcastically that “everybody in favour of abortion had 
already been born.” He was especially unequivocal in his support for the 
evangelical's educational agenda, expressed doubts about the theory of evolution, 
denounced the “moral neutrality” of the government and vilified a Supreme Court 
that had “expelled God from the classroom,” blaming social problems such as crime 
and drug abuse on the failure to uphold moral standards in public schools. When an 
evangelical minister asked for his views on prayer in public schools he replied, “No
one will ever convince me that there’s anything wrong with little children praying in
1 8^the school house.” The crowd responded rapturously. They were equally
impressed with his endorsement of Christian schools and his attack upon the IRS
proposals that would “force all tax-exempt schools -  including church schools -  to
abide by affirmative action orders drawn up by...IRS bureaucrats.”184 He went on to
openly identify himself with the evangelical agenda, speaking, as Oldfield puts it,
“straight out of the Christian Right’s hymn book.”185 With this speech, Reagan, not
Carter presented himself as the man who would turn the White House into God’s
House. Recalling the importance of the speech in Dallas, Pat Robertson declared on
his Christian Broadcasting show that Reagan had “touched a chord across the United 
186States of America.” Afterwards, Reagan continued to express the educational 
agenda of conservative Christendom. Previously Carter had irritated advocates of 
Biblical inerrancy and the teaching of creationism in schools. When asked whether 
he believed in the Garden of Eden, the serpent, whether Eve was taken from Adam’s 
rib, and the return from the dead of Lazarus, he replied “Part of the Bible was 
obviously written in allegories” and “hard to believe on a scientifically analysed
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basis.”187 In contrast, during the Presidential campaign, Reagan clearly expressed his 
inerrant belief in the story of Genesis and his support of its teaching in public 
schools. Declaring evolution to be “a scientific theory only” he said that if it was 
going to be taught in schools Biblical creationism “which is not a theory but the 
biblical story of creation, should also be taught.”188
The 1980 Republican Party platform also clearly recognised the political power of 
the IRS issue to unite Republicans with Christian conservatives; it declared that if 
elected, Reagan would “halt the unconstitutional regulatory action launched by Mr. 
Carter’s IRS Commissioner against independent schools.”189 The political battle had 
been joined. “The stage is set,” Rev. James Robison informed seventeen thousand 
evangelicals at one political rally, “where we are either going to have a Hitler-style 
take-over, a dictatorship, Soviet Communist domination or we’re going to get right 
with God in this country. It is time for Christians to crawl out from under their 
pews.” “Many Americans are sick and tired of the way their government has been 
run,” said Jerry Falwell. “They are tired of being told that their values and beliefs 
don’t matter and that only those values held by government bureaucrats and liberal 
preachers are worthy of adoption in the area of public policy.”190 Once an outspoken 
defender of church-state separation, Falwell now presented the evangelical 
community’s dilemma in starkly political terms. Flaunting the officially non-partisan 
position of the Dallas conference, Jerry Falwell told delegates to vote “for the 
Reagan of their choice” whilst Christian Voice maintained a “Christians for Reagan” 
booth.191 Stephen L. Carter notes that after Dallas “many a religious leader preached 
that a vote for Reagan was a vote for God’s truth.”192
The Carter White House was shocked. One Maddox memorandum explained, “when 
people listen to the President and then to Mr. Reagan, especially on matters of faith, 
the President completely out-distances Mr. Reagan.”193 However, Maddox quickly 
saw the link between the Christian Right, including Falwell’s Moral Majority, and 
the Reagan campaign blossom. He observed his suspicion when Bob Billings, the 
First Executive Director of Moral Majority left the organisation to become the 
religious adviser for the Reagan campaign. “There was a direct tie and there was no 
doubt who they were for,” he recalled.194 The predominately secular White House 
staff never conceived that their candidate might not win the evangelical vote and as a
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result they never expended the necessary political effort to build links between the 
administration and the conservative Christian community. “The staff depended on 
the President’s personal religious practices to keep that whole community,” recalled 
Maddox. “They never did understand what being born-again means, how that 
translates to more conservative people.”195
Unsurprisingly, in the Christian schools themselves, Carter was deeply unpopular. In 
his research on Christian education Peshkin interviewed the Headmaster of Bethany 
Baptist Academy. Headmaster McGraw made no secret of his support for Reagan, 
and alongside IRS intervention, (“he let the IRS interfere with our school” 
complained one teacher), once again the issue centred on Carter’s failure to name
evangelicals to key administration posts. “Jimmy Carter claims to be born-again,”
said McGraw. “Well, the Bible says, “By their fruits, ye shall know them.” I can’t 
question his personal salvation, but I question his biblical understanding. Look at his 
key appointments -  not one of them even claims to be bom again.”196 Peshkin 
observed that “for the world of Bethany” this was “an incredible omission” for to be 
born-again was “to possess the badge of respectability” a “password ...in the only 
way that counts.” For a supposedly Christian President to ignore the bom-again 
credentials of a candidate when making appointments led staff and pupils at Bethany 
to the conclusion that “the President’s integrity and intelligence must be subject to 
doubt.”197 “We’ve never been at a lower state in this country because Carter does 
not have a single Christian in his cabinet,” said McGraw. Donna Reynolds, an 
English teacher at Bethany, also made her political sympathies clear. “It’s important 
to the academy that Reagan becomes President; its for our future as Christians, I 
think.”198 The teachers at Bethany made no effort at political impartiality in their 
lessons. Peshkin observed elementary-grade children playing. “Who votes for 
Carter?” asked one boy, to which the children replied by sticking their tongues out 
and blowing raspberries in disgust. “Who votes for Reagan?” he asked. The 
children put their hands up and cheered.199
By the fall of 1980 a few members of the Carter administration had finally realised 
the extent of the alienation between the Carter White House and the evangelical 
community. They were warned of the increasing politicisation of conservative
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Christians by Carter supporters amongst the liberal Christian community who were 
beginning to worry that the President was not doing enough to build support amongst 
evangelicals. One firm Carter supporter, Albert H. Rusher, wrote to the President to 
warn “One of the most important things that is now being preached to millions of 
people every week by many ministers, particularly Baptist Ministers” was that “the 
United States is turning to humanism.” Rusher warned of the displeasure of 
evangelicals at Carter’s staff appointments. He wrote, “One question that I have 
been asked frequently is why a professed humanist who formerly headed the Aspen 
Institute of Humanistic Studies (Shirley M. Hufstedler) has been appointed to head 
our Department of Education.”200 But once again the White House administration 
aides made little attempt to secure the support of what was potentially a natural 
constituency for Carter. In fact, members of the administration went so far as to 
actively criticise evangelical political activism. In late 1980, Carter aide Pat Harris 
launched a blistering tirade on the Religious Right and the growing involvement of 
the evangelical community in partisan politics. In a speech delivered to Princeton 
University students she warned that evangelical Christian groups had “become a 
major factor in energising right-wing politics in our country” and that the “moral 
absolutism” of religious conservatives posed “a threat to the pluralism and tolerance 
of American democracy.” She was especially critical of the Moral Majority, and its 
proposed crusade to “re-Christianise” America, which she deemed to be “dangerous” 
and “intolerant.” Comparing Christian fundamentalists to Iranian Islamic 
revolutionaries who had recently overthrown the Shah, she warned “I am beginning 
to fear that we could have an Ayatollah Khomeini in this country.” Referring to 
evangelists like Falwell and Robertson she said, “He will not have a beard, but he 
will have a television program.”201
Predictably, these ill-advised attacks did nothing to help rebuild support for the 
President amongst the evangelical community. “Pure rubbish,” Jerry Falwell 
observed in rebuffing Harris’s remarks as “ill informed and outrageous.” He said, 
“The truth of the matter is that as long as it is a liberal group or an ineffective 
conservative group speaking out, Secretary Harris...has no objection.” Yet when 
“the Judeo-Christian community bring[s] masses of new recruits to the conservative 
side of the spectrum they are desperately trying to discredit the movement.” What 
Harris called “Invasion of the political process” was “known in pre-Harris days as
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‘registering to vote.’”202 This squabble between Falwell and the administration only 
reinforced the image of a White House totally estranged from the Christian 
community. Indeed, the antipathy between the Christian Right and Carter reached 
absurd proportions. When a rabid rabbit attacked Carter during a fishing trip, 
Falwell was reported to have declared that swamp rabbits were referred to in the 
Book of Revelations in connection with Satan. Falwell suggested, Jody Powell 
observed, “that any true, heterosexual, right-thinking Christian would have seized
203upon this God-given opportunity to ruthlessly destroy this symbol of the Beast.” 
During the campaign Carter made clear his opposition to partisan political 
involvement by clergymen like Falwell. Citing his continued support of church-state 
separation he declared his opposition to groups like the Moral Majority who he 
accused of “dictating the qualifications for politicians to live up to.” He said, 
“Certain religious groups are trying to say what the definition of a Christian is. 
That’s wrong.” Politically astute, Reagan declared that he “saw nothing wrong with 
Church involvement in politics” and likened it to the involvement of labour unions, a 
key Democratic Party constituency.204
The sense of irritation with conservative Christians for their part in Carter’s 
subsequent defeat in 1980 was exemplified by one last White House memorandum 
written by Robert Maddox. In December 1980, with Carter defeated, Jackie 
Mitchum of Pat Robertson’s The 700 Club’ wrote to Carter to ask him to appear on 
the show and be interviewed by Robertson. For two years Maddox had been 
attempting to get the President to get his message across on conservative Christian 
television: now he was no longer interested. Maddox wrote a letter to thank 
Mitchum for her interest but apologised, warning, “so far, he [the President] has 
declined most interviews so I do not hold out much hope for the session.” Privately, 
Maddox was less conciliatory. He wrote to Ray Jenkins, “I see no reason the 
President should do an interview on the 700 club.” Maddox clearly believed 
Robertson had used his television show to Carter’s detriment. He told Jenkins, “Pat 
Robertson did all he could to unseat the President.”205
Today, over twenty years after evangelical Christianity has returned to political 
discourse and significance, it remains problematic to portray the Religious Right as 
either monolithic or unified. A diverse coalition of loosely connected groups, it is
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mobilised on an extraordinarily broad number of issues, ranging from social 
concerns such as abortion and gay rights, to international affairs including nuclear 
proliferation and climate control. However, if one issue can be said to constitute an 
under-researched but significant factor in the journey conservative Christians 
undertook towards abandoning their long cherished attachment to the doctrine of 
church-state separation, it was the role of Christianity in the American education 
system. The issue energised evangelical Christians both defensively, in support of 
their cherished Bible-based way of life through tax-exempt private schools, and 
aggressively, through their campaign to re-institutionalise prayer in public schools.
One final anecdote highlights a fundamental message within this chapter - the depth 
of the Carter administration’s failure to comprehend the political agenda of the 
evangelical Christian community, an agenda within which education was primary. 
Towards the end of his Presidency, Carter recounts that he invited Adrian Rogers, the 
newly elected fundamentalist President of Carter’s own denomination, the Southern 
Baptist Convention, to a meeting at the White House. As Rogers was leaving he 
turned to Carter and said, “We are praying, Mr President, that you will abandon 
secular humanism as your religion and return to Christianity.” Carter recalled his 
shock, admitting simply, “I didn’t know what it meant.”206
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HUMAN RIGHTS. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
AND THE CARTER PRESIDENCY
Through an examination of the activism of the Carter White House in favour of the 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), this chapter will show how the domestic 
application of Carter’s human rights agenda generated a backlash against his 
Presidency from the evangelical community.1 Through analysis of the highly 
divisive and emotive debate over the ERA, it will diverge from scholarship that 
predominantly views the Carter White House as politically naive, and Carter himself 
as aloof in the use of Presidential authority in support of his policy agenda. It will 
instead present an image of an administration that was deeply involved in the 
legislative process. Carter supported the ERA both because of his Southern Baptist 
Christian principles and his family background but also because of the political 
necessity of retaining the support of feminist women, a vital Democratic Party 
constituency, to whom Carter had made a number of ambitious electoral pledges in 
1976. These promises included ratification of the ERA, a key tenet of the feminist 
agenda throughout the 1970s. This brought Carter into direct conflict with the newly 
emergent ‘pro-family’ movement, a force dedicated to the defence of Biblically 
ordained family values, and constituted in large part by members of evangelical and 
fundamentalist churches. These activists, led by veteran conservative political 
activist and devout Roman Catholic Phyllis Schlafly, perceived the ERA as 
representing a humanist assault upon their families and churches, emblematic of both 
the dangerous excesses of the secular ‘women’s liberation’ movement and the 
degradation of the nation’s religiously derived moral fibre and ultimately further 
evidence of the growing influence of an unbiblical worldview in society as a whole, 
and specifically the federal government. Feeling betrayed by Carter’s public 
advocacy of the ERA and the highly active lobbying of state legislatures undertaken 
by him and his staff in support of its ratification, opposition to the ERA transformed 
into anti-White House sentiment and, in turn, laid the basis for the emergence of the 
Christian Right.
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Carter has been criticised for politically naivety, particularly his failure to use the 
influence of the Presidential office effectively in order to convince legislators to 
support his agenda.2 Most have agreed with Kaufman’s contention that as a “novice 
in the White House” Carter “never reached an accommodation with the institutions 
and interests in Washington he had run against but whose support he needed.” Such 
criticism hinges upon Carter’s refusal to abandon the ‘outsider’ motif that had been 
pivotal in his election victory. After he was elected, Carter’s refusal to engage in the 
‘horse-trading’ activities necessary for effective government meant he did not fit into 
Neustadt’s model of political bargaining.4 Kellerman writes of Carter’s “introverted” 
personality and his abhorrence of “politicking and schmoozing,” whilst Graubard 
notes that Carter’s “barely concealed arrogance” meant that he “was a President who 
never earned the respect of his political peers.”5 For Jones, Carter was a president 
who was “basically anti-political.”6 Vice President Walter Mondale recalled, “Carter 
was not a buddy” and there was “No backslapping.”7 In his memoirs, Democratic 
Speaker of the House Thomas ‘Tip’ O’Neill called Carter “the smartest public 
official I’ve ever known,” yet declared “When it came to the politics of Washington 
D.C., he never really understood how the system worked.” Furthermore, “he didn’t 
want to learn about it either.”8 This chapter presents a different picture of Carter. A 
thorough interrogation of primary archival data, including personal correspondence 
and administration memoranda provides a re-evaluation of the image of a President 
dismissive and ignorant of the legislatory process. This was in marked contrast to his 
unwillingness to acknowledge the political necessity of engaging with evangelical 
Christians. It will focus in detail upon Carter’s highly activist approach to the 
passage of the ERA that, as Dumbrell puts it, “runs counter to any view of the Carter 
Presidency as standing aloof from legislative arm-twisting and as innocent of the 
ways of Washington.”9
Jimmy Carter clearly saw his human rights agenda as a continuum of those of his 
Democratic predecessors in the White House. In accepting the Democratic Party 
Presidential nomination in 1976 he declared John Kennedy to have been “a brave 
young President” and called Lyndon Johnson “a great hearted Texan.”10 Regarding 
the continuation of the legacy of the two Presidents most associated with the 
advancement of modern civil rights, Carter said, “I just felt as if they were my 
duty.”11 Although Carter drew comparisons between his own aspirations and the
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achievements of previous liberal Democratic Presidents, fellow Democrats were not
convinced. Carter did not enjoy unwavering support amongst a number of traditional
Democratic Party constituencies. In seeking the White House Carter ran not as an
advocate of the liberal agenda of Democratic Party but as an ‘outsider’ removed from
the political establishment. In doing so he raised the suspicions of Democratic
activists, at one point stimulating an “anyone BUT Carter” campaign to prevent the
Georgian securing the party’s Presidential nomination. “I’m an organisation man,”
12said one Pennsylvania Democrat of Carter, and “He scares the hell out of me.” 
Carter’s campaign team recognised the need to secure greater support amongst key 
Democratic constituencies. In a pivotal 1972 memorandum, outlining Carter’s 
ultimately successful political strategy a full four years before the election, Gerald 
Rafshoon explicitly focused upon the need for Carter to present himself as “a leader 
in the Democratic Party.”13 In another hugely influential memorandum written two 
years later Hamilton Jordan advised Carter upon the need to secure support amongst 
“key Democratic Party workers and activists.”14
One staunchly Democratic constituency that Carter needed to win over was feminist 
women. As a southerner, a Baptist, and a political outsider with few ties to the 
Democratic Party establishment, Carter had to work extra hard to win the support of 
women’s organisations. They simply were not a natural political constituency for 
him. Feminist women feared that, as a born-again Christian, a Carter Presidency 
might bring a renewal of conservative moral values to government policy and a 
slowing of their campaign for gender equality. During the Presidential election 
campaign Morris B. Abram observed that “for all his brilliance of mind and 
intellectual achievements...on the upper East side of Manhattan,” the Georgian was 
“still suspect as a Bible thumper and a backwater hick.”15 Even one of Carter’s own 
speechwriters, Patrick Anderson was concerned by the “harsh, judgemental culture” 
of the Southern Baptist faith and “the glee with which they would remind you that 
they would someday be sipping iced lemonade in paradise when you and yours were 
roasting in hell.” It lent Carter, Anderson wrote, a “maddening piety” that meant 
“for all his protestations” he clearly believed himself to “have an inside track to the 
lemonade stand.”16 This fear was exacerbated by the patriarchal attitude of Southern 
Baptist Christianity towards gender equality. As Brinkley concedes “feminists found 
it hard to believe that a born-again Southern Baptist known to address women as
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“honey” and “beautiful” could be on their side.”17 Carter later conceded that
fundamentalist Christian movements were “almost in variably... led by authoritarian
1 8 *males” with “an overwhelming commitment to subjugate women.” This led 
outspoken feminist leader Bella Abzug to deride Carter during the election campaign 
as “a closet Moonie.”19 Furthermore, Carter was faced with the need to win votes 
amongst women from a Republican incumbent whose wife, Betty Ford, was popular 
with feminist women because of her public advocacy of abortion rights. Once again, 
the candidate’s own campaign team insightfully recognised the need for Carter to 
improve his appeal amongst women. A month before election day Pat Caddell 
warned, “Were the election among men, Carter would win in a landslide,” but 
women “view Carter less able than do men.” When presented with the statement, 
“Jimmy Carter would be a risk as President because we don’t know what he would 
do,” a majority of women, unlike men, agreed.20
In response Carter himself attempted to allay fears that his religiosity made him 
incompatible with the feminist agenda for gender equality. In an interview for NBC 
television in March 1976 he declared that he “hated to admit” that there was a part of 
the Bible with which he could not agree but, referring directly to the Gospel of Paul 
which dictated male domination of the household, he said “that’s a passage I’ve 
never been able to accept even though I’ve tried.” To reinforce the point he added, 
“My wife doesn’t accept it either.” Talking to reporters at Plains Baptist Church in 
October of that year on his attitude towards Biblical inerrancy he declared that a 
literal interpretation of the Gospels was not valid since “Part of the Bible obviously 
was written in allegories.” He dismissed the selective reading of Biblical passages 
that fundamentalists argued represented incontrovertible proof of female 
subservience because, he argued, they had been written at a time when male 
domination was customary in most aspects of society. He added that the Bible was
• 91not sexist since Christ had been “committed on an equal basis to women.” Far 
from relegating women to a secondary role, for Carter, the exaltation of Mary, 
mother of Christ, was indicative of the status of women in Christian theology.22
During the election campaign Carter also drew attention to his upbringing in rural 
Georgia and his unusual adult family life, both of which had been punctuated with 
strong and independent female role models and influences. Carter attributed many of
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his core political principles to the influence his mother, who Carter recalls as the 
“real leader” of the Carter family.23 Whilst he remembered his father Earl to be 
“quite conservative,” Carter’s attitude to equality derived from his mother who he 
described as “a liberal,” and a “natural champion for those who were weak or the 
object of scorn or discrimination.”24 During her son’s campaign she said “I’ve 
always had a feeling for the underdog.”25 While his father had been conventional 
and cautious, it was Carter’s mother, wrote Anderson, who gave him his “big 
dreams.”26 Lillian Carter also possessed a level of independence in the running of 
the household that was unusual in a rural southern family of the era. Carter recalled, 
“All the time I was growing up it seemed on the surface that my father made the final 
decisions in our house.” It was not until later that he realised, “how strong willed my 
mother was and how much influence she had in our family affairs.” Household 
management, the purchasing of food and organising of bill payments were all areas 
in which “Mama prevailed with no discussion.”27 Kandy Stroud observed Lillian 
Carter to be “spunky, determined, witty” and “dominating.”28 Carter called his 
mother “the most liberal women in Georgia” and said “It is obvious she had a great 
influence on me.”29 When Lillian Carter herself was asked for her opinion on the 
ERA she replied, “I’ve been liberated all my life.”30 Moreover, Carter presented his 
marriage as the modern model of gender equality. Rosalynn had not been a typical 
middle-class southern homemaker. Carter liked to recite tales of how, after his 
wife’s father had died, Rosalynn had washed hair in the local beauty parlour to help 
the family make ends meet. In his campaign biography he wrote, “When we decided 
to enter politics, Rosalynn helped me from every standpoint. We have been full 
partners in every major decision since we first married.”31 Carter also recalled his 
admiration for the women of his Georgia hometown. Although “everyone in a farm 
family had to work long hours,” the heaviest burden, he wrote, fell on the women. 
“In addition to their fieldwork, often more onerous than the men’s ploughing,” the 
women were also responsible for “all the cooking, cleaning, other housework, and 
care for the family garden,” he wrote. Later, when he ran the family peanut 
warehouse, he had “a number of highly valued female customers, some of whom 
operated very large farms.”32 With this in mind Carter recalled his unease that 
female workers were not treated equally with males. He noted that men were paid 
$1.25 a day, whilst women received only 75 cents.33
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Carter also sought to capture the votes of women by actively addressing gender- 
specific issues during the 1976 Presidential campaign. Carter pledged to “tear down 
the walls” that obstructed gender equality. He outlined a nine-point program to meet 
the demands of the women’s leaders, including support for the ratification of the 
ERA. Stating simply that “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex,” the ERA was the 
cornerstone of the agenda of the feminist movement. Its ratification represented the 
most visible symbol of their campaign to overturn what they perceived as ingrained 
political, legal and social inequality. Thus Carter’s declaration that “I understand the 
special discrimination that has hurt women for so long in the country,” and promise 
to “get ERA passed” held significant electoral appeal. Carter went further, 
conspicuously equating the importance of the ERA to that of Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 
Voting Rights. Calling that act “the best thing that ever happened to the South,” 
because it not only “liberated blacks but liberated the whites as well” he said, “the 
women’s movement can do just as much for men as for women by passing the Equal 
Rights Amendment.” Passage of the ERA was vital in order to give “women a 
chance in life” he declared.34 When asked later to expand upon his position on ERA 
Carter replied, “I can answer that in three words: I’m for it.”35
In part because of Carter’s promise to support ratification of the ERA, the women’s 
movement enthusiastically endorsed his candidacy at the 1976 Democratic Party 
convention. In accepting the party’s nomination he announced that it was “time to 
guarantee an end to discrimination because of race or sex.” He demanded “full 
involvement in the decision-making processes of government by those who know 
what it is to suffer from discrimination,” promising “they’ll be in the government if
? 36I’m elected.” Feminist leaders like Betty Friedan were won over. She informed 
reporters that Carter had told her “as President he would want to eliminate legal 
barriers against women” which was “a very important commitment we have never 
had from any President, candidate or nominee.”37 Friedan observed of the 
convention “This is so different...I was moved to tears by Carter.”38 The support of 
the women’s movement helped Carter win an extremely close electoral victory in 
1976. A memorandum from Patrick Caddell written just days after the election 
observed that Carter’s pledges had meant his appeal had “gained tremendously with 
women,” although he did presciently warn Carter that his female support was
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weakest amongst the “non-working housewives” who were later most likely to be
39attracted to conservative Christian organisations.
Throughout the decade the feminist movement had experienced consistent success.40 
These advances had been made under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. As a 
Democrat Carter raised feminist expectations even higher. “If the women’s 
movement could accomplish [so much] during Republican administrations,” asked 
one feminist, “could they not achieve so much more with a Democrat in the White 
House?”41 In particular, ratification of the ERA now seemed assured. Shogan 
observes that at the time of Carter’s election the ERA “seemed as close to coinciding 
with the American consensus on social and cultural values as was possible for a 
political issue.”42 Whitney notes the failure to ratify the ERA before 1976 seemed 
“like an oversight,” simply “a mistake that would be cleared up.”43 Ratification by 
the necessary three-quarters of the states needed for a Constitutional amendment 
looked to be a foregone conclusion. Bella Abzug summed up the overwhelming 
sense of optimism amongst the feminist movement at the time, after all, she asked, 
“Who’d be against equal rights for women?”44
Yet Carter was unwilling to jeopardise his support amongst Bible-believing religious 
conservatives. Both as a candidate and later as President Carter was often attacked 
for his lack of ideological consistency, what Ribuffo called Carter’s “propensity for 
murkiness.”45 His elusiveness caused Wooten to name Carter “the man of a 
thousand faces,” and led The New York Times to note “Whenever Mr. Carter came 
close to embracing liberal dogmas,” he almost always “carefully qualified his 
remarks to satisfy some conservative objections.”46 Bert Lance, a long time political 
ally of Carter recalled that his friend “was conservative to the conservatives, he was 
moderate to the moderates and he was liberal to the liberals. He covered the whole 
spectrum of political philosophy.”47 Carter’s political manoeuvring on the ERA 
during the 1976 Presidential campaign was particularly obvious. For example, when 
he addressed voters in the Southern heartlands of born-again Christianity he was 
careful not to lead them to believe that he did not support their scripturally based 
view of gender equality. Regarding the debate over the ERA in Georgia in 1973 and 
1974, whilst he was State Governor, he recalled that the mail he received ran 9 to 1 
in opposition 48 He had also falsely told anti-ERA demonstrators in Georgia that his
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wife, Rosalynn, did not support the ERA.49 The Georgia legislature refused to ratify 
the amendment during his governorship. He publicly distanced himself from the 
feminist movement when he reminded southern voters that “I’m from Georgia, and I 
understand Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama and North Carolina -  states that didn’t 
ratify the Equal Rights Amendment.” He cautioned feminist “brassiere-burning 
firebrands” against coming to the South to down “ram the Equal Rights Amendment 
down the(ir) throats” and admitted that ERA activists sometimes appeared to be “a 
movement by the Gay Liberation Front or Gloria Steinem and other more liberal and 
exotic characters,” who were seeking “to destroy proper relationships between 
husbands and wives.50 Carter’s inconsistency did not go unnoticed. In his memoirs 
of his time as speechwriter for the Carter campaign Patrick Anderson recalled his 
fury when references to the ERA were edited out of an address he had written for 
Carter on women’s rights so as to avoid alienating conservative voters. “I couldn’t 
believe it,” he said.51
In contrast to Anderson, most evangelicals were impressed. They were fully aware 
that Carter’s own Christian denomination, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) 
stoutly defended a patriarchal position on gender equality, directly attributing this to 
an inerrant interpretation of Biblical Scripture. The SBC believed that the Apostle 
Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians dictated male authority over women in church 
and in the home. Paul dictated that women were to be “commanded to be under 
obedience” (34:35).52 To Southern Baptists, the ERA violated “the Biblical role 
which stresses the equal worth but not always the sameness of function of women.”53 
Time and again during the election campaign Carter made clear the importance of the 
Baptist faith to his political philosophy. When criticised by liberals for his 
membership of a conservative denomination Carter impressed fellow evangelicals by 
refusing to leave the church and declaring, “If it were a country club I would have 
quit, but this is not my church it is God’s church.”54 Significantly, Carter explicitly 
pledged that he would not utilise the influence of the office of the Presidency to 
pressure state legislatures over ratification of the ERA. It was, he said, a matter to be 
decided “between the individual legislator and his hometown women.”55 He told the 
Oklahoma Senate “I don’t think it would be appropriate for the President to try to 
involve himself directly in the deliberations of the Oklahoma state legislature or any 
other.”56 His apparent refusal to compromise on his religious principles helped
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attract evangelical support for Carter’s candidacy in 1976. Steadfast in their belief 
that their Christian values were those of a majority of Americans, religious 
conservatives hoped that Carter’s promise to once again “make government as good 
as [the American] people” would herald a revitalisation of Biblical morality in 
Washington.57
Phyllis Schlafly, Pro-Family Christians and the anti-ERA campaign
Even before Carter came into office in 1976, the forces of religious conservatism 
were marshalling to prevent the ratification of the ERA. The first national political 
organisation dedicated solely to preventing its ratification was STOP ERA, formed in 
1972 by the conservative Republican political activist Phyllis Schlafly. A former 
campaigner for right-wing Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, Schlafly 
organised her campaign through the Republican women’s network that subscribed to 
her conservative newsletter, the Phyllis Schlafly Report. STOP ERA was dedicated 
to lobbying state legislatures to block ratification. Feminist pro-ERA activists 
clearly underestimated Schlafly. Frum points out that Schlafly was “not the sort of 
person feminists found it easy to take seriously.” She wore bouffant hair, pastel suits 
and pink lipstick. She began her speeches by thanking her husband for allowing her 
time away from the family home. She appeared to represent precisely the sort of pre­
suffrage matriarchal figure that feminists had sought to transcend since the 1960s. 
Unfortunately for them, writes Frum, “she also happened to be something none of 
them were: a genius grass-roots political organiser.”58 Schlafly was pivotal in the 
eventual defeat of the ERA. Conover and Gray observe that without Schlafly “the 
ERA probably would be in the Constitution today.”59 She “literally was the anti- 
ERA movement.”60 She became, in the words of her biographer, the “Sweetheart of 
the Silent Majority.”61 Merely mention her name, wrote Berkeley, “and feminists 
shudder.”62
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Schlafly played a key role in encouraging the politicisation of religious 
conservatives. At first her anti-ERA campaign focused upon secular and legal 
arguments against the amendment.63 She soon realised, as Shogan observes, that for 
those seeking to politically activate the religious conservative community, “the ERA 
was a godsend” because “It offered the opportunity to draw a stark contrast between 
traditional values and the cultural revolution on one of the foundations of society,” 
namely “the importance of distinctions along the lines of gender.”64 Schlafly 
consciously looked to build support for her campaign amongst the congregations of 
conservative churches. “We realised the forces against us were too powerful,” she 
recalled of the feminist movement. “We needed reinforcements.” That was when 
she “sent out the word to the churches.” Schlafly remembered that religious 
conservatives were politically inexperienced. “The ones who came out of the 
churches.. .had never been to [a state] capitol before” she said, but under her tutelage, 
“they learned.” Her campaign successfully transcended religious doctrinal 
differences. The anti-ERA movement was composed largely of a multi- 
denominational cross-section of the religious conservative community, including not 
only evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants but also Catholics, Jews and 
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter day Saints. Unlike many of the 
organisations of the Christian Right that appealed consciously to Bible-believing 
Protestants and socially conservative Catholics, the constituents of Schlafly’s anti- 
ERA campaign might therefore more usefully be described broadly as religious 
conservatives. “The Catholics, Protestants, Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, 
Mormons, orthodox Jews, many of these people had never been in the same room 
before,” she said. “I used to say now the person sitting next to you might not be 
saved, but we are going to work together on the Equal Rights Amendment.”65 
Another of Schlafly’s anti-ERA organisations was Eagle Forum, whose motto “for 
God, Home and Country” explicitly linked the institutions most cherished by 
conservative Christians. Describing itself as an organisation determined “to defend 
the values that have made America the greatest nation in the world,” Eagle Forum 
used overtly religious rhetoric in generating support for her campaign.66 “We want 
to pray as though it’s all up to God, but we want to work as though it is all up to us,” 
said Schlafly. “If there is one word that best describes us, it is that we are believers. 
We believe that God is in his heaven, that eternal life awaits us...in eternal principles 
that do not change.” In particular, she was pivotal in convincing religious
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conservatives that the ERA represented a feminist attack on their closely guarded 
traditional and Biblically based family. She warned them that Betty Friedan had 
declared “The ERA has become both symbol and substance for the whole of the 
modern women’s movement for equality,” a movement whose agenda centred upon 
“the restructuring of the institutions of [the] home.”68 Friedan, Schlafly claimed, had 
called housewifery a “comfortable concentration camp.”69 Schlafly pointed out that 
another high-profile advocate of ERA, Gloria Steinem, had stated her hope that by 
the year 2000 society would “raise our children to believe in human potential, not 
God.”70 To emphasise their attachment to the traditional gender roles of husbands 
and wives in states where a vote on ERA was tabled, Schlafly urged activists to bake
71loaves of bread as gifts for legislators -  “from breadmakers to the breadwinners.” 
The home cooked food they distributed bore the motto “My heart and my hand went
79 •into this dough / For the sake of the family please vote no.” One evangelical wrote 
to her state representative, “Forced busing, forced mixing, forced housing. Now 
forced women! No thank you!”73 Schlafly’s organisations helped to transform 
religious conservatives into the self-defined “pro-family” movement that provided a 
key constituency of the Christian Right. Berkeley credits Schlafly with having “both 
anticipated and paved the way” for organisations like Moral Majority.74
The anti-ERA campaign had a strong appeal to conservative Christians who opposed 
the amendment for a multitude of reasons, all grounded in a religious worldview 
based on Holy Scripture. In particular, they dismissed the concept of an egalitarian 
marriage in favour of a hierarchical one because the origins of patriarchy were 
Biblically ordained. In studying the attractiveness of evangelical churches Roof 
notes that conservative religious institutions clearly reinforced the desirability of “a 
gender-specific division of labour” to their congregations. This meant roles as 
“breadwinner and provider for males, and moral and religious nurturer for 
females.”75 According to Roof, female subservience was encouraged through 
“cultural narratives emphasising the good women as a helpmeet,” that is “a wife and
7  Apartner to the man and as mother to her children.” Evangelicals also believed that 
Scripture taught the need for discipline and acquiescence to authority, a sort of social 
“chain of command.”77 “The Bible clearly states,” wrote Ed Hindson, a popular 
evangelical author, “that the wife is to submit to her husbands leadership and help 
him fulfil God’s will for his life,” and therefore “She is to submit to him just as she
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would submit to Christ as her Lord.” 78 They pointed out that Ephesians mandated 
“the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church... As the 
church is subject to Christ, so let wives also be subject in everything to their 
husbands” (5:23-24).
As a part of the feminist project to create an entirely unisex society the ERA would 
radically alter this Biblically ordained gender relationship. As one pro-family 
activist complained, “Under the Judeo-Christian tradition, men are responsible. I did 
not get married as an equal partner.”79 In short, the ERA defied God’s law, ranking 
alongside pornography, crime, homosexuality and drug abuse as indicative of the 
dangers of abandoning Biblical values. The enforced gender equality of the ERA 
would destroy the Christian family and as such, wrote Jerry Falwell, “the foundation 
of the entire social structure.”80 For Falwell, the ERA was nothing less than part of 
“a holy war” against the family, fought between “those who love Jesus Christ and 
those who hate him.”81 Falwell also saw ERA as part of the homosexual agenda. He 
warned “Feminists desire to eliminate God-given differences that exist between the 
sexes; that is why they are pro-homosexual and lesbian.” It was “shocking how 
many feminists are lesbians,” he said.82 He continuously denounced the links 
between pro-ERA feminists and the “militant gays and known, practicing 
homosexuals.”83 Tim LaHaye asked “Who needs ERA?” Like Falwell his answer 
was not women, “but lesbians and homosexuals.”84 Evangelists also warned that 
ERA would end restrictions on abortion, an act, observed the Christian Action
o c
Council that was “a violation of God’s fundamental laws for human society.” One 
typical pro-family mail shot, sent out by a Christian organisation entitled “Parents of 
Minnesota” declared
Man and women have never been equal, aren’t equal and can never be equal 
as long as they exist. Each was given a different role, a role that 
complimented [sic] the other, roles that blend into a harmonious unit. This 
unit is called the family and the family is the core of society. Now society 
can be good or depraved, civilised or uncivilised. It either possesses order or 
chaos depending on the degree on which the male and female sex roles are 
accepted or rejected. Thus, it is, that moral degeneration replaces moral 
virtues, and SOCIETY RETRACTS BACK, back, back INTO 
BARBARISM! 86
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In Georgia an Independent Baptist minister published an essay in opposition to ERA. 
Again reiterating the Biblical nature of patriarchal gender relationships he wrote,
God clearly created male and female as different and distinct, though both are 
equally human. Thus, to deny the difference is to deny reality, but more than 
that, to deny the Word of God. I would point out here that I believe this is the 
essence of ERA. It is a denial of God, both as to His person and to His
87program and purposes for mankind.
Furthermore, for conservative Christians the ERA was clearly indicative of the 
dangerous trend towards the transfer of state powers to the institutions of a federal 
government they believed to be dominated by secular humanists. Evangelical anti- 
Washington sentiment centred not upon Section I, but upon Section II of the ERA 
that declared “The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.” The open ended nature of the language led
Jerry Falwell to fear that the amendment would become “a blank check” for the
88government to “to tell Americans what it means after it is ratified.” Fellow
Conservative Christian Rosemary Thomson clearly revealed the anti-Washington 
sentiment of her constituents when she warned, “The real concern is that the federal 
government would come and tell states that all laws must comply with what they 
think.”89 The ERA would also mean federal intervention into the affairs of their 
churches. One piece of anti-ERA literature declared that the National Organisation 
for Women (NOW) was demanding “women be ordained in religious bodies where 
that right is still denied,” and warned that “To refuse to do this will be illegal under 
ERA.”90 One evangelical author argued that “The assertion of governmental 
authority over areas of life once considered to be under individual and private control 
means that the American state has become more than government.” Now it was 
“acting as if it possesses the attributes of deity.”91 This anti-government sentiment 
inevitably brought religious conservatives into open conflict with the Carter White 
House. Their opposition to the ERA, and as a result Carter, was extremely effective. 
After 1975 only one state ratified the amendment and a number of other states sought 
legal ways in which to nullify their previous ratification.
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The Carter Presidency and the Failure of the Equal Rights 
Amendment
Once in office Jimmy Carter was faced with the need to retain the support of key 
constituents within an increasingly fractious Democratic Party, few of whose 
members owed him a strong political allegiance. Nesmith observes the desperate 
“need for Carter” to act in order to “hold together the increasingly fragile New Deal 
coalition.”92 One memorandum from Pat Caddell sent in December 1976, during the 
transition period and whilst Carter was still planning his new administration, warned 
“The Democratic party is in serious national trouble,” and Carter’s “political 
situation is precarious for a Democrat. Any loss that he sustains among the non- 
traditional groups which supported him in 1976 that is not compensated for among 
other groups would put his political future in danger.” Stuart Eizenstat also
observed Carter’s difficulties with his fellow Democrats first hand. Recalling one 
difficult meeting with labour leaders he noted the strained relationship caused in part 
by Carter’s religious faith.
And here’s a President who is a fine Christian man, coming in and saying 
grace before the meal. One of the international Presidents made some sort of 
coarse joke, made some coarse remark that sort of berated the President for 
not doing something, and they all laughed at it. And it just, you know, it just 
turned him off. At the end of that lunch, he said he would never repeat that 
experience again.
I think it was an important lunch because it was face-to-face with all of the 
leaders of the central backbone of the Democratic Party for the last four 
years. They didn’t seem to have any respect for him which I thought they 
should exercise. They didn’t show the sensitivity to his background that I 
thought they should have, and he wasn’t part of their whole framework and 
background. And it was painfully obvious at that point that regardless of 
what he might do or say, neither was going to feel terribly comfortable with 
each other.94
Of the tension between the White House and what he called “screaming, unrealistic, 
doctrinaire liberals,” Hamilton Jordan later observed “Our fights were always with 
Democrats” because the White House “had no unifying Democratic consensus.” The
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administration was forced to “put together one coalition” for some issues and “an 
entirely different coalition” for others. As such, “the same fragmentation that 
allowed [Carter] to be elected President made it more difficult for him to govern.” 
Simply put, there was “general chaos in the party.”95 Similarly, Landon Butler 
observed that Carter tried to avoid “the obvious conclusion that the Democratic 
agenda was unpopular” but “a Democratic President does not have the freedom to 
completely repudiate his party’s agenda.”96
One Democratic group whose expectations had been raised by the promises that 
Carter made during the election campaign was feminist women. Indeed, Patrick 
Caddell wrote to Carter to warn him that he would face problems because of his
97“over promising” regarding what he could realistically achieve for feminists. The 
need for Carter to placate feminists did not relent throughout his Presidency because 
of the resignation of Midge Costanza, caused in large part by her criticism of the 
President’s abortion policy, and by his decision to fire Bella Abzug a year later, after 
she complained when Carter scheduled only fifteen minutes for a meeting with 
Abzug and feminist representatives.98 Afterwards Abzug threatened to mobilise 
feminists against the Carter White House, telling the President “You’ll regret 
this...I’ve got a constituency out there.”99 Finally, Carter fired Linda Tarr-Whelan, 
who had been specifically hired by the White House to act as a link between the 
administration and women’s organisations, particularly those seeking ratification of 
the ERA.100
As soon as he took office, female advisors and feminist activists consistently 
pressured Carter to lobby aggressively in favour of ERA. They made it known that 
their continued support could only be guaranteed by aggressive political activism by 
the President in favour of its ratification. Just days after his election, Mary E. King, 
Deputy Director of Action, a Washington based women’s organisation, wrote to 
Carter with a long list of demands, including ratification of ERA. Her high 
expectations of the new President were clear. “With your leadership” she wrote, 
“you can accomplish more than all the last 38 Presidents for over half the 
population.” What was required from him, she said, was more “Direct Presidential 
Leadership.”101 Feminist organisations warned Carter of the electoral consequences 
of his failure to provide such leadership. In March 1977 one such organisation
116
entitled the Ad Hoc Coalition For Women met with Carter and Vice-President
Mondale. They explicitly linked their expectations regarding ERA to Carter’s
pledges on human rights. They demanded that Carter “demonstrate his concern with
the human rights crisis in our own country by exerting the necessary moral
leadership to obtain ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.” Carter should
“reiterate his support of the amendment made during the campaign” perhaps
dedicating “a fireside chat” to do so. Passage of the amendment “must be given
higher priority in a Democratic administration,” especially when “14 of the 15
unratified states have overwhelmingly Democratic legislatures and 23 of the 15 have
Democratic governors.” They complained that the ERA “requires greater
102commitment of the White House resources and staff than currently exists.” NOW 
released a newsletter, entitled “National ERA: A Call to Action,” that judged the 
President to be a “Target” for activists, naming him personally on “a constant list for 
pressure” for activists as part of the ratification strategy.103 In February 1979 Sheila 
Greenwald, the executive director of NOW wrote to the Special Assistant to the 
President for Women’s Affairs, Sarah Weddington, to forcefully remind the White 
House that it was “crucial that ERA maintain high visibility,” and hoping that her 
letter would “serve as a note of encouragement” for the White House to do more to 
support ratification.104
However, as Berkeley observes, feminists quickly became “disenchanted” with 
Carter over what they believed to be his lacklustre efforts in support of women, 
including his “lukewarm support for abortion rights and the ERA.”105 In one 
example early in his Presidency, Secretary Juanita Krups wrote to Carter to complain 
that the number of qualified women appointees in the White House was 
“disappointing.”106 One feminist activist who wrote was highly critical of Carter’s 
efforts regarding ERA and warned Weddington that the President “should not be 
saying that ERA is a top priority if it isn’t.”107 Activists were infuriated with his 
failure to assist a NOW sponsored boycott of states that had not ratified the ERA.108 
Some feminists blamed not only Carter but his staff for the failure to ratify the ERA. 
One women’s leader, Catherine East, wrote directly to Rosalynn Carter to urge her 
“to consult with you, Judy [the President’s daughter in law] and Sarah Weddington 
on women’s issues rather than Jody Powell or Ham Jordan, who manage to hurt the 
ERA and the women’s movement with every move.” Referring to the firing of Bella
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Abzug as co-chair of the National Advisory Committee for Women, East wrote that 
“making a martyr of Bella is no easy task,” but Powell and Jordan “did it with
Carter clearly heeded the feminist warnings. In a repudiation of the position taken by 
his own Southern Baptist denomination, he consistently acted as a strident and highly 
public advocate of the ERA throughout his Presidency. For example, in an address 
to the National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC) in March 1977 he admitted that 
the “failure to pass the equal rights amendment hurts us as we try to set a standard of 
commitment to human rights throughout the world,” and he pledged women his 
administration’s “continuing, unswerving, never-diminishing commitment...to the 
goals that you and I know are crucial to a better life for all Americans.” He was 
extremely optimistic that with his support ERA would be passed. In regard to the 
failure to reach the number of states required for ratification he told them “I hope we 
can correct that defect by next year.”110 Five months later in a Presidential 
Proclamation marking August 26 as ‘Women’s Equality Day’ Carter proclaimed 
“Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment must be completed. Achievement of 
this goal was essential because “Equal rights for women are an inseparable part of 
human rights for all.” He declared,
Strong action is needed to guarantee women total equality in the areas of 
politics and government, education, employment and related benefits, health 
care, housing and justice. The needs, hopes and problems of a complex 
society demand the talents, imagination and dedication of all its citizens 
without regard to sex.111
In June 1979 a Presidential Statement, signed by Carter, in support of the ERA was 
sent to women’s magazines for publication.112 Moreover, Carter used his State of the 
Union addresses throughout his Presidency to make public his support of the ERA. 
He used his first address to Congress in 1978 to declare “the elimination of barriers 
that restrict the opportunities available to women” was a “major priority for our 
Nation.” “What we inherited in the past must not be permitted to shackle us in the 
future,” he said.113 In his 1979 address he pledged to “work with all my strength for 
equal opportunity for all Americans,” and to ensure that the “legal rights of women
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as citizens are guaranteed under the laws of our land.”114 A year later he described
himself to be “committed as strongly as possible to the ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment,” calling its adoption “one of my highest priorities.”115 Carter
explicitly linked ratification of the ERA with his high-profile human rights policy.
He declared the ERA to be an issue of “basic human rights,” and announced “Today
the United States speaks out on behalf of human rights for all the people of the
world. We must be no less vigilant in our defence of human rights at home.”116 In
1980 he told a leadership conference on civil rights “We’ve got to get the Equal
Rights Amendment passed.”117 He told a town meeting at Temple University that he
was “strongly in favour of the ratification of the ERA.”118 In May 1980 he told a
meeting of the League of Women voters of his strong desire to see “the Equal Rights
Amendment applicable throughout the Nation.”119 The President “constantly
120emphasised it in speeches he gave around the country,” recalled Weddington. She 
remembered one instance when Carter
Gave a speech for the ERA in Abilene, Texas, which is not your prime 
audience. But they responded well. We had a series of briefings for business 
leaders, civics leaders, so on and so forth, here in the White House. The 
President himself came up with the idea of sponsoring [an] ERA fundraiser to 
raise money, and he was the principal guest at the event which raised...about 
$115,000 clear, net, and was the largest single event to benefit the ERA that 
anyone has ever had.” 121
His support for ERA was not only public but was also personally reiterated within 
his own administration. Carter himself wrote a memorandum to heads of 
departments outlining guidelines for department heads because of his unequivocal 
support for ERA. “I have made clear,” he wrote “that ratification of the Equal Rights 
Amendment is and will remain a priority with this administration.” He directed the 
head of each White House department and agency to take the following actions:
— Make the most of public appearance opportunities to demonstrate the 
Administration’s commitment to the ERA.
— Include in public speeches...language emphasising the importance of the 
Equal Rights Amendment and assure that similar language is included in the 
speeches made by officials of their agency or department.
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Carter also told his staff that he had tasked Midge Costanza to “focus her efforts on 
women’s issues,” with “particular emphasis on the Equal Rights Amendment.” He 
told her to “meet regularly with department and agency heads, [and] their staffs, and 
representatives of women’s interests to assure full and immediate implementation of 
this directive.”122 Carter himself often met with representatives of women’s 
organisations to discuss how he could support ERA. For example in September 1979 
Carter sponsored a “Presidential Salute to the ERA,” inviting more than 800 
supporters to the White House, followed by ERA strategy meetings with leaders in 
December 1979 and January 1980.123 In February 1980 he personally addressed a 
White House ERA briefing and met with the Presidents of women’s organisations in 
support of the ratification effort.124 Sarah Weddington recalled that “The President 
met monthly with the Presidents of national women’s organisations” often 
“discussing ERA.” Overall, the White House was “very active.” Carter “did try to 
use the influence, the persuasive ability, and the platform that being President gives
1 9 Sone for the benefit of the Equal Rights Amendment.”
In spite of Carter’s advocacy, the strength of the anti-ERA movement made the 
prospect for its ratification, once seemingly inevitable, appear highly precarious. In 
order to give themselves more time, ERA advocates were forced to focus their 
energies in support of an extension to the deadline for ratification from March 1979 
to June 1982. Senior members of Carter’s own staff warned the President of the 
political risks of supporting the extension application which Phyllis Schlafly branded 
a “fraudulent proposal prompted by a little bunch of military radicals.” Once 
again Carter’s aides advised the President to take a course of action because of the 
need to win the support of women, despite acknowledging that there would be a 
backlash from conservative opposition, and again underestimating the level of the 
evangelical reaction. In March 1978 Stuart Eizenstat wrote to the President. Firstly, 
he noted “There is not unanimity in favour of extension” and that “There is little 
apparent support in Congress for the extension.” He warned that should President 
choose to support extension the “political benefit is decidedly marginal.” Therefore 
Carter should procrastinate. “An announcement might be better timed six months 
from now” wrote Eizenstat. Noting “Mrs Carter has publicly supported the 
extension,” Eizenstat advised the President that he might want to ask her to play 
down this support, writing “You might talk with her about the tradeoffs of an
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announcement.” However, Eizenstat then went on to urge Carter to recognise the 
more pressing need to retain the support of feminist groups, noting that an 
“announcement today would please some women’s leaders.”127 He advised Carter to 
use the extension plan to shore up feminist support by writing to key members of the 
Subcommittee on Civil Rights to “make clear your position in favour of an 
extension.” “Perhaps of equal importance” he wrote, this “should blunt some of the 
criticism we have been feeling from women’s groups on you lack of visibility on the 
issue.”128 On the same day Carter’s stridently feminist adviser Midge Costanza 
wrote to the President to inform him “ERA is at an extremely critical point on the 
hill.” She warned that a planned House Judiciary Committee vote on the extension 
had been postponed because of “lack of sufficient support” and that the “chances of 
postponing a vote beyond that date are nil.” Clearly aware of the criticism from 
feminist groups that Carter was not expending the necessary political capital to 
achieve ratification she told Carter “There is a consensus that a final push must come 
from the White House to obtain the additional votes needed.” Costanza listed a 
number of Congressmen who opposed the extension but “may be susceptible to an 
appeal from the President.” Some of these would require “a hard sell” from Carter, 
but Costanza was insistent. “All [of the calls]” she said, “were critical.”129
Once again Carter ignored religious conservative opposition and instead chose to 
please feminist leaders by publicly supporting the extension of the time period for 
ERA ratification. Acceding to the request of Eizenstat and Costanza he wrote to a 
number of the high-profile members of the Judiciary Committee personally, 
including the Committee chairman, Peter Rodino, declaring his “strong support for 
an extension of the deadline.” He wrote “I am concerned that the current deadline 
may be an unnecessary barrier toward ensuring more than a hundred million 
Americans their constitutional rights.” Clearly aware that ERA opponents like 
Schlafly questioned the constitutional legality of the extension proposal, Carter took 
time to outline his position:
There is no constitutional requirement that ratification occur within a seven- 
year period, nor within the period originally established for ratification. 
Under the Constitution, in the opinion of the Justice Department, Congress is 
empowered to determine the period of ratification and can change, by
130resolution, any previously established ratification period.
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Evangelicals wrote to the White House to protest Carter’s support of the time 
extension. “It is extremely unfair to extend the date of ratification” wrote one, “This 
is a democracy -  we are allowed to say ‘No.’” Another evangelical wrote “I do hope 
that the proposed extension for ratifying...ERA will be dropped...enough time, 
energy and money have already been wasted.” She wrote, “I am proud and grateful 
to be a wife, mother and homemaker in this free land. Please, help protect my rights 
to remain free.” One evangelical alerted Carter as to the increasingly organised 
nature of religious opposition to ERA. “There are several large religious bodies in 
the United States opposed to ERA and we belong to one of these,” she wrote. Her 
letter was revealing of the types of concerns that evangelicals had about the ERA. 
“It would (if passed) repeal abortion laws... decency laws... concerning 
adultery...would be struck down.” It was un-Christian because American women 
had been “endowed by her creator with feminine rights.” Finally, she observed, 
“Religious institutions whose doctrines designate different roles for the sexes would 
be discriminated against under ERA.” “This country was founded on the idea of 
belief in almighty God and religious liberty was a part of it,” she wrote.131
Carter ignored their pleas. His lobbying was vital in convincing Congress to extend 
the period of ratification by 30 months. Weddington observed that Carter’s actions 
“changed about seven no votes to yes votes, which did make the difference in the 
final passage [of the extension application]” and that “the President and Vice- 
President played a key role in turning some crucial votes, particularly at the last
132minute.” Carter publicly signed the Congressional resolution that extended the 
ratification deadline. Although a Presidential signature was not required on such a 
resolution, he declared “I particularly wanted to add my signature to demonstrate as 
strongly as I can my full support for the Equal Rights Amendment.”133
An interrogation of the Carter administration’s archival papers reveals a picture of a 
President time and again proactively seeking ratification of the ERA. It indicates 
numerous occasions when Carter and his family personally intervened in an attempt 
to influence debates in state legislatures regarding ratification. For example, when a 
memorandum from Congressional Liaison Frank Moore’s office, this time warning 
that the support of the entire Carter family was necessary to achieve ratification, he 
again acted. Moore’s aides noted that Betty Ford “has been working hard for ERA,”
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and there is “a growing perception among women that the Fords care much more 
about equal rights than do the incumbent First Family.” This, they warned, “was 
especially embarrassing for Democratic women,” and could “cause embarrassment 
for the Democratic Party.” This could result in “a substantial fall-out” if the White 
House did not “come out of the woodwork now, and strongly.” Failure to do so was 
“not worth the risk” they said.134 Once again Carter headed the advice. Both the 
First Lady and Judy Carter were enlisted in support of ratification. Indeed, Rosalynn 
Carter recalled having just two key objectives for her time in White House, the first 
being to promote care of the mentally sick, the second the passage of the ERA.135 
After her husband left office the former First Lady recalled, “I did just about 
anything I could for the cause.”136 She held pro-ERA events and meetings, delivered 
speeches and wrote letters in support of the amendment. She made one particularly 
strong appeal in support of the ERA to a group of prominent female leaders in April 
1979. With one eye clearly on the conservative pro-family lobby she described 
herself as “a relatively traditional person” but went to say, “I am not threatened by 
the Equal Rights Amendment. I feel freed by it.”137 In her memoirs she recalls 
being asked to be auctioned off as a dance partner to raise funds for the ERA 
campaign. “My staff was wondering if it would be appropriate for a First Lady to be 
auctioned o ff’ she said, but her husband told her “Well, it’s better than being a 
wallflower!” so “I danced for the ERA.”138
Another example of the First Lady’s involvement was a memorandum sent to the 
President by his Congressional Liaison Frank Moore entitled “Phone Calls on ERA.” 
Moore’s memo told Carter that the House Judiciary Committee was preparing to vote 
on ERA and that support was two votes short of the 18 required. Moore listed a 
number of Congressmen who had yet to decide how to vote and he urged the need to 
call them to win their support. Moore noted of one Republican from New York 
“Privately says he will vote for the amendment,” but “We need to get a firm 
commitment from him.” Another, from North Carolina “was still 50-50.” These 
calls, Moore stressed “could make all the difference.” Carter himself forwarded the 
memorandum to his wife, personally writing on the memorandum, “Rosalynn -  make 
all of them.” In return the First Lady personally confirmed that she had done so.139 
Later she recalled that “Jimmy and I made dozens of calls to state legislators.”140 
Other administration family members were also involved. Joan Mondale, the wife of
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the Vice-President met the wives of Senators in key states and asked them to 
encourage their husbands to support the amendment.141
In response Schlafly personally charged the First Lady with “improper” use of 
“White House pressure” that “violated Article V of the Constitution” which reserved 
ratification power to the Congress and state legislatures. Schlafly led demonstrators 
to the gates of the White House brandishing signs declaring “Mrs Carter, you have 
no right to lobby for ERA,” and “Mrs Carter: Please Obey Article 5!” Schlafly 
declared “Rosalynn Carter is a part of the Executive branch. She wakes up every 
morning on an Executive branch bed. She made calls to a number of state legislators 
on an Executive branch telephone.”142 Schlafly charged that one North Carolina 
Congressman had cast a key vote in favour of the extension only after the White 
House pledged $1.6 million in federal funding for a local airport.143 According to 
Schlafly, Rosalynn also played a key role in winning ERA ratification in Indiana. 
Democratic Senator Birch Bayh had called the White House with the news that the 
Indiana Senate was deadlocked 25-25 on the issue.144 When the tie was broken and 
Indiana became the thirty-fifth (and last) state to ratify, Schlafly told a rally of 
supporters in Springfield, “The only way they got ERA through Indiana was by 
telephone calls from Rosalynn Carter,” who had “turned on her southern charm and 
told one undecided Senator ‘I’ll campaign for you if you vote for ERA.”’145 Judy 
Carter received similar treatment from Schlafly and her supporters. When the 
President’s daughter in-law travelled to Nevada to lobby state legislators, pickets 
greeted her with signs reading “Go Home, Mrs Carter. You are wasting taxpayers’ 
money!”146
Yet when religious conservatives accused the Carter White House of improper use of 
the Presidential office in support of ERA, the President himself completely denied it. 
During a radio phone-in question and answer session, one caller attacked Carter for 
“violating the states’ rights when you call into the different states and lobby for the 
ERA.”147 In response Carter asserted, “The final decision [on ERA] is with the state 
legislatures.” Admitting only to having “made a few telephone calls” and having 
“talked to .. .some Governors about the passage of ERA,” he declared “I haven’t tried 
to interfere or put pressure on them. I respect very well and very consistently the 
right of individual state legislators to vote the way they choose.” He claimed “I
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don’t have any way to make a legislator vote against his or her wishes...I haven’t 
tried to interfere or put pressure on them,” and furthermore “I don’t want any 
influence on them.”148
This was clearly not the case, and predictably, the White House was once again 
inundated with letters from evangelicals who proclaimed their opposition to both the 
ERA and Carter’s lobbying. One wrote “I feel very strongly that much more harm 
than good, for all concerned, will come if this amendment is passed. The ERA 
“could do more to undermine the American home and family than any other piece of 
legislation.” “This resolution is anti-family” wrote Mrs Gary B. Opperman, 
“Women already have equal rights and this amendment would be redundantory [sic.] 
allowing for no restrictions.” “After reviewing the E.A.R amendment [sic.] I most 
decidedly would not vote for it” wrote Mrs Mary L. Hall to the President, and she 
warned, “I hope that you too are not in favour of it.”149
Time and again the Carter White House lobbied state legislatures to support the ERA 
and time and again Schlafly and pro-family activists defeated them. One such state 
was Nevada. White House aide Mark Siegel wrote to the President to urge him to 
call several members of the Nevada Senate to ask them to vote in favour of 
ratification. He wrote, “I want to impress upon you how critical Nevada is.” The 
memorandum made clear the political crystallisation of religious opposition to the 
ERA. Although Siegel observed that Senator Eugene Echols of Las Vegas was a 
Democrat whose “District is very pro-ERA,” Echols publicly opposed ERA because 
he was “a fundamentalist” with “religious problems with ERA.” Siegel advised 
Carter to take advantage of his “shared religious background” with the Senator in 
order to elicit support, advising him to talk about the need for “Christian equality and 
egalitarianism” when lobbying Echols. Carter should also telephone another 
opposition Senator, Norman Glazer, who Siegel observed was having dinner with 
Judy Carter that evening. For extra effect the President should time his call to 
interrupt the dinner. “A phone call from you to Glazer during the dinner might turn 
around the vote.” A third call should be made to Senator Floyd Lamb, a Mormon, 
who again had “religious objections to ERA.”150 Despite Carter’s lobbying efforts 
the ERA was rejected in Nevada. Carter was again frustrated by religious 
conservatives, especially Mormons legislators who held sway over important state
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committees. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints took an official 
doctrinal position against the ERA on the grounds that God had ordained different 
roles according to gender. They declared “We recognise men and women as equally 
important before the Lord, but with differences biologically, emotionally, and in 
other ways.”151 ERA would “stifle any God-given feminine instincts.”152 Mormon 
opposition also contributed to the amendment’s defeat in Virginia and Georgia. 
They were highly active amongst antifeminist groups in Hawaii, Washington, 
Montana, Idaho and Utah. When one Mormon woman spoke publicly in favour of 
the amendment, she was excommunicated on the grounds that she was “not in 
harmony with Church doctrine concerning the nature of God.”153
Undeterred, the Carter White House continued to aggravate religious conservatives. 
A Spring 1979 memorandum from Sarah Weddington to fellow White House staff is 
typical in that it reveals clearly the extent of the lobbying campaign in Florida, 
targeting one possible “changeable vote,” that of a Democratic Senator from Miami, 
Vernon Holloway. When Holloway had visited the White House for an unrelated 
meeting, the First Lady, Judy Carter, and Hamilton Jordan had all taken the 
opportunity to meet with him regarding the ERA. Weddington wrote, “He loved 
it.”154 The White House also co-ordinated with Florida Governor Bob Graham to 
lobby the Florida Senate. The Chicago Tribune reported, “The governor tried to 
entice key senators off the floor so he and White House aides .. .could try to persuade 
them to change their votes.”155 Democratic Senator Dempsey Barron complained, 
“Senators are being pulled out of the Senate and being threatened by the White 
House.”156 In response members of STOP-ERA sent bottles of glue to the Senators 
with a note, “please stay glued to your seat.” The White House was again thwarted 
and Florida rejected ERA for the fpurth time.157
The White House launched a similar lobbying effort in Oklahoma. In February 
1979, Carter invited Oklahoma Governor George Nigh and key Democratic members 
of the Oklahoma legislature to the White House to plan strategy for the passage of 
the ERA. The Tulsa-Oklahoma World observed that this was unusual given that 
“The President seldom entertains individual governors, and even more infrequently
I f O
entertains state legislative leaders.” However, the ERA was clearly considered by 
the White House to be a priority and a report from Weddington revealed that the
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“President and Mrs. Carter had the Governor, Speaker, President Pro Tempore and 
Majority Leaders of the [Oklahoma] House and Senate to lunch at the private 
residence.”159 According to reporters, the Carter’s used the dinner to pledge to “lend 
whatever support they could to ratification of the ERA in Oklahoma.”160 Carter even 
tried to specifically address the concerns of religious conservatives that the ERA 
“will destroy families,” declaring “If I felt that the Equal Rights Amendment would 
destroy a single family I would not support it.” He addressed the fear that the ERA 
would herald a massive expansion in federal power, conceding that this concern was 
“a very real factor” but declaring that “with a uniform application of the law under 
the U.S. Constitution, it is highly likely that existing laws and regulations can be 
administered much more efficiently, much more simply and with less 
bureaucracy.”161 Carter’s pleas had little impact. A letter from Mary King to Sarah 
Weddington gloomily observed that opposition to the ERA “is based on little
commitment to the issue; it is almost entirely political,” and that grounds for
162opposition by many legislatures were “based on Phyllis Schlafly’s organisation.” 
Again Schlafly mobilised her religious conservatives and once again the amendment, 
and the White House, was defeated.
After Florida and Oklahoma, Illinois became a key battleground state for the ERA. 
As the only remaining northern industrial state yet to ratify, ERA strategists 
predicted that it would hold the key to the future of the amendment. Recognising 
this importance Weddington urged Carter to use his influence in the Illinois State 
Senate. She wrote, “Several Carter delegates who are Senators or Representatives 
are active in the anti-ERA stand.” The President should contact them “to see if their
1 f i'Kvotes are moveable.” Weddington and fellow White House aide Jack Watson then 
circulated a memorandum in April 1980 to cabinet agency heads. Regarding the 
vital importance of the pending vote in the Illinois legislature, they wrote, “The 
political season focuses special attention upon it.” The memorandum asked “all 
administration spokespersons” to:
Raise ERA in speeches and press conferences in the unratified states. 
Reiterate the strong support of the President and the Administration in 
all press opportunities.
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Speak on ERA in addresses to national conventions of a broad range 
of organisations to show this issue as a domestic policy initiative of 
importance.
The memorandum went further by listing a number of rebuttals to complaints likely 
to be raised by Christian ERA opponents. If challenged on abortion, members of the 
administration were advised to declare “The ERA has absolutely nothing to do with 
abortion.” Similarly, if asked whether the ERA would legalise single-sex marriages, 
their answer should be an emphatic “Absolutely not.” In answer to religious 
conservative claims that the ERA woulddead to a blurring of gender boundaries, the 
memorandum cautions “the basic principle of the ERA is not that men and women 
are the same.”164 Another memorandum, this time from Barbara Haugen to Bill 
Albers in May 1980 again revealed the extent of administration activity in Illinois, 
including that of the President himself. It also revealed the need for the Carter White 
House to retain the appearance of non-intervention for fear of a religious 
conservative backlash. Haugen wrote that although “The Administration has poured 
a considerable amount of effort into Illinois,” it is “difficult to blow our own hom on 
this.” The White House was keen to appear disinterested, at least publicly, for fear 
that Carter’s unpopularity with opposition activists would hamper the efforts of what 
Haugen calls the amendment’s “delicate coalition of supporters,” consisting of 
[Mayor] Jane Byrne, [Republican] Governor Thompson, and us.” Although Haugen 
advised that the “Battle [was] becoming increasingly partisan,” the memorandum 
noted that “The President and Vice-President are making calls to legislators” and that 
“Illinois legislators met with the President” in a concerted White House effort to 
convince them to support the amendment. The “President also meets monthly with 
Presidents of major women’s groups. Much of their meeting focus is on ERA 
strategy, especially Illinois.” The White House sent Deputy Undersecretary of the 
Defence Department Kathleen Carpenter to testify at the Illinois House of 
Representatives regarding the implications for the armed force of the ratification of 
the ERA. Haugen recorded that “ERA supporters were delighted with her testimony, 
and credit her with turning “no” votes to one “absent” and one “present.”” The black 
feminist leader Eleanor Holmes Norton was also sent to Illinois to represent the 
administration. Haugen also noted the importance of a White House briefing for 
leaders from unratified states, including religious figures, in an “effort to build 
stronger coalitions of supporters.”165 However Carter’s image amongst the Christian
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community was further damaged when a group of Illinois prostitutes threatened to 
reveal the names of legislator clients if they did not follow Carter’s lead and vote in 
favour of ERA.166
Once again religious conservatives were outraged with Carter’s intervention in 
Illinois. Schlafly charged the President with “blatant blackmail” convening a press 
conference to declare, “During the week Iran was going down the tube, President 
Carter was sitting in the Oval Office telephoning [legislatures] begging them to vote 
for the ERA.”167 She claimed Carter and his supporters in the state were bribing the 
Chicago legislators, offering them “federal housing projects in their districts if they 
would vote yes.” “Governor Thompson was calling the Republicans, offering them 
dams, roads, [and] bridges in their districts if they would vote yes. Mayor Byrne was 
calling the ones who were from the Chicago [Democratic Party] machine and 
threatening to fire their relatives from the payroll unless they voted yes.” However, 
their efforts had little effect.168 “Legislators preferred to have Carter mad at them 
than Mayor Daley,” recalled one pro-ERA activist.169 Most commentators had 
predicted that the ERA would pass in Illinois, but once again anti-ERA activists were 
successful. Recalling the victory Schlafly declared “I didn’t know we had the votes 
[but] God found a couple of votes for us.”170 Midge Costanza responded by 
declaring that Schlafly and fundamentalist Christian anti-gay rights activist Anita 
Bryant would make “a fine set of bookends for Mein Kampf.,,]1{
Another key event in the breakdown of the relationship between the Carter White 
House and the evangelical community because of the President’s stance on the ERA 
took place in January 1980 with the breakfast meeting at the White House between 
the President and evangelical leaders, an event Robert Maddox recalled as “our 
famous Jerry Falwell meeting.”172 At the meeting Tim LaHaye asked the President 
“why he as a Christian and pro-family man, as he protested to be, was in favour of 
the Equal Rights Amendment in view of the fact that it would be so harmful to the 
family.” LaHaye recalls that Carter “gave some ‘off-the-wall’ answer that the Equal 
Rights Amendment was good for the family.” The pro-family evangelist recalls this 
was the moment when he realised that Carter was, as he put it, “out to lunch.” It 
was clear, thought LaHaye, that Carter was a President “who professed to be a 
Christian, but didn’t understand how un-Christian his administration was.” Waiting
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for a limousine to take him back to his hotel afterwards, LaHaye prayed, “God, we 
have got to get this man out of the White House.” The other evangelicals joined 
LaHaye in the limousine. “They were stone silent.” A “depression had settled on us 
all.” Together, they “made a commitment to God that, for the first time in our lives, 
we were going to get involved in the political process and do everything we could to 
wake up the Christians to be participating citizens instead of sitting back and letting 
other people decide who will be our government leaders.”173
After the disastrous breakfast meeting Robert Maddox attempted to convince Carter 
to play-down his support for the ERA, telling the President that his association with 
the amendment risked jeopardising his support amongst the religious community in 
the upcoming 1980 Presidential election. In a memorandum entitled “Religious 
Aspects of the Campaign” Maddox estimated that there were “at least 100 million 
conservative Christians in the nation. This strong base gives the President the 
support to make even clearer calls to moral and spiritual responsibility.” Many of 
these evangelicals “deeply believed that Jimmy Carter has been,” in the evangelical 
parlance “raised up for such a time as this.” He can “capitalise on their feelings and 
convictions to make emphatic statements calling the country to greater moral 
responsibility.” To win their support, however, Carter had to downplay his support 
of the ERA. Maddox wrote, “I would urge that ERA be kept at a low profile” 
because the amendment “remains a deeply divisive issue.” What Carter needed to do 
was be less assertive in his support for ERA. Maddox wrote that many religious 
conservatives “will not hold his stand against him” as long as “he does not push 
ratification of the amendment.”174 Weddington too wrote to the President warning 
that opposition to the ERA was strongest in “the South and rural areas, adults over 
sixty-five, political conservatives, and adults in households where the female head is 
describes as a housewife” a profile largely analogous with pro-family religious 
conservatives. She also noted the effectiveness of the conservative campaign 
regarding the likely effects of the amendment. Weddington reported findings of a 
poll that showed 46% believed the ERA “will have a negative effect on families,” 54 
% believed “Abortions will be more common,” and 54% believed “Employers will 
hire admitted homosexuals.”175
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Carter did not heed these warnings and instead a pivotal blow for the ERA came with 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas day 1979. This raised the 
possibility of the registration of women for military service. Opponents of the ERA 
argued that if the amendment had been ratified, the drafting of women would have 
been mandated by law. Weddington wrote to Carter, “Opponents of ERA will 
undoubtedly again use the registration issue as a reason to oppose the Amendment.” 
Drafting women she said was “a ready-made weapon to the anti-ERA people” and 
could become “a cause celebre to defeat ERA.” She also urged the need for 
President to effectively combat the activities of Schlafly who had “started a petition
1 Hf\drive to stop registration for the drafting of women.” Undeterred, in February 
1980 Carter sought the authority to register both men and women, without 
conscription, under the Selective Service Act of 1948 and in accordance with 
Presidential Review Memorandum/ NSC -  47 that recommended “registration and/or 
induction of women.”177 Again the President made his attitude to gender equality 
publicly clear. “My decision to register women is recognition of the reality that both 
women and men are working members of our society,” Carter said. “There is no 
distinction possible, on the basis of ability or performance that would allow me to 
exclude women from an obligation to register.”178 The 1980 Democratic Platform 
was “committed to ensuring equal opportunity and full voluntary participation in the 
military regardless of sex,” and declared “we do not favour the exclusion of women 
from registration.”179 The reaction of religious conservatives was predictable. One 
Florida Senator declared the use of women in the military to be in defiance of God’s 
laws. “Man has the physical strength,” he said. “Man has got it. God decreed that. I 
didn’t, you didn’t. And God decreed that women would have children.”180 Robert 
Maddox wrote to Anne Wexler warning that registration would create “a major crisis 
in the conservative religious community.” Maddox told her he was “getting braced 
for the onslaught.”181 Schlafly recalled that the issue of military equality was 
decisive in the defeat of the ERA. It “put the nails in ERA’s coffin.”182 In contrast 
to the Democrats the Republican Party took the opportunity to further strengthen its 
support amongst the religious conservative Christian community. “We support equal 
rights and equal opportunities for women” the 1980 party platform declared, 
“without taking away traditional rights of women such as exemption from the 
military draft.”183
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Carter’s strident attempts to lobby state legislators in favour of ERA failed. Just one 
state successfully ratified the amendment during his term of office. Two years after 
he left office the ERA ratification effort finally ended, falling three states short of the 
thirty-eight necessary for ratification. Weddington recalled, “State legislators are 
simply not the natural constituency of the President;
And those state legislators felt far more a sense of concern about what the 
people in their district thought than they did the President of the United 
States. And, if fact, a couple of times after the President made phone calls, 
some of those legislators went out on the floor of their respective Houses and 
said, “I got a call from the President of the United States, but he doesn’t live
184in my district and I’m voting for my people.”
Judy Carter concurred, saying “We didn’t do our homework.” The President “would 
make calls at the last minute trying to sway some legislator, and then the guy would 
publicly announce, “Ha, ha, the President didn’t make me change my vote.”185 
Many legislators refused to support the ERA because of pressure placed upon them 
from religious conservatives in their constituencies. One legislator from North 
Carolina revealed that he received a call from the President during the debate over 
ratification in his state. “The whole world will be watching,” Carter warned him. “I 
put my head down and cried,” recalled the Senator who refused to bow to the
1 RAPresidential pressure. “My people are two to one against it,” he told Carter. In 
her biography of Phyllis Schlafly, Felsenthal attributed the failure of the Carter 
administration’s efforts wholly to her subject. She wrote, “For every one 
Washington lobbyist dispatched to the provinces by Jimmy Carter, Phyllis Schlafly 
dispatched a hundred Stop-ERAers.” Inevitably they were “housewives from the 
legislator’s own district who could make or break him in the next election.”187 In 
her memoirs Rosalynn Carter recalled the failure to ratify ERA the “greatest 
disappointment” of all the projects that she worked on during her time in the White 
House.188 The First Lady specifically blamed the political activism of Christian 
conservatives. One of the difficulties of the ratification campaign she said was “the 
fervour and organisation of the opposition,” that was “so vocal and so powerful at the 
polls that local legislators, who are the ones who must vote for ratification, were 
reluctant to do so.” The opposition spread the image of the ERA supporters as
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“demanding and strident man haters” who “Nice women” did not wish to be 
identified with.189 She recalls that her realisation of the overwhelming faith-based 
opposition to the ERA came on a 1980 campaign trip to a Texas shopping centre. 
“All along the path the police had cleared for me were women holding their hands up 
with printed cards pasted in their palms that read: YOU DON’T LOVE JESUS. “I 
do love Jesus I said to some of them. “If you loved Jesus, you wouldn’t support the 
ERA,” they replied.190
Jimmy Carter’s strained relationship with key constituencies of the New Deal 
Democratic coalition, including feminist women, was inevitably fractious, writes 
Leuchtenburg, because of the “high expectations with which liberals contemplated 
the return of the Democrats to power in 1977, when, after eight years of frustration 
under Nixon and Ford, they could, they thought, pick up where they had left off in 
the Great society era.”191 Carter had specifically raised feminist expectations during 
his 1976 Presidential campaign, but regarding women, as Stuart Eizenstat put it, 
“Whatever we tried to do was never enough.”192 Landon Butler agreed and observed 
that a state of “almost total paralysis” developed between Carter and feminist groups. 
“We found ourselves not only trying to take care of our own politics, but their
I QO
politics as well,” he said. At one White House meeting with representatives of 
women’s groups a plainly frustrated Carter complained that despite having achieved 
“double or triple what has been done with the previous Presidents, even Lyndon 
Johnson, even John Kennedy,” in regards to women’s equality his administration 
“never get anything but criticism.”194 After he left office Carter confessed to the 
tension that existed between feminists and his administration, saying “for some 
reason I was never quite compatible...[their] support was equivocal at best.”195 He 
confided in his diary that “In many cases I feel more at home with the Conservative 
Democratic and Republican members of Congress than I do with the others.”196 
Feminists, both within and outside of the administration demanded that Carter 
constantly expend his political energy on ratification of the ERA. This is not to say 
that Carter did not personally support the ERA. Its ratification was a key aspect of 
the domestic application of his human rights policy, and unlike many of his fellow 
evangelicals, gender equality was central to his understanding of Holy Scripture. 
However, the need to publicly be seen to address the feminist agenda and shore up 
support amongst feminist women led himself, his family, and senior members of his
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White House staff to undertake to an increasingly highly public, strident and 
politically risky lobbying of state legislators in its favour. In effect, Carter was 
forced to over compensate in his relationship with the feminist movement.
In turn, this deeply aggravated religious conservatives fearful of the impact of an 
amendment they perceived as wholly incompatible with their Biblically ordained 
concept of gender and greatly concerned by what they saw as undue federal 
intervention into the affairs of their families, churches and local government. Caught 
between the two Carter, writes Critchlow, “found himself in an ideological riptide 
from which there was no natural escape.”197 In the same way that feminists felt 
betrayed, Carter’s overt identification with the values of the Southern Baptist church 
during the 1976 election campaign only added to the sense of Christian alienation 
with his advocacy of ERA. Furthermore, Carter’s assertive, high-profile Presidential 
support for the ERA helped make prevention of its ratification a question of national 
political importance for religious conservatives, encouraging them to see politics as a 
valid and potentially advantageous avenue in which to channel their opposition. 
Phyllis Schlafly in particular was hugely influential in generating mass grass roots 
opposition to the amendment amongst conservative religious congregations that 
counteracted the efforts of the White House. In one 1980 election strategy meeting 
Carter had predicted “I am afraid the anti-ERAers will defeat me.” Unfortunately for 
the President his premonition proved correct.198
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GAY RIGHTS AND THE CARTER PRESIDENCY
Jimmy Carter’s opposition to homosexual discrimination derived directly from both 
his call for a renewal of the nation’s commitment to human rights and the influence 
of his Baptist Christian religiosity. Combined with his need to retain the support of a 
key Democratic Party constituency, namely the homosexual community, it led to the 
open courting of gay and lesbian electoral support, his refusal to support legislation 
that discriminated against the homosexuality and an unprecedented level of open 
contact between his White House staff and gay rights activists. Unfortunately for 
Carter, it also led Christian conservatives to believe that the President had abandoned 
the defining precepts of his Baptist faith. Conservative Christendom interpreted 
Carter’s apparently secular humanist attitude as both emblematic of the rise of an 
intrusive centralised government bureaucracy into the private affairs of their church 
and family and culpable in America’s precipitous moral decline. In January 1977 
Christian conservative leaders emerged to contest the advances made by the gay 
rights movement during Carter’s Presidency, part of what Glazer terms a “defensive 
offensive” against the increasing acceptance of homosexuality as a valid alternative 
lifestyle.1 The most famous of these was fundamentalist Christian entertainer and 
former beauty queen Anita Bryant. Joining forces with more established evangelical 
figures like Jerry Falwell, James Robison and Pat Robertson, Bryant inspired the 
evangelical community into political opposition to homosexual equality, and in turn 
the Carter White House. Carter’s refusal to adhere to what conservative Christians 
believed to be the Biblically ordained principles of his Southern Baptist faith 
regarding the sinful nature of homosexuality contributed greatly to their decision to 
abandon support of his Presidency in favour of Ronald Reagan in 1980.
Carter’s pledge to renew American devotion to the upholding of human rights was 
consistently articulated throughout both his 1976 election campaign and his 
Presidency. This principle, Carter believed, was rooted in traditional and time- 
honoured national values. The “basic thrust of human affairs points towards a more 
universal demand for human rights” he announced, declaring this to be a trend that
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the United States had a “historical birthright” to be associated with because, as he put 
it, “human rights invented America.”2 Human rights infused “the soul” of American 
nationhood,” he said.3 Appraisals of this key aspect of Carter’s Presidency have 
largely focused upon his characterisation of human rights as a “fundamental tenet” of 
American foreign policy.4 In comparison, the domestic application of Carter’s 
commitment to human rights has received less scholarly recognition. In fact, Carter 
was equally consistent in seeking to address issues of domestic human rights. 
During the 1976 Presidential campaign he spoke of the need “to seek out basic 
human rights and basic civil rights” a commitment, he said, that had been abandoned 
“when Lyndon Johnson left the White House and Richard Nixon came in.”5 Once in 
office he admitted that his “international emphasis on human rights would be 
undercut and fruitless” if his administration “didn’t set an example in our country.”6 
In his 1978 State of the Union address he told Congress “The very heart of our 
identity as a nation is our firm commitment to human rights” and this was both “true 
in our foreign policy” but also “true in our domestic policy.”7 Carter clearly saw this 
policy as applicable to domestic issues such as gender discrimination and sexual 
inequality. As he wrote in his post-Presidential memoirs “Human rights was not 
merely a matter of reducing the incidence of summary executions or torture of
o
political prisoners” but included “protection against discrimination based on sex.” 
As Dumbrell puts it, Carter’s approach to human rights clearly “was not designed to 
begin at the water’s edge.”9
Although Carter saw his human rights policy as an effective political tool with which 
to invoke the memory of his Democratic forebears and to draw a distinction between 
himself and his disgraced Republican predecessors, it would be wrong to assume that 
Carter’s personal commitment to combating injustice and inequality was superficial. 
Carter’s policy on gay rights was shaped by a sincere and profound sense of 
Christian responsibility to use, as he put it, God’s transformative ‘love’ to shape 
government. “Love in isolation doesn’t mean anything,” he told the congregation of 
Plains Baptist Church in July 1976. “But love, applied to other people can change 
their lives for the better through simple justice -  fairness, equality, concern, 
compassion [and] the elimination of inequalities.”10 For Carter this impulse was 
firmly rooted in his understanding of Biblical Scripture. In November 1977 he told 
the World Jewish Congress
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In large measure, the beginnings of the modem concept of human rights go 
back to the laws and the prophets of the Judeo-Christian traditions. I have 
been steeped in the Bible since early childhood, and I believe that anyone 
who reads the ancient words of the Old Testament will find...the idea of 
equality before the law and the supremacy of law...the idea of the dignity of 
the individual human being and the individual conscience; the ideas of 
service to the poor and to the oppressed. 11
In his attitude to applying Biblical precepts through secular government Carter was 
greatly influenced by the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, a liberal theologian who sought 
to understand the constraints on morality that governed Christian interaction within 
the political arena. Niebuhr argued that the primary goal for individual Christians 
was the achievement of complete agape -  the sacrificial love inspired by Christ. 
However, as a ‘Christian Realist’ Niebuhr cautioned that this Biblical love was not a 
practicable political objective since society could not reflect the morality of the 
individual but rather a collective selfish impulse. Instead the highest ideal that a 
Christian could expect from democratic society was the institution of justice. To 
translate Christian love into justice, Niebuhr emphasised the need for Christian 
involvement in politics. “Theology and politics are not really separate fields” he
wrote, “but two perspectives on a single reality, each helping to illumine the data of
12the other.” Carter first began reading Niebuhr in the 1960s when a friend gave him 
a compilation of the theologian’s writing entitled Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics. He 
was profoundly influenced by Niebuhr’s writings on the political harnessing of 
Christian love in the service of social justice and Niebuhr’s conception of justice as a 
political objective compelled Carter to express compassionate Christian impulses 
through his political career. Although during the 1976 campaign commentators 
questioned Carter’s understanding of Niebuhr, the affinity between his understanding 
of the relationship between political power and his religion derived from Niebuhr’s
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work was authentic. In a 1976 campaign interview Carter clearly paraphrased 
Niebuhr in announcing that if he were elected one of his major responsibilities would 
be the “elimination of injustice.” This, he said revealingly, “applies to a broad gamut 
of things” not only international affairs but also “equality.”14 Whilst Carter had been 
governor of Georgia, Niebuhr’s widow Ursula had sent him a taped copy of her 
husband’s sermons.15 Carter was so moved that he took time to write to her 
personally to tell her of the influence that her husband had had upon his political
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philosophy.16 Once in office Mrs Niebuhr and her son were invited to meet with the 
President in the Oval Office, where she presented him with recordings of her 
husband’s sermons for use at Carter’s church.17 Throughout his term in office Carter 
continued to make clear the importance of Niebuhr’s work in shaping his philosophy 
as to the political applicability of Christianity. In a 1978 address on the role, limits 
and responsibilities of the government regarding human rights made before the 
Southern Baptist Convention he again consciously mirrored the theologian’s words. 
He announced, “A person should have as a goal complete agape love.” However, the 
most that could be expected from a secular government was “to institute simple
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justice.” Carter called Niebuhr’s writings “the amazing thing he had ever read” and 
described them as his “political Bible.”19 He later declared, “I live with Niebuhr’s 
work, on a continuing basis.” In an important re-evaluation of the Carter 
Presidency John Dumbrell described Carter’s religious position to be “a kind of
9 1optimistic Niebuhrism.” Carter was moved to apply Niebuhr’s concepts of social 
justice in regards to homosexual inequality.
Clearly Carter saw the realisation of equality, one of the defining tenets of Christian 
doctrine, as fundamentally distinct from advocating legislation based upon specific 
Biblical passages that were themselves open to differing human interpretations, as 
was the case with abortion. For Carter, activism in favour of gender equality and 
against discrimination on the basis of sexual preference did not violate church-state 
separation. Furthermore, Carter’s attitude to discrimination against homosexuals was 
completely compatible with the specific precepts of his Southern Baptist faith and 
the history of Roger Williams’ fight for religious freedom in Colonial America, a 
time when Baptists had suffered severe persecution.22 As Hefley and Hefley 
observe, when Carter launched his crusade for human rights, “Nobody familiar with 
Baptist history was surprised” because he was merely “acting in the finest tradition 
of his early American Baptist heroes.”23 Morris B. Abram, writing in the New York 
Times agreed. Although “I never heard him mention that Roger Williams was the 
founder of the Baptist church in the United States,” he wrote of Carter, “in his bones 
he has absorbed the essence of Baptist Christianity.”24 Press Secretary Jody Powell 
also observed Carter’s human rights policy to be a consequence of his Baptist 
background. “His concern for human rights and his concern about the less fortunate 
in society, and the obligation of those who are more fortunate,” said Powell, “was an
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outgrowth of his faith.”25 Speaking after Carter left office, fellow evangelical James 
Wall observed that Carter “views the world compassionately” as a consequence of 
his Baptist faith. Everything that Carter did, said Wall, was “grounded in his 
religion” because Carter “possesses a religious sensibility.”26 Nowhere did Carter’s 
faith imprint on his policies as much as in his efforts to defend human rights and they 
were clearly discernable in his attitude to homosexual discrimination. “My Christian 
faith is just like breathing to me or like being a Southerner or an American” he said, 
“It’s all part of the same thing -  the sharing, the compassion, the understanding, the 
dealing with the poor and the destitute and the outcasts.”27 Unfortunately for Carter, 
conservative Christians took a very different attitude to the applicability of Biblical 
precepts and the demands of their faith in regards to homosexual discrimination.
The 1976 Carter Campaign and the Gay Rights Movement
Gay and lesbian activism first emerged as a cohesive political movement at the end 
of the 1960s, inspired both by the success of the Black civil rights, antiwar and 
women’s movement of the same decade and the riot at the Stonewall Inn in New 
York City in 1969.28 Explicitly comparing their plight to that of Southern Blacks, 
the newly politically conscious gay and lesbian community demanded an end to legal 
discrimination on the basis of sexual preference. And similarly, just as younger, 
more militant Blacks challenged the older established leadership of the Civil Rights 
movement at the end of the 1960s, so a new generation of more aggressive gay rights 
advocates emerged in the 1970s. They were extremely successful, winning greater 
public acceptance, political recognition and legal equality for their homosexual
29lifestyle. An affluent, politically literate and well-organised gay community was 
centred upon the traditionally Democratic cities of San Francisco and New York, and 
they overwhelmingly voted Democratic. In 1972 the Democratic Party platform 
endorsed freedom of “lifestyle and private habits without being subject to 
discrimination or persecution,” the first time such language had been written into the 
platform of a national political party. “It seemed as if gays were everywhere”
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observed Heineman, “but especially in the Democratic Party.”31 By the time Jimmy 
Carter ran for the White House the gay community had became a key Democratic 
Party constituency, and one Carter could ill-afford to ignore, either as a candidate or 
later as President.
The Presidential campaign of 1976 was the first in which issues of gay and lesbian 
discrimination entered the national political discourse. Whilst President Gerald Ford 
remained uncommitted, the Carter campaign consciously courted the vote of the 
newly activated Democratic constituency through a well co-ordinated campaign in 
support of homosexual rights. In April 1976 a Carter campaign memorandum, from 
Dick Ellis entitled ‘Gay Rights and the Carter candidacy’ outlined the pressing need 
for Carter to make contact with representatives of the gay community. However, the 
memorandum also revealed the difficulty posed to a candidate like Carter in 
associating with the homosexual community. Ellis admitted that the question of 
sodomy would “bring nervous grins to the faces of the Carter people.” In a political 
context, the campaign had to be careful of not appearing to taking a position “for 
sodomy.” Despite this danger, Ellis argued that the political risk was one worth 
taking. He strongly urged that “Carter people” make contact with a number of 
homosexual political groups. One, “The Gay Activists Alliance,” was a national 
organisation that was “well organised, articulate and vocal” as well as “heavily 
Democratic” and “respected within Democratic circles.” He called for active 
involvement with the Alliance and detailed the key issues of concern to the gay 
community that Carter should publicly address including discrimination in the civil 
service, the military, in immigration, in the taxation of gay couples and in anti­
sodomy legislation. As a “political footnote” Ellis observed, “Gay people have been 
estimated as comprising at least six percent of the electorate.” Carter’s engagement 
with gay activists had to be serious: lukewarm efforts had already “managed to make 
both Gerald Ford and Scoop Jackson look foolish.” Carter needed to take a 
“sophisticated” view on gay rights. He had to “be able to pass something” to the gay 
community. For example, regarding lesbian discrimination he advised Carter to take 
a “stand similar to our position on equal rights for women.” On immigration Ellis 
advised, “We can easily support reform on the grounds that we should treat 
everybody the same.” The political advantage of winning the gay vote was clear. “If 
we do this right, we ought to be able to get good mileage out of it,” he wrote.32
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Subsequently other campaign staff reinforced the political advantages to be gained 
by Carter’s contact with gay voters. The Carter campaign was especially focused 
upon San Francisco where the gay community was well organised politically. A 
memorandum from Charlie Graham, a Carter staff member from San Francisco to 
David Moran, a member of the domestic issues staff back in Georgia concerned an 
upcoming campaign visit by Carter to the West Coast. Warning that San Francisco’s 
gay electorate was “endorsing Jerry Brown,” Graham advised that Carter must work 
to “win as many gay votes as possible with an assertive pro-gay rights stand.” A 
strong pro-gay rights statement by Carter would “loosen Brown’s influence in San 
Francisco considerably.” Observing that, “a conservative estimate in the primary is 
that 500,000 of the 3.5 million votes are from gay people,” the gay community’s 
“dollars, endorsements and volunteer time can come to Carter.” Again however a 
member of the Carter staff warned that this might be problematic for Carter because 
of his faith. “Religion is a contentious issue for gay voters” he said, because “The 
Bible and church involvement are rejected outright by gay people.” He urged Carter 
to “admit that Old Testament sexual theory doesn’t have to be everyone’s way of 
life, and it is possible to reject religion and Christianity altogether and still be a 
complete person.” It may be difficult for Carter to adopt this either-or-approach to 
faith,” but “I’m convinced he can be damaged severely with gay people...unless he 
does.” Carter was also hurt by the actions of his faith-healing sister, Ruth Stapleton 
Carter who claimed she “cures homosexuality with religion.” Graham warned, “so- 
called cures are very contentious among gay people who don’t believe they are sick 
to begin with.”33
Heeding the advice of staff like Ellis and Graham, the Carter campaign team worked 
overtime in an effort to make clear their support of the homosexual community. The 
candidate himself appeared on the NBC’s Tomorrow Show and declared, “I favour 
the end of harassment, abuse or discrimination against homosexuals.”34 In an open 
letter to the Philadelphia Gay News he wrote, “I oppose all forms of discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.” During a press conference in San Francisco he 
was asked if he supported a bill sponsored by then Democratic Congresswomen 
Bella Abzug that would extend the coverage of all federal civil rights legislation to 
sexual orientation. “I will certainly sign it” said Carter, “because I don’t think it is 
right to single out homosexuals for special abuse or special harassment.” Moreover,
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were he to be elected President “all the policies of the Federal government will 
reflect this commitment.” Robert Havely, the Carter campaign’s National Issues and 
Policy advisor wrote personally to Jean O’Leary, co-executive of the influential 
National Gay Task Force (NGTF), a homosexual rights advocacy group, to reiterate 
that Carter supported Abzug’s bill and “although not entirely comfortable with 
homosexuality for personal reasons,” he would “sign the bill if it reaches his desk” 
because of his “feeling that gay people should not be singled out for special 
harassment, abuse or discrimination.”
Just as the evangelical community saw a Carter Presidency as a way to have their 
views heard in government, so a key concern of the gay community was that they 
should be represented politically through appointments to positions of authority. 
They were particularly concerned that sexual preference should not be a 
discriminatory factor in political appointments. The Carter campaign again sought to 
convince them that their candidate would deliver on both counts. One Carter press 
release claimed that “Avowed gay people hold staff positions in the Carter 
campaign.” Another explicitly appealed to the lesbian community. It announced 
the appointment of three openly gay women to a committee tasked with advising 
Carter on the appointment of women to federal positions. The appointments, it 
declared, were “the first time that known gay people have been appointed to an 
important national advisory committee.”37 The Carter campaign funded an 
organisation entitled ‘California Gay People For Carter’ a press release from whom 
announced “Jimmy Carter speaks out on Gay Rights.” Charles Cabot III, a member 
of the Carter campaign issues staff wrote personally to one gay voter to declare,
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“Governor Carter is opposed to discrimination in all its forms.” In particular, 
Carter acted on the advice of his staff and specifically sought to quiet the gay 
community’s apprehension that as a Southern Baptist Christian he would seek to 
legislate against homosexuality. “I don’t consider myself one iota better than anyone 
else because I happen to be a Christian” he said, “and I have never done anything 
other than keep strictly separate my political life and my religious beliefs.”39 When 
asked about his attitude to the legislation of sodomy and homosexuality he said, 
“You can’t legislate morality” and advised those concerned to examine his record as 
governor of Georgia. If they did, they would see “I didn’t run around breaking down 
people’s doors to see if they were fornicating.”40 Indeed, rather than dictating a
150
disapproving attitude, Carter believed his faith guaranteed his respect for homosexual 
lifestyles. “A true Christian loves everybody” he said later, “Blacks, Mexicans, gays, 
you must feel compassion for everybody.”41
Carter’s campaign raised the expectations of many gay voters and led key leadership 
within the gay community to strongly support the Carter campaign. Reverend Troy 
Perry of the predominantly gay Metropolitan Community Church in San Francisco 
announced publicly “I am strongly supporting Jimmy Carter because of his 
commitment to civil rights.” Lesbian leaders Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon, 
Chairperson of the San Francisco Commission on the Status of Women and 
Commissioner of the San Francisco Human Rights Commission respectively 
announced their support for Carter specifically “because he supports gay civil 
rights.” Another gay activist said “I am convinced that the Carter-Mondale 
administration will place in key positions hundreds of persons in a new 
administration,” and would “assist us in realising our goals of Federal legislation in 
the areas of law reform and discrimination.” Referring to the social conservatism of 
previous Republican administration he said, “Those of us who have had to deal with 
the federal bureaucracy under the Nixon-Ford administration” would “recognise the 
benefits of a Carter-Mondale victory.” The homosexual press lauded Carter for 
being “consistently upfront on gay rights.” Unlike other politicians, they wrote, he 
“makes no hesitation in speaking out on the subject at all times.”42 Subsequently an 
advertisement ran in the gay press that declared “Jimmy Carter will deliver for 
California’s Gay people,” and in return urged the homosexual community “Let’s 
deliver for Jimmy Carter.”43
As a Southern Baptist Christian Carter’s advocacy of homosexual rights was clearly 
a political gamble. Were he to be too overt in his lobbying amongst the gay 
community he risked jeopardising his support amongst what in 1976 appeared to be 
his most natural constituency, namely the evangelical and fundamentalist Christian 
community. Bible-believing Christians saw a clear link between America’s moral 
decline and the advances of the gay rights campaign made during the previous 
decade. Their opposition to homosexuality was grounded in the Scriptures that 
declared the act of homosexuality to be sinful. “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as 
with womankind: it is an abomination” warned Leviticus 18:22, “If man also lies
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with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them hath committed an 
abomination.” The acceptance of homosexuality as a valid alternative lifestyle, a key 
demand of the gay rights campaign, risked incurring the apocalyptic wrath of God 
and threatened America’s providential status as His chosen nation. Jerry Falwell 
warned that the Almighty had “destroyed the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah because 
of their involvement in this sin.”44 The “homosexual movement [was] an indictment 
against America and is contributing to its ultimate downfall,” he said.45 Falwell cited 
the warning of Psalm 9:17, “The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations 
that forgot God.”46 Only by reversing its decline into moral degradation could 
America once more reclaim its place as the Lord’s prime agent of worldly 
redemption. As Hill and Owen put it, evangelicals wanted a return to a nation based 
upon the “vision of what God wills for American society -  which is a far cry from 
the way things are now! An aroused, purged, redeemed and redirected America will 
be a refreshed America.”47 James Robison scoffed at the “men who want to make 
love to men,” whilst Falwell pondered whether the death penalty might be instituted 
as the standard punishment for being homosexual.48
Despite the risks of promising to address the agenda of gay voters Carter’s campaign 
staff clearly believed that their candidate’s obvious religious identity would be 
enough to guarantee the continued support of conservative Christians. They gambled 
that Carter could convince homosexuals of his support for their lifestyle whilst 
equally convincing Christians that he shared their Biblical attitude to gay rights. 
Overwhelmingly secular, the Carter staff’s underestimation of the strength of feeling 
amongst the evangelical community on this issue was once again revealed in another 
campaign memorandum from Charlie Graham. It made explicit the expectation that 
Carter could support gay rights without jeopardising his support amongst the 
conservative Christians. Graham wrote to David Moran regarding a Christian 
organisation called The Family Lobby organised through Californian fundamentalist 
congregations. Greatly concerned by the advances made by the homosexual 
community towards acceptance of their lifestyle in the first half of the decade, in 
1975 The Family Lobby had formed a petition to reverse a consensual sex law that 
legalised homosexual acts between consenting adults. Graham wrote that they had 
“stopped their referendum effort when gay groups moved against them.” Now in the 
election year the Lobby was trying again, seeking to raise enough signatures to place
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a gay “sexual offences” initiative on the California general election ballot. Graham 
believed that Carter should avoid speaking out either in support or opposition to the 
referendum because “Public opinion itself may defeat the Family Lobby bill” and 
“may split painfully over the fundamentalist/civil libertarian issue and I don’t think 
Carter wants to get caught in this bind.” Instead, Graham advised Carter only to 
“speak out modesty” in favour of “privacy in relationships between consenting 
adults,” a code-phrase for the acceptance of a homosexual lifestyle. In this way, said 
Graham, Carter could win the support of both the Christian and homosexual 
communities because gay people would “remember his support” on the issue, but 
Carter’s identity as a born-again Christian meant that “the fundamentalists will know 
that he supports them in other ways.”49
The “other ways” that Graham suggested Carter could retain his Christian support 
included a number of statements on homosexuality made during the campaign that 
hinted that Carter shared their theologically conservative attitude. He told U.S. News 
and World Report that same-sex sexuality was “contrary to Biblical teaching”50 and 
asked in a television interview about his attitude to homosexuals serving in the 
military Carter admitted “I do have a hang-up about that particular thing.” Carter 
explained his fear that active homosexuals in the military would be “susceptible to 
blackmail” because of the “highly secret...nature” of homosexual relationships. 
When the interviewer pointed out that the same would be true of an adulterous affair 
carried out by a heterosexual husband with children, Carter denied that a 
heterosexual act could possibly be as much of “an embarrassment” as a homosexual 
one. Blackmail attempts would therefore be “much more successful in the case of 
homosexual acts.”51 He told Playboy magazine that his Christianity lent him a sense 
of “nervousness” about the issue of homosexuality. He also made his opposition to 
consummation of a gay relationship absolutely clear. To engage in “homosexual 
activities” was the same as to engage in “adultery” or “for us to steal, for us to lie” 
because, according to his Southern Baptist faith, “all of these are sins.” As he often 
did during the campaign he invoked the traditional image created by his small-town 
Southern background. In Plains, he recalled,
We’ve had homosexuals in our community, our church. There’s never been
any sort of discrimination - some embarrassment but no animosity, no
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harassment. But to inject it into a public discussion on politics and how it 
conflicts with morality is a new experience for me. I’ve thought about it a 
lot, but don’t see how to handle it differently from the way I look on other 
sexual acts outside marriage.52
Carter also appeared to suggest that he possessed a conservative Christian attitude to 
the legislation of homosexuality. He told Playboy that legislation controlling 
homosexuality and sodomy “were on the books quite often because of their 
relationship to the Bible.” Early in the nation’s history the Judeo-Christian moral 
standards had been “accepted as a basis for civil law...I don’t think it hurts to have 
this kind of standard maintained as a goal,” he said.53 This, combined with Carter’s 
assertion that “we should try to assure that secular law is compatible with God’s 
laws” and that “If there is a conflict between God’s law and civil law, we should 
honour God’s law” suggested to conservative Christians Carter’s agreement with 
laws based on Biblical precepts, including religious principles with regards to 
homosexuality.54 Carter portrayed his views as compatible with those of his fellow 
Southern Baptists, a denomination that declared homosexuality to be “not a valid 
alternative lifestyle” because “The Bible condemns it as sin.”55 The Southern 
Baptist’s conservative interpretation of divine revelation led many believers to be 
moralistic in doctrine and life-style. Dr Duke McCall, President of Southern 
Seminary in Louisville admitted that this puritan tone was still to be found in the 
Southern Baptist Church.
We have a more puritan ethic in our official pronouncements, if not in our 
personal practices, than many other religious bodies. Paint us purple with 
passion if a public official advocates any form of gambling. Colour us absent 
in the ecumenical meetings. Paint us red with rage if one of our leaders takes 
a stand on a public issue with which individually we do not agree.56
McCall conceded that Southern Baptists often appeared disengaged from mainstream 
culture as a result. Baptists “regularly make our collective statements about 
alcoholic beverages, pornography and dancing. Whatever these sound like to us, 
they sound like voices out of the past to modern Americans. Southern Baptists really 
are different” he said. “We cannot make ourselves look like the main line church 
bodies in America.”57 E. Brooks Holifield, professor of American religious history
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at Emory University, called the Southern Baptist Convention “one of the last great 
repositories of the Puritan tradition in America,” and he wrote “Carter embodies a 
Calvinist piety filtered through Puritan introspection.”58 Carter’s obvious aversion to 
homosexuality was clearly founded in the Southern Baptist faith. When challenged 
during the 1976 campaign about his “puritanical tone” he simply declared, “I can’t 
change the teachings of Christ” and, what is more, he added, “I believe in them, and 
a lot of people in this country do as well.” 59
The Carter Presidency and Homosexual Discrimination
Jimmy Carter was the first Democratic President elected since the 1969 Stonewall 
riots and the founding of the National Gay Task Force in 1973. Furthermore, he was 
the first Democrat elected since the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 
1965 Voting Rights Act. These factors, coupled with Carter’s focus on human rights 
and its obvious implications for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
meant that the homosexual community had extremely high expectations of the new 
President.60 A key tenet of Carter’s campaign victory had been his personal integrity 
and trustworthiness. His victory had been built upon a long list of promises.61 Once 
he was elected Carter was faced with the challenge of delivering on these ambitious 
electoral vows, none more so than his pledges regarding human rights. In July 1977 
White House staff secretary Rick Hutcheson wrote to the new President observing 
“People have seized the words ‘human rights’ and are applying them to every 
argument, cause and issue imaginable.” These included “Domestic concerns, 
including gay rights.” These had “taken precedence over foreign affairs in many 
peoples minds. They ask ‘If you [the President] are so concerned about the violation 
of human rights in other countries, why don’t you do anything about the human 
rights here [In the U.S.]?”62
The attitude of the Carter White House to the gay community became an issue of 
national focus in January 1977 when commissioners in Dade County, Florida sought
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to end discrimination against homosexuals. They voted to extend a local 
antidiscrimination ordinance to protect gays, banning discrimination in housing, 
public accommodations and employment, including educational institutions, on the 
basis of affectional or sexual preference. Violators would be subject to up to 60 days 
in jail. Gay activists compared the law to Lyndon Johnson’s Civil Rights Acts 
against racial discrimination. In doing so they were clearly inspired by the new 
President’s rhetoric in support of human rights. As Florida gay activist Robert Kunst 
declared in support of the ordinance, “I believe that human rights are absolute, as 
President Carter said.”63
Conservative Christians in Dade County challenged the anti-discrimination 
ordinance and the debate developed from a state issue into an early demonstration of 
the Christian community’s willingness and ability to engage in political activism on a 
national scale. Anita Bryant, a former Miss Oklahoma, singer and devout 
fundamentalist Christian, started a campaign to overturn the new anti-discrimination 
law in Florida. It was, writes Brown, “the first shot in what became a major battle 
for Christian conservative organisations.”64 Believing that the ordinance represented 
official endorsement of homosexuality as “an acceptable alternative lifestyle,” she 
declared herself to be “not only aflame but on fire” in disgust.65 Bryant claimed 
“Gay activists are joined in a disguised attack on God.”66 She called homosexuality, 
“a cancer on the soul of society” and warned, “I am not the only one who feels this 
strongly.”67 “Before I yield to this insidious attack on God and His laws” she
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pledged to “lead such a crusade to stop it as this country has not seen before.” 
Bryant believed that God had chosen her to lead the struggle against immorality, 
seeing her fight as mirroring that of Esther and Deborah, two Old Testament Biblical 
heroines who had saved the people of Israel. The strength of this conviction was 
further reinforced when she discovered that Deborah had also been a singer.69 
Inspired, she formed an organisation entitled ‘Save our Children’ and called on 
conservative Christians to mobilise their dormant political strength. Political apathy, 
born of Christian separatism, was no longer an option she warned. “The day of the 
comfortable Christian is over,” she said.70 In a full page advertisement in the Miami 
News entitled “The Civil Rights of Parents: to save their children from homosexual 
influence” Bryant bemoaned the fact that, “American society largely has developed 
an attitude of tolerance toward homosexuality.” This mistake had been “based on the
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understanding that homosexuals keep their deviate activity to themselves.” This 
acceptance been “destroyed” in Florida because of the attempt to “legitimise 
homosexuals presence in our society,” for example “by forcing our private and 
religious schools to accept them as teachers...no matter how blatant and perverted 
their lives might be.” Bryant feared that allowing homosexuals to teach in schools 
would create gay “role models for the impressionable.” It would allow homosexuals’ 
access to children, an act that was “absolutely necessary for the survival and growth 
of homosexuality” because “since homosexuals cannot reproduce, they must 
recruit!” The most likely victims were “a teenage boy or girl who is surging with 
sexual awareness.” The advertisement warned that police in Los Angeles had 
reported that “25,000 boys 17 years old or younger had been recruited into a
71homosexual ring to provide sex for adult male customers.” She called homosexuals 
“human garbage” and warned that the Dade County ordinance would “protect the 
right to have intercourse with beasts.”72
Bryant’s campaign was hugely successful and other Christian leaders quickly joined 
her. Clear links developed between her campaign and those evangelists who would 
go on to form the Christian Right. In late January 1977 she appeared on Jim 
Bakker’s top-rated ‘The PTL (Praise the Lord) Club’ television show to tell viewers 
“We are in the middle of a battle that the Lord opened my eyes to...Homosexuals 
want to come out of the closet. When I first heard about what they were attempting 
to do in Dade County, the Lord took hold of my heart.”73 She warned that America 
faced dire consequences if the gay liberation movement succeeded. “When society 
deliberately rejects God,” she told the Pentecostal Bakker, “the Bible tells us God 
will give them up to uncleanness.”74 After the interview Bakker called Bryant’s 
performance “the bombshell that exploded over America.”75 A month later she was 
a guest on Pat Robertson’s ‘The 700 Club.’ “We believe in the Word of God, and
7  f \there it says that homosexuality is an abomination” she said. She also appeared on 
Jerry Falwell’s ‘Old Time Gospel Hour’ and in return Falwell staged an anti-gay 
rally in Miami alongside Bryant. Falwell yearned for a return to pre-1960s attitudes 
to homosexuality. “Less than a decade ago” he wrote wistfully “the word 
‘homosexual’...was disdained by most Americans.” It represented “the nadir of 
human indecency” and was utilised “as a word of contempt.” Now “all of this has 
changed.” Now gays were openly demanding recognition of their deviant lifestyle.
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77“Today thousands of men and women in America flaunt their sin openly.” 
Christians denied that the issue was one of homophobia, but one of Biblically based 
moral instruction. “I love the homosexual enough not to allow him to assert himself 
a life-style the Bible teachers is a perversion,” Reverend William Chapman, a 
Baptist, told the Miami Herald, “I love him enough to take a stand and say, ‘No, that 
ought not to be. You don’t break God’s laws.” According to Scripture, he added, “a 
gay person is a pervert.”78 Sufficiently agitated, Miami voters rejected the anti- 
discrimination ordinance, voting by 71-per cent to 29 percent for its repeal in June 
1977. The Miami Herald reported that the fervour over the ordinance brought 
hundreds of opponents to the County courthouse and the Metro Commission 
chamber in protest, and noted with interest that most “appeared to have been brought
79in by fundamentalist Christian churches arriving in church school buses.” They
wore signs reading “God says no, who are you to be different?”80 After the defeat of
the ordinance triumphant conservative Pat Buchanan declared, “the gay rights
81movement has been routed” in its “collision with Christian fundamentalists.” 
Bryant announced, “The ‘normal majority’ have said, ‘Enough! Enough! Enough!” 
She promised to continue her crusade nationwide to “repeal similar laws...which 
attempt to legitimise a life-style that is both perverse and dangerous.” Her campaign
would “slow down the forces that are attempting to destroy the foundations of this
82country.” “It was like watching the Scopes Monkey Trial,” said one bemused
Q-0
Miami reporter.
After her victory in Miami, Bryant won further successes against anti-gay 
discrimination ordinances in Minnesota and Oregon. In doing so she also made her 
political persuasion clear and her campaign became increasingly partisan. At one 
rally she appeared on stage with future Republican Presidential hopeful Ronald 
Reagan. Another Republican, Senator Jesse Helms circulated a report to his 
constituents in support of Bryant. It described her as “a deeply committed Christian” 
and “a concerned American” who had “dared to speak out.” It encouraged readers to 
write to Bryant in support. “She is fighting for decency and morality in America and 
that makes her, in my book, an All-American lady,” said Helms.84 When she 
continued to win further successes against gay rights, Bryant declared, now with one 
eye firmly on the Carter administration, “Hopefully the White House will be 
challenged...to take a more consistent stand for those values that made America a
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great nation.”85 “America’s political leaders” she warned “will not be permitted to
86impose on the people a standard that legitimises sexually abnormality.” She also 
attacked Carter for staying silent during the Dade County debate and derided him for 
his failure to live up to his Southern Baptist principles. Specifically referring to 
Carter, she told conservative Christians that he had “refused to take a stand on the 
issue of gay teachers,” and she threatened “before the next election, millions of 
fellow born-again Christians will demand to know if our President is in favour of 
known practicing homosexuals teaching in public, private and religious schools.” 
Bryant promised to “continue to pray for President and Mrs. Carter” in “hopes that 
they will take a stand against this issue of morality.”87 As a result of her campaign, 
Bryant was named “Most admired Woman in America” in a poll in Good 
Housekeeping magazine.
Bryant’s campaign led conservative Christians into conflict with the Carter White 
House. His failure to support discriminatory legislation against homosexuals and his 
open lobbying of gay electoral support appalled them. Equally, they were dismayed 
by his failure to appoint conservative Christians to influential posts in his 
administration, choosing instead a number of staff members with openly liberal 
attitudes to homosexual rights. The liberal and feminist Presidential appointments 
made by Carter in an effort to placate feminist and gay rights organisations, like 
Bella Abzug, Marilyn Haft and Midge Costanza caused him the most problems. As 
chairwomen of the International Women’s Year Commission Abzug had upheld the 
rights of lesbians. Haft had a long legal background of working in support of gay 
causes, including a period of time sitting on the board of directors for both the Gay 
Rights National Lobby and the National Gay Task Force (NGTF).88 Conservative 
Christians were especially disillusioned with the appointment of Costanza as 
Director of Public Liaison. She strongly supported the Dade County gay rights 
ordinance and publicly attacked Anita Bryant, by now a genuine heroine for 
evangelicals, for having “visions of grandeur.”89
Evangelicals and fundamentalists were aggravated when in March 1977 Costanza 
agreed to meet with representatives of the NGTF, the first gay lobbyist organisation 
to ever receive an invitation to the White House. The NGTF used the three-hour 
White House meeting to protest against what they perceived as the wide ranging
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discriminatory practices of a number of federal agencies.90 Co-Executive Director of 
the NGTF, Jean O’Leary, recalled the huge significance of the White House meeting 
for the gay community, saying “I think this meeting meant a lot for the whole 
community. It was history.” O’Leary had no doubts as to who was the most forceful 
advocate of gay rights at the White House. “The meeting came about through Midge. 
The people we met with often didn’t want to be there, but when Midge called...they 
knew they had better show up and listen to what we had to say,” said O’Leary.91 
After the meeting Costanza wrote to the President requesting action on a number of 
issues. These included gays being “refused entry into the Armed Forces and 
dishonourably discharged if discovered,” the IRS “unofficial policy” that denied tax 
exempt status to non-profit Gay organisations” that was “financially crippling the 
gay rights movement,” the need for gay groups to receive “a higher proportion of 
Health, Education and Welfare money for gay counselling and health programs,” and 
the immigration policy that meant gays were “refused entry into this country for 
visits” and “denied permanent residency or naturalisation based on homosexuality.” 
Furthermore, the U.S Commission on Civil Rights had “declined to expand their 
jurisdiction to include discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,” and in the 
State Department “Gays are being denied security clearance.” Costanza told the 
President that during the meeting she had “agreed to help” set up meetings with the 
Justice Department, the Department of Defence, the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights and the H.E.W. She had also arranged for the NGTF to “return for another 
White House meeting with me in six months to report on their progress.”92 Once 
again the high expectations amongst the gay activists that Carter would act to 
eliminate discriminatory practices were linked to Carter’s campaign pledge to uphold 
human rights. One gay activist who attended the meeting noted that were Carter to 
meet their concerns it would be perceived as “a significant human rights action by 
the President.”93
The papers held at the Carter Presidential Library reveal the extent to which the 
federal government acted upon the grievances outlined by Costanza to the President. 
After a meeting between the NGTF and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service 
(INS), the INS had “agreed to survey and reassess its policies and procedures 
affecting gays,” a memorandum from Marilyn Haft to Costanza reported. The INS 
“acknowledged that a double standard exists in the application of...the law”
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confirming that “in many instances homosexuals are required to meet higher 
standards for establishing “good moral character” (a key requirement for aliens) than 
are demanded of heterosexuals.” They had been unfairly denied on the basis that 
they were “sexual deviants.” Similarly, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
reported that from hereafter, “gays were being included in the Commission’s 
jurisdiction under the language ‘unequal administration of justice.’”94 A 
memorandum from Haft to Costanza described how after “much pressure” the Civil 
Service Commission had agreed to include gay rights under its jurisdiction.95 The 
Defence Department revised its regulations to prevent homosexuals from receiving 
dishonourable discharges.96 Haft moved to intervene on a gay prisoner’s behalf in a 
lawsuit against the Bureau of Prisons.97 New regulations permitted gay ministers and 
gay literature into federal prisons. The IRS gave tax-exempt and tax deductible 
status to gay organisations. The Federal Communications Commission approved 
regulations which required broadcasting stations to include the gay community in 
determining community broadcast needs. The Office of Personnel Management 
circulated guidelines that specifically cited sexual orientation as a protected area of 
an employee’s private life.98 Further meetings between federal agencies and the 
NGTF were scheduled.99 Costanza publicly recommended that the President himself 
should meet personally with gay community leaders.100 “There was solid follow 
through on all the issues we raised at the White House,” O’Leary recalled of the 
administration’s response. “We had meetings with all the heads of departments. 
Gay people had never done this before.”101
Evangelicals who were already alienated by their lack of access to the Carter White 
House were horrified. Pat Buchanan warned that the NGTF “seeks to unfurl and
elevate a banner of homosexuality -  and force the rest of us to fire a 21-gun
102salute.” Human Events magazine warned, “What the Carter people will do now in 
pushing the counterculture is unclear.”103 Despite the controversy the White House 
publicly supported Costanza over the March meeting. Questioned on CBS News 
‘Face the Nation’ Jody Powell described Costanza’s “primary function” as to make 
“sure that there is a window to the White House for groups that want to put before 
the President, and in a way, before the American public in the process, their concerns 
about our society.” Giving gay activists the opportunity to say “we’re not getting a 
fair shake” was, said Powell, “the essence of what America is all about.”104 Costanza
161
herself was forced to answer stinging criticism. A reader’s poll in the supermarket 
tabloid National Enquirer asked: “Should [the] White House have met with [a] 
homosexual group?” In an open letter to its readers Costanza answered yes and, 
typically, refused to apologise for her actions. “The White House, the government -  
belongs to all of the people” she wrote, “When people come to the White House, we 
do not ask them what their sexual preference is,” just as “we do not ask them what 
their religious preference is.” This equation of sexual preference to religious belief 
was guaranteed to only further anger evangelicals and reveals the White House’s 
fundamental misunderstanding of the breadth of the Christian community’s 
estrangement from the administration. Furthermore, she totally underestimated the 
numerical growth of the conservative Christian community by declaring, “We cannot 
allow one or two people in this nation to decide who participates with their 
government and who doesn’t.” She concluded,
I will never apologise for allowing people the right to petition their 
government, to participate in their government. Nor will I ever apologise for 
listening to the problems that are being experienced by the people of this 
nation. There are 20 million Americans who are simply saying: “Look, I 
want the right to love whomever I choose.”
On the same question Reverend L. Duane Brown, President of the American Council 
of Churches, answered “no” to the Enquirer. Claiming to represent “a viewpoint 
shared by millions of Bible-believing Americans who totally disagree with the 
motives and morals of this gay liberation movement,” Brown denounced the meeting 
because it “gives them [the homosexual community] publicity, recognition and 
power. If the White House is going to meet with homosexuals, why not meet with 
exhibitionists, prostitutes and panderers? Are they not being discriminated against?” 
He “commended Anita Bryant” for her warning regarding the ‘recruitment’ of 
homosexuals. “The history of homosexuality” he observed, “is that they never 
practice homosexuality alone. They prey on people. That is why we have laws in 
our communities to protect us from people like them...when the White House 
indicates public acceptance of these people, and lends dignity to them, it is offensive 
to the American people.” He strongly advised the Carter White House to “stay clear 
of this issue.”105 After the NTGF White House meeting Anita Bryant herself
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publicly denounced the White House claiming homosexuals were being “blessed in 
their abnormal lifestyle by the office of the President of the United States.”106 
Unlike Costanza, she said, “I do not favour the granting of special privileges which 
violate the constitutional rights of normal Americans.”107 In the face of such 
criticism gay rights advocates within the Carter administration attempted to convince 
the President of the political advantage to be gained from association with their 
cause. One memorandum, from Jane Simpson to Hugh Carter, tallied the number
and purpose of telephone calls to the White House. It claimed that the issue had
108stimulated 1,438 calls, every one of which was made in support of gay rights. 
However, this is certainly not borne out by the records of written correspondence 
received by the Carter White House, the vast majority of which registered opposition 
to the NGTF meeting, nor by the results of the National Enquirer poll that showed 
almost 80 percent of readers opposed the White House meeting.109
Dismissing the overwhelmingly public criticism of the contact between the White 
House and the gay activists Costanza continued to advocate the needs of the gay 
community to the President. One issue upon which she attempted to elicit Carter’s 
support was the inclusion of anti-discrimination clauses in civil service employment 
legislation. In February 1978 Seymour Wishman wrote to Costanza that proposed 
civil service legislation for consideration by Congress “contains a series of specific 
categories such as women, race and religion,” but “does not include sexual 
preference as a category for special protection.” Urging Costanza to talk to the 
President, Wishman admitted that should Carter support a change to civil service 
criteria he would be “directly confronted with the necessity of making an outright 
endorsement of gay rights.” If the President “includes the category in his proposed 
legislation, he will be subjected to...enormous criticism...for defending the 
constitutional rights of gays.” However, she warned that “if he does not make any 
reference to protecting gays, the gay community will attack him for insensitivity.”110 
Two days later Costanza told the President that the inclusion of sexual preference as 
a protected category in the bill
Would be of symbolic importance to the gays and if Congress passed the
legislation, it would be viewed by the gays and probably by others, as the first
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step toward passage of a more comprehensive bill which would protect 
against employment discrimination throughout the federal government.
To further convince Carter Costanza told him that it would “be consistent with your 
human rights stand.”111 Less than a week later she wrote again, reminding the 
President of the political advantages of speaking out on gay rights. “Not to include 
the provision might make likely a confrontation with the gay community” she 
warned, but “Inclusion would be very supportive of gay people in their campaign for 
equal rights.” Their support would be valuable: “The gay community estimates its 
membership at 20,000,000” she said.112 Conservative Christians bitterly opposed 
any moves to extend the provision of civil rights to homosexuals. Religious Liaison 
Robert Maddox later met Bob Jones III and Bill Billings of the Moral Majority and 
received petitions dedicated to preventing such an extension. The meeting, Maddox 
told Anne Wexler was “brief’ because of the intransigence of the evangelists, 
particular Jones. “Any attempts at compromise with the ultraconservative
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fundamentalist were “hopeless” he said. Tom Laney later reported that, “upon 
hearing upon the meeting with Bob Jones and his crew” gay Christian representatives 
“requested equal time” with Maddox so that he could “become acquainted with the 
size, extent, work and leaders of the gay churches.” In a decision guaranteed to 
further aggravate evangelicals, their request was accepted.114 Although Carter 
subsequently did not include sexual orientation as a category on the Civil Service 
Reform Act, staff memoranda showed that during Carter’s Presidency civil service 
rules explicitly included “sexual orientation” in a list of factors that should not be 
taken into account when considering employment, a point that was repeatedly 
publicised in correspondence with gay activists.115
Carter clearly sympathised with the discrimination faced by homosexuals. He also 
understood the need to secure his somewhat shaky support amongst a Democratic 
constituency not entirely reconciled to the edicts of his Southern Baptist Christianity. 
However, pressure from Costanza, both private and public, became an 
embarrassment to the President amongst the conservative religious community. Her 
views were not always wholly compatible with those of the President. One 
speechwriter noted after Carter had left office, “Every speech [Costanza]
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made...would start off, ‘You know what my boss thinks? He thinks this, this and 
this. Of course, I don’t think that. This is what I think.”116 Some members of the 
administration attempted to make light of the increasing tension between the Catholic 
Costanza and the Southern Baptist President. One Presidential speechwriter wrote 
jokes for Costanza. They revealed the clear incompatibility between the feminist 
assistant and the born-again President. “It doesn’t bother me being a Catholic in the 
Carter White House” went one, “although I admit I was surprised right at first by the 
job application I had to fill out. Where it said, “Date of Birth” there were two 
blanks.” The joke would have done little to endear Costanza to the born-again 
evangelical community. Another joke poked fun of the President’s apparent lack of 
interest in gender equality and the Georgian’s perceived chauvinism, two key sources 
of tension between the White House and Costanza’s liberal constituents. “Just 
recently the President invited me to one of those grand state dinners. A wonderful 
experience for me: It was the first time I ever had the opportunity to cook for 500 
people.” A third joke made fun of Carter’s marginalisation of Costanza and his 
rejection of her feminist constituents. “Not only am I in the inner circle, but I am 
closer to the President than Ham, [Jordan] or Jody [Powell] or Stu, [Eizenstat] or the 
Vice-President. Just look at the floor plan of the White House. The President calls 
me in frequently for advice, “Midge, what do you think of this colour for the
117drapes?” Behind the jokes, the administration’s exasperation with Costanza was
real. At one point she publicly criticised the President for not supporting the ERA to
the same degree as he had the Panama Canal Treaties. Robert Bickel, a White House
aide tasked with building support for the Treaties was appalled. He recalled “Midge
Costanza was in the middle of God knows what” but it was “some constituency of
left-handed Nicaraguan refugees or something.” Costanza was “not helpful to us” he 
118said. Costanza undoubtedly cost Carter support amongst the evangelical 
community. She was first ostracised by the administration and then finally forced to 
resign in September 1978.
Carter’s choice of liberal staff and his efforts to build support amongst the gay 
community fuelled the sense amongst the conservative Christian community that 
Carter had abandoned his faith in favour of secular humanism. Carter was clearly 
uneasy in regards to homosexuality. However, he steadfastly adhered to the Baptist 
principle of church-state separation in refusing to concede to evangelical demands
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that he support legislation that discriminated against homosexuals based on Biblical 
authority. One fundamentalist preacher from Colorado compared Carter’s promise to 
be bound by church-state separation to the appeasement of the Nazi’s by England in 
the 1930s. Warning “the hour is late” to stop the “homosexual revolution” he wrote
...If we make homosexuality as respectable as England did in the twenties 
and thirties, we surely will be swept away with the previous nations of the 
world who believed they could defile the laws of God...We must publicly 
and privately stand for spiritual and moral values as revealed by God in the 
Bible...or we, too, will die.119
Homosexuality, he warned was “a kind of national death wish” that seeks to “change 
the natural order created by God himself.”120 Opposition to the gay rights movement 
was a central motivating factor in the growth of key organisations of the Christian 
Right. For example, Jerry Falwell successfully used the fear of homosexuality to 
raise funds for his Moral Majority organisation. One direct mail pamphlet declared 
“We are losing the war against homosexuals.” As proof Falwell cited the news that 
“gays were recently given permission to lay a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier at Arlington Cemetery to honour any sexual deviants who served in the 
military. That’s right,” he said “gays were allowed to turn our Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier into: THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SODOMITE! 121
Another early Christian Right organisation to be inspired to oppose the gay rights 
movement was the aggressively anti-Carter Christian Voice. This organisation 
clearly signalled the political coming of age of the conservative Christian community 
as a new, and lasting religious force in the American political discourse. In 1978 
Anita Bryant joined with sponsors of a California state ballot initiative that sought to 
ban homosexuals from teaching in public schools. Though the initiative, 
‘Proposition 6’ was defeated its, a year later supporters formed a new organisation, 
Christian Voice, that protested against an attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to 
remove the tax-exempt status of churches whose ministers were campaigning against 
gay rights laws. From its inception it was overtly political and strongly partisan. 
“Moral decadence is a very serious problem today” said Gary Jarmin, the 
organisation’s President, “and politics is a big reason for these problems.”122
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Christian Voice was also notable for the size of its political ambitions. Many 
Christian Right organisations were organised on a local or state level but Christian 
Voice proclaimed national goals. Jarmin declared organisations like the Roundtable 
and Moral Majority to be “a full step behind” Christian Voice. “They said they are 
not going to endorse candidates. We in Christian Voice are going to endorse 
[candidates] and target others for defeat,” he said.123 “If Christians unite, we can do 
anything,” said chairman Robert Grant, “We can pass any law or any amendment. 
And that is exactly what we intend to do.”124 Christian Voice issued “moral report 
cards” to rate the voting record of politicians on evangelical ‘hot-button’ issues such 
as abortion, the ERA and gay rights as a means to “restore traditional Christian 
values throughout the United States.”125 The report cards made absolutely no 
pretence at political neutrality. The issues listed included Carter’s decision to create 
a Department of Education, his refusal to ban abortion, his failure to support prayer 
in public schools and his advocacy of the SALT II treaty. Unsurprisingly, noted 
Journal o f Church and State the “results were far from a morality rating, as claimed 
by Christian Voice, but rather a rating of members of Congress according to their
1 9Apolitical leanings.” For example, two Democrat Congressmen, one a devout 
Lutheran, the other an ordained Baptist minister, received grades of ‘0.’ A 
Republican, who had been charged with soliciting sex from a sixteen-year old boy, 
received the maximum grade of ‘100.’ Christian Voice was also significant in its 
pioneering use of extensive direct mail solicitations as a means to stimulate 
evangelical political activism. One typical example warned readers “The Children in 
your neighbourhood are in danger,” and described the existence of “a master plan to 
destroy everything that is good and moral here in America.”127 Another announced,
THIS LETTER WILL MAKE YOU ANGRY!
But I’m Going To Tell 
You The Truth About. ..
...Militant gays 
. . .Liberal Educators 
...Cruel Atheists 
...And Godless Politicians. 128
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Early in 1980, Christian Voice and Moral Majority launched campaigns to remove 
Carter from office in large part because of his lenient stance on gay rights. Although 
Jerry Falwell’s manifesto for his Moral Majority organisation claimed, “we are not a 
political party...we do not endorse political candidates,” the public statements and 
literature of the organisations made their opposition to the incumbent President clear. 
The California Director of Moral Majority, Tim LaHaye, warned that homosexuals 
were “already are far too influential to assure the moral sanity of the next 
generation,” and openly blamed “the lenient government policies of the Carter 
administration.”129 LaHaye urged conservative Christians to abandon the bom-again 
President, declaring that Carter’s Presidency had “resulted in a humanist takeover of 
the American government.” He pondered whether Carter was “a Christian who is 
naive about humanism” or “a humanist who masqueraded as a Christian to get 
elected and then showed his contempt for the 60 million ‘bom agains’ by excluding 
them from his government.”130 The Christian News reported that during a meeting 
with gay activists to discuss the 1980 Democratic Party platform one member of the 
Carter administration had announced “The President stands fully for civil and 
humans rights for all Americans and I’m glad to say that includes homosexuals.”131 
Conservative Pat Buchanan made light of Carter’s professed bom-again status and 
observed,
Our born again Southern Baptist President has undergone another conversion. 
The government of the United States, he now contends, should provide a 
special protected status in law for individuals who profess and practice a life 
style that Carter’s church teaches is aberrant, sinful and immoral...The 
President is not the sort of simpleton to allow Biblical beliefs to get in the 
way of carrying San Francisco.1 2
Evangelicals wrote to the Carter White House to register their disgust. One pastor, 
B.J. Willhite, wrote directly to the President. He made clear that Carter’s gay rights 
policies would have damaging political consequences. He told Carter that “a 
representative of either your office or your election campaign” had campaigned 
alongside a “Gay Activist” and “stated that there would be a ‘plank’ in your 
campaign platform supporting the “gay liberation movement and gay rights.” 
Willhite warned, “This position is inconsistent with a Biblical understanding of
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homosexuality and inconsistent with a Christian perspective.” Support for this sinful
practice was comparable “with conditions which existed in Sodom and Gomorrah,
not a nation which claims Christianity.” Willhite was a typical evangelical. He had
supported Carter in 1976 because of “my belief that you were a committed
Christian,” but he wrote “I am sorry to say that I will no longer be able to do so
unless your position in this matter can be clarified and brought into conformity with
1
the preservation of order in our society.”
Dismissive of the growing anti-Carter sentiment amongst evangelicals and pressured 
by gay rights activists the Carter White House largely ignored the warnings of 
Christians like Willhite. Instead they listened to pressure from the gay community 
and sought their electoral support. Again this pressure was focused upon Carter’s 
human rights policy. As San Francisco Mayor Harvey Milk put it in one speech on 
the need for gay equality, “I’m tired of the silence from the White House. Jimmy 
Carter you talk about human rights a lot...you want to be the world’s leader for 
human rights. Well, damn it, lead!” Carter, he said, talked often about his faith, but 
Milk asked “When are you going to talk about that most important part: Love thy 
neighbour? After all, she may be gay.”134 A number of letters from gay activists to 
the White House made it clear that Carter’s faith was still an issue of concern for 
them, and urged the President to do more to earn their trust.135 In December 1979, 
one gay organisation, ‘Lesbian/Gay Democrats of Texas’ wrote to the President to 
remind him of the need to support their agenda. They warned Carter that the gay 
community was now “politically astute” and “constitute a very significant body of 
voters.” Because of “major gay/lesbian voter registration efforts during recent years” 
as well as “massive get out the vote projects planned for next year” it was “likely that 
the number of lesbians and gay men who actually go to the polls will exceed that of 
several other minority groups.” They warned Carter to “pay attention to gay/lesbian 
issues.” Ignoring them would be “neither just nor politically wise in 1980.”136 The 
National Gay Task Force also wrote to Carter to warn that it was “surveying current 
and prospective Presidential candidates for their positions which concern lesbian and 
gay voters.” These issues “must be addressed at the Federal level and in particular 
by the President.”137 The Mayors of San Francisco and Seattle wrote to Carter 
personally urging him to sign an executive order prohibiting discrimination in 
Federal employment and Federal programs and services on the basis of sexual
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orientation. One Democratic Senator wrote to ask the President to end the 
“harassment of gay tourists and aliens” by the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service.138
In reply the Carter White House strongly re-iterated the President’s support for the 
gay and lesbian community. Writing to the NGTF, Robert Strauss, the Carter re- 
election campaign manager, told them that because of Carter “In the area of public 
policy decisions, gay concerns now have an equal opportunity to be heard and have 
been made part of the public process.” He reminded the NGTF, “For too long the 
doors of the federal government were closed to too many Americans.” In contrast, 
“Jimmy Carter has opened those doors and he intends to see that they remain open.” 
The President was personally committed “to continuing his policy of appointing
i o n
qualified individuals without discrimination based on...sexual orientation.” Gay 
representatives contacted Robert Maddox to register their concerns that the President 
might speak at the Christian ‘Washington for Jesus rally’ scheduled for April 1980 
alongside openly anti-gay evangelists like James Robison and Pat Robertson. 
Although the rally presented Carter with the opportunity to address the evangelical 
community, Maddox “assured them.. .President Carter will not attend the rally.”140
Carter’s need to address the demands of the gay community in his bid for re-election 
was once again clear in 1980. As in 1976, the gay and lesbian community 
represented a vital Democratic Party constituency for Carter. Gay activists sent 37 
openly gay representatives to the Democratic Party convention in 1980. “We’re 
taking advantage of the most powerful closet we have,” declared Jean O’Leary of the 
NGTF, that is the “the voting booth.”141 The difference between the Democratic and 
Republican Party attitudes towards homosexual rights was clear in their respective 
electoral platforms for 1980. The Democratic Party platform declared “We must 
affirm the dignity of all people and protect all groups from discrimination based on 
colour, religion, national origin, sex or sexual orientation.”142 The party declared its 
support of the family “in all its diverse forms,” considered a code-phrase to include 
single-sex marriages.143 In response to the Democratic platform Gary Jarmin 
organised a lobby group entitled ‘Christians for Reagan’ becoming the first 
organisation of the Christian Right to publicly join Reagan’s Presidential campaign. 
The group aired a number of television advertisements that attacked Carter in key
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states, mostly southern, where, they admitted, “there exists a large number of 
fundamental, evangelical Christian votes.”144 The advertisements accused Carter of 
supporting homosexual rights and featured footage of radical gay rights activists 
demonstrating in Washington and New York. They warned viewers “Now the march 
has reached Washington. And President Carter’s platform carries his pledge to cater 
to homosexual demands.” In defending the action Jarmin announced, “If there is any 
reason at all they [evangelicals] should oppose Carter, this is it.”145 Jody Powell 
recalls his shock at the advertisements “run by Reagan supporters charging the 
President with being in favour of putting homosexuals in the classrooms of 
elementary schools across the land,” and declaring Carter to be an “enemy of the 
American family.”146 Maddox wrote to Anne Wexler to report that Christian Voice 
“had shown its true colours.” He had been trying to tell his ‘Tightest, conservative 
politically active Christian friends that they were being used,” but despite this he 
warned “These religious lobby groups are proliferating.”147 The influence upon the 
Republican Party of groups like Christian Voice also became clear for the first time 
in 1980, a relationship that continues today. Unlike the Democrats, the Republican 
platform referred to “our belief in the traditional roles and values of the family in our 
society” and declared that “The importance of support of the mother and homemaker 
in maintaining the values of his country can not be over-emphasized.” Clearly this 
“traditional” family did not include homosexuals.148
In an effort to repair his links with Christian conservatives Carter finally agreed to 
talk to prominent evangelists including Jerry Falwell, Bob Jones, James Robison, 
Oral Roberts and James Bakker at a short White House breakfast on January 22nd 
1980. The breakfast meeting was arranged by Maddox as part what he called a 
“cluster of three events,” the others being an address by the President to the National 
Religious Broadcasters and a television interview in which Carter would talk about 
his religious faith. These three events, cautioned Maddox in a memorandum to Anne 
Wexler, were “important” for evangelicals because they would “let them feel his 
identification with them as a Christian believer while still communicating that he is 
President of all people.” As such these events “must be carefully coordinated” 
because they “could well become the keystone of [the] future Presidential 
relationship with this vast segment of the Nation.” The breakfast meeting was 
particularly pivotal. “If a feeling of intimacy and trust can be created” he wrote, “the
171
leaders will be inclined to interpret accurately the President and his views to their 
constituencies.” Maddox was keenly aware of the possible political advantages to be 
gleaned if the meeting was carefully managed. He told Wexler, “By selecting just 
the right leaders and by helping them ask the most crucial questions, the President’s 
views can be more fully stated and more carefully interpreted.”149
Far from building ties the meeting only reinforced the depth of estrangement 
between the President and Christian conservatives and any political benefits that did 
accrue for the Carter White House were overshadowed by the controversy that flared 
soon after. Jerry Falwell publicly attacked Carter for his stance on gay rights, 
accusing him of attempting to woo homosexual voters by giving public approval of 
their ‘sinful’ lifestyle. At a Moral Majority rally in Alaska soon after the White 
House breakfast meeting, Falwell fabricated a conversation with Carter he claimed 
had taken place there. He said he had asked the President, “Sir, why do you have 
practising homosexuals on your senior staff at the White House?” According to 
Falwell, Carter had replied, “I am the President of all the American people and I 
believe I should represent everyone.” Falwell said, “I said why don’t you have some 
murderers and bank robbers and so forth to represent?”150 Carter aide Gerald 
Rafshoon recalled “Jerry Falwell really took out after him, saying that he was not a 
good Christian” because “he’s had homosexuals in the White House.”151 The actual 
transcript of the meeting reveals that the conversation never took place. Falwell had 
actually asked Carter “Is it fair to say that your definition of a family would not 
include the marriage of homosexual men or lesbians?” The President’s response was 
not recorded, but Falwell replied, “Thank you -  thank you very much.” When the 
White House protested over Falwell’s misrepresentation, the fundamentalist preacher 
suggested that the whole affair had been planned by the administration “as an attempt 
to discredit evangelical ministers who disagree with him [Carter].”152 Confronted by 
reporters he admitted to having “fabricated” the tale. Maddox blamed the 
increasingly popular evangelist’s desire for political power, noting that at this time 
“Falwell was on his celebrity jag.”153 An infuriated Carter recorded in his personal 
diary, “Falwell has lied. I have never had any such conservation.”154 The President 
was particularly angered by Falwell’s accusation that he was guilty of falsely 
“claiming” to be a Christian.155 “Nonetheless” Carter recalls, “one of the ‘religious’ 
television spots aired during the general election campaign depicted a concerned
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mother telling her child that I was a bad man because I encouraged 
homosexuality.”156 Indeed, after he left office Carter himself admitted in his 
memoirs that the criticism of his administration from “bitter” conservative Christians 
was “a serious problem we could not overcome.”157 Nor did Carter forget Falwell’s 
deception. After an address at the Baptist Meredith College in Raleigh in 1986 
Carter was asked by a student to comment on the influence of religious 
fundamentalists like Falwell on government. “In a very Christian way,” Carter 
replied, “as far as I’m concerned, he can go to hell.”158
The affair further damaged Carter’s standing with evangelicals. Despite Maddox’s 
denials, rumours spread among evangelicals in regard to the breakfast meeting. One 
angry evangelical wrote to Carter demanding clarification of the exchange between 
Falwell and the President. “It appears that Satan has us right where he wants us -  
Christians against Christians,” he wrote.159 Maddox was forced to explain in reply, 
“The President in no way condones homosexuality as a proper, Biblical life-style” 
although he “believes that the civil rights of all Americans, homosexuals included, 
should be protected.” Maddox made it clear “Neither the President nor I want to 
fight against Dr. Falwell. He has every right and responsibility to preach the 
Gospel.” However Maddox ended by remarking, “When [Falwell] comments about 
the President, he should endeavour to be accurate in his statements. In the highly 
charged atmosphere of an election year, we all must be careful to speak factually.”160 
Another evangelical wrote to Anne Wexler, claiming to have heard from leaders of 
the Southern Baptist Convention that Carter had treated Falwell rudely during the 
breakfast meeting. “He said that men like Jerry Falwell and others had tried to, in 
Christian love, share some concerns of the majority of people in this country with 
President Carter.” In return “he had become cold and would not discuss the matter 
further.” The writer also accused Maddox of telling the SBC that “President Carter 
wanted nothing to do with James Robison + preachers like him.” The evangelical 
ended with a threat. “Everybody I talk to is voting for Reagan + most of them voted 
for Pres Carter before...In the last election 70% of evangelicals didn’t vote. This 
time they are. The black vote won’t win it for him -  The Christian vote is bigger.”161 
Wexler wrote back in reply that the meeting had been “very cordial and frank. While 
those present may have disagreed with some of the President’s positions, I would 
characterise them as very appreciative of the time they had with the President.” She
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also dismissed the accusations regarding Maddox, who had told her “he never said 
the President wants nothing to do with James Robison.” However, she candidly 
conceded “that President’s Carter’s views on certain issues differ from those held by 
Rev. Robison” and that “a meeting between the President and Reverend Robison
1 f\9would not be productive.”
Jimmy Carter’s White House brought issues of gay and lesbian rights into the 
national discourse to an unprecedented degree. Turner comments upon “the 
remarkable amount of energy” that the White House poured into tackling the issue of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation,” whilst Marcus calls the contact between 
the gay activists and the White House “a wonderful breakthrough” for the gay 
community.163 The Carter Presidency heralded an unprecedented level of federal 
government engagement with the gay community. In a letter to the leadership of the 
National Gay Task Force, Robert Strauss claimed that the President had done nothing 
less than “taken steps, in his first three years in office, to address most of the public 
issues articulated historically within the gay community.”164 After he left office 
Carter openly defended gay civil rights and attacked what he called “extreme 
religious activists” who he blamed for “emphasising vicious attacks on gay men and 
women ostensibly based on the teachings of Jesus Christ.” His opposition to 
discrimination was grounded in great part in his Baptist faith and his human rights 
agenda, observing that Christ himself had had encounters with those suffering from 
condemnation. “Christ set an example for us by reaching out to them, loving and 
healing them.”165 However, his open support of gay rights during his term in office, 
coupled with the high-profile activities of his White House staff who sought to end 
discrimination based on sexual orientation contributed to Carter’s rejection by the 
evangelical community in the 1980.
The day that Reagan won the Presidency in 1980, Pat Robertson identified the 
reasons for the Republican victory on his Christian Broadcasting Network show. No 
longer required by political expediency to denounce Carter, he reversed his usual 
withering criticism of the President and instead commended Carter’s display of 
“Christian virtue” in defeat. “He has been magnificent” said Robertson, asking his 
audience to pray with him for the defeated President. However, he singled out 
Carter’s White House staff for attack. He accused Carter aides Peter Bourne of
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“dispensing drugs illegally” and Tim Kraft of using cocaine. He commented upon 
Hamilton Jordan’s “escapades” and referred to the “alienation” of evangelicals who 
“had not been welcomed into the Carter administration as they had hoped.” As a 
result, evangelicals had said, “we just don’t think this is quite right and we’re not 
being included [in the administration].” He was most scornful of Midge Costanza, 
who, observed Robertson “had opened her arms...to some of the people of the 
homosexual persuasion” which, he declared “is repugnant to Christians.” Because of 
Costanza and her ilk there had been, Robertson said, “a definite defection from a 
group that would have been 100% for Mr Carter” if only “he had played it 
differently. In contrast, Robertson did not hide his delight at the news of Reagan’s 
victory.166
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JIMMY CARTER, CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANITY 
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY
In 1976 Jimmy Carter’s Southern Baptist faith led religious conservatives to believe 
that his election might herald a re-awakening of traditional Christian family values in 
America. They were drawn into support for Carter’s campaign for the Presidency in 
part by his promise to address the plight of the nation’s families, a pledge that Carter 
himself tied explicitly to a renewal of Biblical morality and his own personal old- 
time religious principles. As a fellow evangelical, conservative Christians believed 
that Carter would support the same family agenda that they espoused, namely one 
grounded in their inerrant interpretation of Holy Scripture and aimed at halting what 
they perceived as the precipitous decline in the nation’s moral standards. This 
chapter will show that Carter did not meet their expectations.
In particular, two national conferences irrevocably destroyed Carter’s image as a 
champion of the traditional family and led instead to his portrayal within the 
evangelical community as an ‘anti-family’ secular humanist. The first of these was 
the 1977 International Women’s Year (IWY) conference composed of a series of 
state conferences mandated to address the needs of the American women and 
culminating in a national conference, held in Houston, Texas. The second was the 
1980 White House Conference on Families (WHCF), a series of state and regional 
conferences convened to discuss issues of concern to American families. Even 
before these conferences took place conservative Christians were dismayed by 
Carter’s appointment of liberal and feminist delegates to their respective organising 
committees. This contrasted greatly with his refusal to appoint Bible-believing 
Christians to key posts in his administration, in spite of the pleas of evangelical 
leaders, most notably the Pentecostal evangelist Pat Robertson. The IWY Houston 
conference endorsed a National Plan of Action that contained liberal planks on key 
issues including abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, and homosexual 
discrimination. It was strongly supported by the Carter White House and funded by 
federal authority. In the eyes of conservative Christians this government
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involvement represented nothing less than a Presidential legitimisation of the 
feminist humanist agenda. Disagreements over the WHCF centred on the correct 
definition of what constituted a family, with evangelicals favouring one based on 
Biblical law. Combined with Presidential commitments to address the agendas 
drawn up by the delegates, both conferences exemplified precisely the unwarranted 
intervention into Christian family relationships that evangelicals and fundamentalists 
abhorred, once again exacerbating conservative Christian disappointment with the 
Carter Presidency.
The 1976 Carter Campaign and the American Family
Jimmy Carter consistently placed a concern for the American family at the centre of 
his 1976 Presidential election campaign. He dramatised the importance of family 
issues to his campaign by making them the focus of the very first speech he made 
after winning the Democratic Party Presidential nomination. “I have campaigned all 
over America,” he told an audience in New Hampshire in August 1976, “and 
everywhere I go I find people deeply concerned about the loss of values in our lives.” 
Carter identified the “root problem” to be “the steady erosion and weakening of our 
families,” and warned “The American family is in trouble.” Carter pledged a return 
to a time when “The family was the first church. The family was the first school. 
The family was the first government.” He would use his Presidential authority to 
“reverse the trend that we’ve experienced in the past that has destroyed the American 
family,” because “the family unit is the best way for men and women to live their 
lives, the best way to raise children.” It was the “only solid foundation upon which 
to build a strong nation.” He declared “There can be no more urgent priority for the 
next administration than to see that every decision our government makes is designed 
to honour and support and strengthen the American family.”1 Two months later 
Carter again publicly promised to place family issues at the centre of his political 
agenda, this time specifically addressing the religious community. He told the 
National Conference of Catholic Charities that the family was “the cornerstone of
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American life,” but admitted to being troubled “by the deterioration of [families] in 
recent years, and by the fact that our elected leaders and our government agencies 
and programs have...pursued policies that have damaged families, rather than 
supporting and strengthening them.” Moreover, conservative Christians could not 
fail to be heartened when he declared that, rather than using federal intervention, he 
wanted to “strengthen the system of private voluntarism” that was imperative for the 
realisation of “basic social justice.” He declared, “If we want less government, and 
many of us do, then we must work for strong families. For when the family structure 
is weak,” he said, “our government will tend to fill the vacuum, often 
unsatisfactorily.” He blamed unwarranted and misguided government intervention 
for creating, rather than solving problems for the family. “Because of confusion or 
insensitivity, our government’s policies have often actually weakened our families, 
or even destroyed them” he said, “We don’t need new bureaucracy.”2 Carter’s 
attitude to government further appeared in line with that of conservative Christians 
when he announced that “on strengthening individual liberties and local levels of 
government, I consider myself a conservative.”3
Carter’s concern for the family was emblematic of the central theme of his 1976 
Presidential campaign, namely a renewal of trust in government and a return to old- 
fashioned Christian moral values. Carter openly attributed many of his values, 
character and much of his political philosophy to his rural boyhood, close knit family 
and his devout religious faith. For Carter, the image of small-town rural life in his 
tiny hometown of Plains, Georgia was central in building his appeal amongst 
conservative Christians who feared the impact of modernity, particularly upon their 
families. He placed great emphasis on the link between his small town upbringing 
and his traditional principles nurtured by his Southern Baptist beliefs. In Why Not 
the Best? Carter made great play of his old-fashioned upbringing in sleepy Plains and 
his traditional values forged through hard work and adversity. “My life on the farm 
during the Great Depression more nearly resembled farm life of fully 2,000 years ago 
than farm life today,” he wrote. “For years we used an outdoor privy in the backyard 
for sanitation and hand pump for water.”4 He called Plains “one of the poorest parts 
of the country. In my county we didn’t have a doctor, we don’t have a pharmacist, a 
dentist.”5 When he travelled to Georgia to meet Carter during the campaign Norman 
Mailer remarked upon Plains “unmistakable well-ordered patina” that held a promise
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that the mysterious gentility of American life” was present. Plains had retained the 
feeling of “an old-fashioned town” that America had “all but lost to the Interstates 
and the ranch houses, the mobile homes and the condominiums, the neon 
strips...truck stops [and] shopping centres.”6 During his childhood, said Carter “Our 
lives then were centred almost completely around our family and our home,” and in 
adulthood his family life centred in Plains “remained a source of his inner strength.” 
He told Bill Moyers in May 1976, “You know, when things started going wrong in 
my own life, my mother and father were there...There was something around which
o
I built my life.” “Jimmy Carter believed that one can go home again,” wrote Leslie 
Wheeler during the campaign, because “he always has.”9 Carter’s home, wrote Peter 
Bourne, was “a place of retreat, renewal and replenishment.”10
Carter’s portrayal of a down-home image that promised of a return to time-honoured 
American values rooted in the stability of traditional family life and Christian piety 
was not empty political rhetoric. His mother, Miss Lillian, explained, “The church is 
the centre of everything in a small town. Plains didn’t even have a beer joint at that 
time. A church and a school -  that’s all there was.”11 Carter told voters that his 
childhood in Plains had been one “steeped in the Bible” centred upon and shaped by 
the Baptist church.12 He recalled “We felt close to nature, close to the members of 
our family, and close to God.” As a boy he had considered the peanuts that provided 
his family’s livelihood to be “one of the great Gifts of God to mankind.”13 Carter 
had, observed Baptist historians Hefley and Hefley, “gone to a Baptist church almost 
every Sunday of his life.”14 Hutcheson observes that the Church occupied such a 
central place in the life of Baptists “socially, educationally, and culturally as well as 
religiously,” that its “formative influence [upon Carter] would be hard to 
overestimate.”15 At the age of eleven he had reached what Baptists deem “the age of 
accountability” and was formally accepted as a member of the Plains church. Carter 
recalled of this event simply that he “accepted Jesus into my heart.”16 Carter himself 
said of this simple church centred life “I never knew anything except going to 
church. My wife and I were born and raised in innocent times. The normal thing to 
do was to go to church.”17 Carter’s focus upon the importance of his own family life, 
interwoven as it was with his modest background and religious faith, helped him, 
observes Hutcheson, to exude “an aura of moral rectitude that exemplified all the 
traditional... values.”18 In recalling the electoral appeal of Carter’s religion and
185
family in the campaign, Stuart Eizenstat observed, “the notion of a man grounded in 
solid family and religious values gave a certain amount of confidence that this was 
the kind of person who could do the healing the American people expected.”19 
Another example was Carter’s marriage. Carter spoke openly about the depth of his 
love for Rosalynn, a local girl that he declared to be “the best thing that ever 
happened to me.” Much of this strength derived from their shared Christian faith. 
During the campaign he admitted that when they had suffered difficulties in their 
relationship, it had been this religious faith that “sustained our marriage and helped 
us overcome our difficulty.”20 Mailer confirmed as much on his visit to Plains. He 
predicted Carter would make good on his campaign promise to “restore the family” 
in part because Carter had been “Faithful, by public admission, to his wife for thirty 
years.” He was “in every way a sexual conservative.”21 Carter’s values led Mailer to 
conclude him to be “within range of the very good and very decent man he presented 
himself to be.” Mailer would be happy to vote for him, he said, after all, “it was not 
everyday that you could pull the lever for a man whose favourite song was Amazing 
Grace.”22
No one group found Carter’s presentation of a life centred on family and church 
more appealing than conservative Christians. Evangelicals’ upheld the traditional, 
monogamous and male-headed family, as pre-scribed by Scripture, as the 
fundamental unit of society. The family was absolutely central to the evangelical 
worldview. In his study of American spirituality Roof contends, “Families are the 
arenas where rules of Biblical authority are instituted and the Christian life lived 
out.”23 Similarly Oldfield notes that the family unit was primary to evangelicals 
because it was “a realm of nurturance” for their Biblically based belief system. The 
family existed as the organisation through which the teachings of the Christian 
church were to be instilled, disseminated and perpetuated. It was “the transmitter of 
threatened values in a hostile modern world.” Evangelicals strongly believed that the 
family must remain “a private realm” through which they could promote “values 
threatened by the world outside,” a means for “the transmission of evangelical 
values.”24 This vision of the family was “closely intertwined with evangelical
25religious doctrine.” Smith also observes that in the evangelical mindset there was 
“a strong connection between the family and faith.” They viewed the family as “the 
basic social unit of society, the foundation of its survival and health.”26 Thus a
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weakening of the family endangered the moral ties that bound Christian society 
together.
The desire to return to a golden age of family values was a key organising principle 
of many Christian Right organisations. Falwell openly called for a “return to where
27America was fifty years ago,” in order to restore “America back to moral sanity.” 
Oldfield observes the mobilisation of the Christian Right as “an attempt to fight the 
trends of modernity.”28 Clecak also interpreted the resurgence of the old-time 
religion as representing a “flight from modernity.”29 Evangelicals felt “more and 
more marginalised and estranged by the modern world” that, observes Foner, 
“seemed to trivialise religion and exalt immorality.”30 Similarly, Hunter observes 
“Modernity creates the conditions in which “immorality” from the evangelical
perspective is structurally engendered” and modernity therefore “fosters sin.” The
*2 1
Christian Right arose specifically in “resistance to modernity.” Cox points out that 
during the 1970s evangelicals began to see the modern era to be “a uniquely fallen or 
deranged age.” Cox admits that this is nothing new: “The vocation of religious 
teachers and exemplars - especially in the Biblical tradition [has always] been to call 
nations to righteousness, to expose sin and folly, to uphold the law.” He calls 
fundamentalist Christianity “an offshoot of the tradition of anti-modernism which 
has fought against the modern world since its inception.”32 But what was new was 
evangelists’ “apocalyptic tone,” their suggestion that America was “worse off...than 
anyone else has ever been, that the modern world is peculiarly cursed and damned.” 
As a result of the increasingly secular, pluralistic nature of American public 
discourse, Christian conservatives have felt “besieged by every touch of 
modernism.”33 A. James Reichley of the Brookings Institution observed that the 
political resurgence of evangelicalism was nothing less than an anti-modernist 
“revolt” against the “erosion of the moral foundations of American society.”34 
Clearly central to this was a defence of the Christian family. It was no coincidence 
that Pat Robertson’s cable network was entitled “The Family Channel” whilst the 
most popular conservative Christian radio show was James Dobson’s “Focus on the 
Family.”
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By placing his promise to protect the traditional family household at the very centre 
of his electoral agenda, Carter guaranteed the support of many evangelicals in 1976. 
In a press release forwarded to President Ford during the 1976 Presidential 
campaign, UPI Religion writer David Anderson observed that Carter benefited from 
“one of us syndrome” amongst the evangelical community. Evangelicals “tended to 
perceive Carter as a moderate conservative, taking on Big Government and the 
Federal Bureaucracy in ways familiar and dear to the hearts of conservative 
evangelical voters.”35 Once he took office they were initially impressed with the 
Christian, pro-family tone of the Carter White House. For example, early in his 
administration Carter told co-habiting members of his staff “Those of you who are 
living in sin, I hope you’ll get married. Those of you who have left your spouses, go 
home. Those of you who have forgotten your children’s names, go home and get 
reacquainted. I don’t want your families breaking up because of your loyalty to me.” 
When asked about allegations of sexual impropriety by members of his staff he 
declared that he would not punish, but rather “pray for them.” These sentiments 
seemed mawkish to much of the secular press, yet indicated to conservative 
Christians that the new President shared the sense of value that they themselves 
placed on family life.
The 1977 International Women’s Year Conference
Conservative Christian expectations of the Carter Presidency were soon dashed by 
the National Women’s Conference that took place in Houston in November 1977. 
Jointly called by Congress and the Carter White House, the four-day convention was 
the culmination of a two year series of conferences held in each of the 50 states to 
mark United Nations International Women’s Year in 1975. Significantly, it was the 
first national women’s conference to receive the support of the federal government. 
Evangelical disillusionment with the Carter White House began to grow even before 
the conference took place. Although it had been Gerald Ford who had appointed the 
National Commission for the Observance of International Women’s Year to organise
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the convention, as soon as he took office Carter replaced his predecessor’s 
conservative choice as chairwomen, Elizabeth Athanasakos, with a feminist, Bella 
Abzug. Carter’s appointment of the controversial Abzug aggravated evangelicals 
who saw feminists as advocating an anti-Christian lifestyle. Although the 
appointment of Abzug seemed an unlikely choice for Carter, it represented an 
opportunity for Carter to satisfy feminist women, a vital Democratic Party 
constituency. Carter’s need to do so translated into explicit White House policy. 
Presidential Counsel Robert Lipshutz recalled that the President himself told him to 
actively seek out candidates with “a diversity of background,” including the use of 
gender as a criteria as a form of indirect affirmative action when making 
appointments.37 Similarly, Health, Education, and Welfare chief Joseph Califano 
recalls that Carter “made persistent and determined efforts to place minorities,
o o
particularly women...in top federal jobs.” He recalls a note from Carter, dated 
May 10, 1979, after the President had approved Califano’s choice of Dick Beattie as 
General Counsel of HEW. “I’ve approved Beattie” affirmed Carter, but he had 
written the words ‘white male’ alongside his name and noted “This can’t go on. It is 
embarrassing to me. I do not want to handle it one (woman) appointment at a
39time.” The appointment of Abzug was an example of the awarding of political 
posts to shore up support for Carter amongst feminists. Three senior members of the 
administration lobbied the President strongly in favour of her appointment to the 
IWY commission. In April 1978 they sent a memorandum to Carter declaring,
If we appoint her, we will have a strong card to play in 1980 when we need 
the support of the group she represents. Although she is a controversial 
person, she understands politics and the nature of such commitments. Her 
leadership on your behalf in 1980 will be significant since she represents an 
activist constituency who can be counted on for strong grass roots support.
The staff clearly advised the appointment of Abzug with one eye on the feminist 
movement. In doing so they greatly underestimated the level of conservative 
Christian resentment that an outspoken feminist like Abzug would provoke. “If 
Bella did not have a role to play there would be considerable vocal outrage” they 
wrote, but “If she does play a role, there will be not much fanfare.”40 Carter acted as 
his staff suggested but the appointment of Abzug was a political disaster.
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Furthermore, Carter named other feminists to the National Commission for the 
Observance of International Women’s Year. These included Liz Carpenter, co-chair 
of ERAmerica, an ERA advocacy organisation; Ruth Abram, a former program 
director of the American Civil Liberties Union; Gloria Steinem, founder of the 
National Women’s Political Caucus and Jean O’ Leary, co-executive director of the 
National Gay Task Force and a high profile lesbian rights activist.
In the eyes of evangelical and fundamentalist Christians, Carter’s appointments 
reinforced the domination of the institutions of government by secular humanism. 
Recalling that he had “done everything this side of breaking FCC (Federal 
Communications Commission) regulations” to help Carter win in 1976, Pat 
Robertson charged the President with betrayal. “I wouldn’t let Bella Abzug scrub 
the floor of any organisation I was head of but Carter put her in charge of all the 
women in America” said an exasperated Robertson.41 One conservative Senator 
agreed, and declared “When the good Lord created the earth, he didn’t have the 
advice of Bella Abzug.”42 Warning about the dangers of secular humanism in 
government, Tim LaHaye pointed out that Abzug had won the ‘Humanist of the Year 
award in 1975.43
The suspicion that Carter had taken advantage of them during the 1976 election 
campaign only exacerbated the evangelical sense of betrayal. One evangelist who 
felt particularly let down was the Pentecostal Robertson. A supporter of Carter in 
1976, the televangelist recalled of his election victory, “I was personally thrilled to 
think that a born-again Christian might gain the White House.”44 Looking forward to 
Carter’s Presidency he said “I thought it would be wonderful.” Robertson even 
claimed a measure of credit for Carter’s election, recalling that he gave “some quiet 
help behind the scenes in the Democratic primary that may have been responsible for 
winning Pennsylvania for him.”45 Early in his Presidency Robertson regularly 
corresponded with Carter and his staff. For example he wrote to Carter in December 
1976, asking him to meet with Dr. Charles Malik, former President of the United 
Nations General Assembly because he was “a warm hearted evangelical” who 
wanted to share his insights with Carter, a fellow “Christian brother.”46 A month 
before Carter’s inaugural Robertson launched a “geopolitical newsletter” intending,
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according to Robertson biographer David Harrell, “to track the progress of world 
events under the Presidency of a Christian.”47
Robertson’s subsequent high-profile activism in opposition to Carter derived in part 
from Carter’s failure to reciprocate Robertson’s repeated overtures, and especially 
his failure to deliver on assurances as to the religious background of Presidential 
appointments that Robertson believed had been made during the 1976 election. One 
example came when Rosalynn Carter was asked, “Will religion be a factor in his 
[Jimmy’s] appointments as President?” She had replied, “I am sure it will be. By 
looking into their backgrounds, he will check not only to see that they are qualified 
for the job, but that they are also honest, respectable people. And I am sure he will 
ask God for guidance.”48 Of even greater irritation was a promise made by the 
candidate himself in a personal interview with Robertson on the evangelists’ 
Christian Broadcasting Network. Robertson had asked Carter, “Would you 
anticipate as President that you would bring godly men into your inner councils or 
into the cabinet to advise you?” Carter’s answer appeared unequivocal. He replied 
that
a commitment to the principles expressed to us by God would certainly be an 
important prerequisite [of service]. The ethical commitments of our lives -  
unselfishness, truthfulness, honour, a sense of compassion and understanding 
of other people, a sense of integrity, those principles given to us by 
God....would be prerequisites of my selection of anyone to service in
, , 4 9government.
Robertson was convinced. After the interview he promised his viewers that Carter’s 
election meant “in the next five years we have an unprecedented opportunity for 
America to fulfil the dream of the early settlers who came right here to Virginia in 
1607, that this land would be used to glorify God.”50 Crucially, Robertson asked 
Carter after the interview whether he would accept some advice on his Presidential 
appointments and the President-elect again agreed. Robertson recalls:
I spoke to President-Elect Carter during a three-way telephone conversation 
along with pro-family activist Lou Sheldon of California. I suggested to
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Governor Carter that he, as a strong evangelical, might want to include some 
evangelical Christians among his appointments.
According to Robertson, Carter “greeted the idea with enthusiasm.” He asked 
Robertson and Sheldon to deliver a list of likely candidates “within two weeks” to 
his transition headquarters in Plains. The two evangelists “worked night and day” to 
put together a list of resumes which, Robertson recalls, “was outstanding. All were 
highly distinguished in government, business, or education.”51 The list included a 
number of highly educated, philosophically fundamentalist scholars and professors, 
women and minority candidates. It “looked like what Jesse Jackson sometime later 
called the Rainbow Coalition,” said Robertson. In a letter attached to the list 
Robertson told Carter “I deeply appreciate your gracious invitation to furnish you 
with a list for your personal consideration of key evangelicals who would be 
supportive of your programs during the next four years.” Those on the list he said 
“warrant your careful consideration” as they represent the “joint input of many 
evangelical leaders from across the length and breadth of America.” Robertson also 
made clear his support of the President-elect. He wrote,
As you know, the 50 million evangelicals in the United States of America are 
highly supportive of you as their future President. We want to support you 
and to marshal this enormous reservoir of prayer and good will on your 
behalf....Let me assure you that the evangelicals of America will stand 
behind you when difficult times arise for your administration.
Robertson denied any political or self-interest on his and Sheldon’s behalf. “Our 
major concern in relation to government service is not one of individual or group 
self-seeking” he wrote, but rather “Our sole concern is for the betterment of our 
beloved country.” However, Robertson made clear that “In return, we feel that there 
should be significant representation in the Federal Government on behalf of a group 
of people who unfortunately have been sadly lacking in representation in past 
administrations.” He singled out “four areas of national life” regarding which 
conservative Christians were “particularly concerned” and to which he asked that 
suitable candidates be named. These included Carter’s White House staff, that 
Robertson called “The official family which will surround you in the White House
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and be your window to the American people.” Robertson also asked for evangelicals 
to be named to posts in the “compassionate agencies of the United States” including 
the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development. Concerned with the 
“press and broadcasting systems” that “portray our land as totally secular and 
humanistic,” he asked for Christians to be named to the Federal Communications 
Commission, the United States Information Agency and Voice of America. Worried 
that “far too much of the American taxpayers money has been spent on humanistic 
endeavours,” he asked for “key evangelicals” to be placed in the Department of 
Housing, Education and Welfare to oversee “a return to the theistic concept of 
education and welfare which would be found in the historic nature of our nation as 
reflected in its Declaration of Independence.” The names on the list reveal a 
sophisticated depth of understanding on the part of Robertson and Sheldon of the 
need for Carter to build cross-partisan political support not often associated with 
fundamentalist Christians. It also suggests that Robertson’s political affiliation with 
the Republican Party, whose Presidential nomination he would seek some years later, 
was far from fully formed. For example, on the list were Dr Betsy Ancker-Johnson, 
a Presbyterian nuclear physicist; Owen Cooper, described by Robertson as “one of 
the South’s outstanding businessmen,” John Grayson, a coloured Presbyterian with 
“Deep roots in the black community,” J. Hammond, the Governor of Alaska, 
suggested as Secretary of the Interior and who “would have significant appeal to 
conservationist groups because of his sensitivity to the environment,” William K. 
Brehm for National Security Assistant, described as “one of the young whiz kids 
brought in by Secretary McNamara,” and an “outstanding expert on all aspects of 
defence.” Robertson even suggested Morgan Maxfield for Assistant for Economic 
Affairs, an unsuccessful Democratic Congressional candidate from Missouri who 
had lost his election only because of what Robertson called “an untrue smear 
campaign by his Republican opponent.”53 Robertson recalled in a letter to Robert 
Maddox that the evangelicals considered the list to be of such significance that they 
refused to allow it to “go through an intermediary” and instead ensured that it was 
“hand delivered to his [Carter’s] home in Plains.”54 Robertson continues,
When the document was ready, I chartered a small aircraft to take Lou
Sheldon to the grassy strip in Georgia we laughingly called ‘Plains
International.’ Sheldon arrived at the Carter residence to find the next
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President barefoot and in blue jeans. They greeted each other warmly, and 
Sheldon proudly presented the booklet. Carter took it, read it, and began to 
cry.
Sheldon later told Robertson “Jimmy was so touched by all the work that we did that 
tears came to his eyes.” Robertson replied, “Lou, you are wrong. The reason he 
cried is because the appointment process is out of his hands, and he is not going to 
appoint any of those people.” Robertson’s suspicion was well-founded. “My words 
were true,” he writes. “Not one of our recommendations -  men and women who on 
the surface shared every principle that Jimmy Carter espoused -  was appointed to 
public office, or even seriously considered.”55 In an interview conducted at the end 
of Carter’s Presidency, Maddox substantiates Robertson’s story. Of the list of 
candidates he recalled, “That was the last that was heard of it,” even though he 
admits, “There were some very good people on the list, not only Christians but well 
qualified.” Robertson and Sheldon “didn’t even get a “thank you” for sending the 
names down” said Maddox. They, and other evangelicals, felt “burnt up” that they 
had been taken advantage of for political gain.56 Carter’s unwillingness to name one 
single openly professed evangelical to a key post within his administration badly 
damaged the new President’s standing with Robertson and his constituency of Bible- 
believing Protestants. Referring to the evangelical disillusionment with Carter 
Maddox recalls, “If the President had appointed a visible evangelical to the cabinet it 
could have made a difference.”57 When he did not do so, said Maddox, “It looked 
like they were being ignored” and that “Carter had used them to get elected.”58
Instead of appointing Christian candidates, Carter exacerbated this tension by 
choosing to largely transplant his Georgian election campaign team into the White 
House. In an infamous article in Atlantic Monthly, James Fallows, a former Carter 
speechwriter, wrote that the White House staff “took office in profound ignorance of 
their jobs.” They liked to see themselves as “cool guys...not trying too hard or 
taking it all too seriously.”59 Similarly, Playboy magazine called Carter’s staff “as 
hard-drinking, fornicating, pot-smoking, freethinking a group as has been seen in 
higher politics.”60 Comparing Carter’s staff to the hippy college students who had 
supported liberal George McGovern’s Presidential campaign, one journalist observed 
that the President hired “every McGovernite not then employed by a rock band.”61
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This only exacerbated evangelical disenchantment and Carter was assailed with 
accusations from religious conservatives that his administration was encumbered by 
secular humanists. Recalling the Carter years evangelist Tim LaHaye wrote 
“Between 1976 and 1980 I watched a professing Christian become President of the 
United States and then surround himself with a host of humanistic cabinet members, 
assistants, judges and almost three thousand other humanist appointees. These 
people nearly destroyed our nation.” Another four years of Carter in the White 
House “might have plunged us into another French Revolution, only this time on 
American soil.” In particular, said LaHaye, Carter and his secular staff would have 
“destroyed the American home.”62 Robert Maddox observed the evangelical 
perception of the White House staff was “They were all like Hamilton Jordan,” 
referring to Carter’s Chief of Staff who had earned a reputation as a fast-living 
drinker and party lover, and had been accused of using illegal drugs. Maddox 
recalled that one of the most frequent evangelical complaints conveyed to him in his 
role as liaison with the religious community was “Why doesn’t the PRESIDENT DO 
SOMETHING ABOUT Hamilton Jordan?”63
The abrasive Jordan was not the only Carter appointee to raise the hackles of 
Christian conservatives. Under Bella Abzug’s guidance the IWY National 
Commission was tasked with producing a list of recommendations to be endorsed by 
the IWY conference and enacted by the President and the Congress, dedicated to 
improving the situation women. Liberal, feminist and gay activist groups including 
The National Gay Task Force, Lesbians for Wages for Housework and the National 
Organisation for Women were invited to attend the commission hearings. These 
groups guaranteed a liberal slant to the IWY National Plan of Action, a twenty-five 
point list of recommendations to be enacted by the Carter White House. For example 
it resolved that the federal government “should assume a major role in directly 
providing comprehensive, voluntary, flexible-hour, bias-free, non-sexist quality child 
care.” It strongly supported abortion rights through the upholding of the “Supreme 
Court decisions which guarantee reproductive freedom to women,” and demanded 
“Medicaid reimbursement for abortion.” It also urged “all branches of the Federal, 
state and local government to give the highest priority to complying with [Roe vs. 
Wade] and to making available all methods of family planning to women unable to 
take advantage of private facilities.” Family planning services should be available
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“for all teenagers who request them,” alongside “education in responsible sexuality.” 
Sex education courses should be instituted in “all schools, including elementary 
schools.” The Plan demanded an end to discrimination on the basis of “sexual and 
affectional orientation,” in housing, employment, public facilities, government 
funding and the military. Penal codes and state laws restricting private sexual 
behaviour, including homosexual acts between consenting adults, were to be 
reformed or repealed.64 It declared that “The Equal Rights Amendment should be 
ratified.”65
The resolutions of the National Plan of Action made the IWY a key event in the 
development of the Christian “pro-family” movement, whose organisations were a 
key constituent of the Christian Right. For conservative Christians the National Plan 
was an affront to their cherished family-centred lifestyle and served to solidify 
evangelical opposition to the Carter White House.66 In particular they attacked the 
perceived bias of the delegates who had produced the resolutions. During the state 
meetings that took place prior to the national conference, representatives from 
conservative Christian groups complained that only feminists were being appointed 
as delegates to attend and address the Houston conference. They denounced what 
they saw as irregularities in voting procedures that favoured those who espoused 
liberal views. The publishing of the commission resolutions in advance of the 
Houston conference suggested to conservatives that the conference had been 
organised to ensure the passage of a feminist and secular humanist agenda. Their 
anger was exacerbated when the federal government allocated five million dollars of 
federal funds to support the work of the commission. The channelling of millions of 
dollars of tax money by the federal government into sponsoring a conference that 
advanced a “radical” agenda greatly heightened the sense of dislocation between the 
evangelical community and the Carter White House. “No other event so politicised 
traditional homemakers” as the IWY, Yale Pines observed.67
Evangelical and fundamentalist Christians wrote directly to the President to register 
their concerns and demand action to reverse the feminist domination of the IWY 
procedures. One evangelical attendee of the Illinois IWY conference wrote “The 
people of Illinois do not want ERA, or any of the other IWY resolutions.” The 
meeting and the resulting resolutions were “invalid, and do not represent the true
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views of the people of Illinois.” She pleaded to Carter “Please heed our words and 
INVESTIGATE this illegal set up.”68 Mrs. Thomas Hadfield of Massachusetts who 
had attended an IWY meeting in Boston called it “unforgettable experience.” She 
wrote “The prejudice of those in charge, against those of conservative ideas was 
blatant,” and complained “The room was divided in half and the votes counted by 
two teams. Those liberals on the border voted twice.” Furthermore, “During the 
count of the conservative votes the liberals got up and milled around taking pictures, 
etc., in an effort to obstruct from view the voter cards.” It was “utter chaos” said 
Hadfield, “I object to the tax money being provided for a meeting, and views used as 
input to effect federal legislation from that meeting, that was so lacking in 
representation of the conservative tax payer.” In a curt reply Midge Costanza wrote 
only “to thank you for taking the time to express your views” and said that the 
queries would be referred to “other appropriate offices.” She was more forthcoming 
with another correspondent who complained about the “radicalism” of the IWY 
commission and its support of the ERA. Typically, she went on the offensive, 
accusing the complainant of being “politically motivated.” She wrote “Everyone has 
the right to have their own political view about anything going on this country.. ..All 
are loyal to this country and certainly deserve to be respected for their views.” 
Costanza also derided conservative Christian opposition to ERA. “The fact that 
more [women] may be for ERA than against makes sense” wrote Costanza, “since it 
was set up to bring women into an equal position in our society and to help eliminate 
barriers against them, thus, people who believe that women should accept their lot in 
life aren’t likely to be on such a commission.”69
Dismayed with the response of Costanza and the activities of the Carter 
administration, conservative Christians sought to convince their Congressmen to 
register their displeasure with the White House. In October 1977, Mrs Frank 
Filewicz wrote to her Congressman, C.W. Bill Young of Florida, declaring “Things 
are getting from bad to worse during this administration.” She included in her letter 
a document written by Jean O’Leary, the gay rights activist appointed by Carter to 
the IWY Commission entitled ‘Lesbians and the Schools.’ The pamphlet outlined 
the need for homosexual issues and resources to be included in sex education 
courses, school counselling services and school libraries. Filewicz denounced 
O’Leary as “a pervert.” She asked, “Are these the kinds of ‘creatures’ we need on
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this commission?” She explicitly blamed President Carter for the political imbalance 
of IWY National Commission delegates. Carter had “included some of the most 
actively militant of the sexist radicals” on the commission she said. Filewicz also 
reported a number of bizarre sexual activities from the state conferences. In 
Virginia, she claimed, witches ran a workshop entitled “Women and Spirituality.” In 
Vermont lesbian books that included sections entitled, “I fantasise to sleep with my 
brother” and “I fantasise sleeping with horses” were distributed. “Five hundred of 
these books were passed out...our tax dollars paid for them” she wrote. In 
Pennsylvania workshops promoted “bestiality and necrophilia as normal forms of 
sexual expression.” In California, one of the workshops featured displays of “lesbian 
equipment” that included “masturbation wands, clitoral vibrators” and “vaginal 
speculums.” A pregnant woman looking at the devices “was offered instruction on 
how to perform an abortion on herself.” Women in Hawaii were “subjected to a 
dance program of such revolting filth” that it was “difficult to report it accurately and 
remain within the bounds of common decency.” Aside from the highly sexualised 
nature of the proceedings, Filewicz reported their anti-patriotic and un-Godly temper. 
She warned that in Minnesota, the suggestion that the meeting begin with a pledge of 
allegiance and prayer was “actually booed, shouted down and declared out of 
order....In most states there was no evidence of an American flag anywhere.” She 
wrote “It is impossible to even believe all this went on...are we supposed to pay our 
hard earned money for such filth?” She made the religious aspect of her complaint 
clear by quoting the book of Genesis: “God created man in his image, male and 
female. We are together to compliment each other. We are equal in Gods eyes, we 
need no other rules to make us equal.” Filewicz also wrote to Griffin Bell, the Carter 
appointed Attorney General, to complain that the IWY was a “blatant misuse of tax­
payers money.” The Carter White House made little attempt to address the lurid 
claims of evangelicals like Filewicz. Again the White House’s reply betrayed a 
dismissive attitude. Beth Abramowitz replied to Filewicz only that the issues “may 
seem moot” and pointed out that the IWY Commission “did operate within the 
law.”70
However, by now Congressmen were moved to write to the President to complain. 
James Broyhill of North Carolina wrote to Carter, “It was clearly the intent of 
Congress that the Co-ordinating Committee reflect a broad range of philosophies,”
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but “only one of ten members of the North Carolina Co-ordinating Committee is 
opposed to the Equal Rights Amendment.” Broyhill was also concerned that “the 
North Carolina delegation to the Houston Conference is not a representative one but 
rather carefully selected to reflect a philosophical bias” and in particular the National 
Commission “reflects a decidedly one-sided viewpoint.”71 In reply, Midge Costanza 
dismissed Broyhill’s complaints and once again defended the procedures of the IWY. 
She wrote that “legal challenges have been made” to the IWY activities and 
“everything was seen as in order.”72 Anti-abortion advocate Jeannette Dreisbach 
attended a Pennsylvania IWY meeting and wrote to her Congressman, Robert 
Walker, to warn of unfair feminist domination. She told Walker that she had asked 
one of the commission members how she was chosen and was told “My friend got a 
call from the National Organisation for Women.” Dreisbach observed that “Several 
of the commissioners had their NOW buttons on. It is obvious that the decision 
makers were a selected, hand-picked group which represent the militant feminist 
philosophy.” Walker forwarded her concerns to the White House and was infuriated 
when he received a dismissive ‘Dear Sir’ form letter in return. “Need I remind you 
that my constituents help pay the bill for this atrocious bureaucratic pomposity?” he 
replied.73 Another Senator, Charles E. Bennett of Florida, wrote to Carter to ask, 
“Mr President...is there anyway in which the funds can be cut off for this IWY 
activity?” Again he singled out Jean O’Leary who, he said, did not represent 
“average American citizens” but rather “extreme liberals and proponents of 
homosexuality and lesbian activity.” He warned Carter that the delegates at his state 
meeting had “desecrated the American flag and sang the Russian national anthem.” 
In a second letter to archconservative Senator Jesse Helms, forwarded to Carter, 
Bennett warned that the meeting had been “rigged” by “people who represented 
extreme organisations” deliberately to “exclude people of ordinary points of view,” 
who he called “clean minded citizens.” Bennett declared, “I never voted to establish 
this useless and wasteful expenditure of Federal funds to begin with but I think most 
Members of Congress who did vote for it had no idea that it would get out of hand.” 
In reply, Midge Costanza wrote “Jean O’Leary is a true professional and highly 
responsible person.” Her appointment to the IWY was “entirely appropriate.”74 Vito 
Mazza, a member of the Connecticut State Assembly wrote to the President 
demanding an explanation as to activities of the IWY. He forwarded to Carter a 
pamphlet circulated by a pro-family organisation calling itself “The Connecticut
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committee to rescind ERA” that warned readers about the “Federal Festivals of 
Female Radicals financed with your money!” It attacked Carter for his choice of 
IWY committee members. These included Bella Abzug who had “introduced a bill 
to give civil rights to homosexuals.” It quoted Gloria Steinem as announcing that 
“Overthrowing capitalism is too small for us. We must overthrow the whole 
+$/&* [patriarchy!” Jean O’Leary was “another Carter appointee...remember, 
homosexuality is still illegal in most states yet the President appointed a nationally 
recognised lesbian.” The pamphlet declared “Our nation is not embroiled primarily 
in a battle of the sexes, but a battle of philosophies -  between those who hold the 
pro-family Biblical values upon which our nation was founded and those who 
embrace the humanist feminist philosophy.” Again Midge Costanza was moved to 
reply personally. She told Mazza that the pamphlet was an effort to “deliberately 
distort the procedures” of the IWY and she angrily accused pro-family activists of 
running an underhand campaign to discredit the conference:
You might be interested to learn that in Kentucky a similar publication was 
released. There, the contents of a National Gay Task Force information 
packet were removed from the pamphlet cover. Pornographic material was 
then substituted in its place [and] the adjusted pamphlet was give to children 
to distribute to the State Legislators, and announcements made by the persons 
responsible criticising and reprimanding the National Gay Task Force as 
being responsible.76
Costanza’s repeated efforts to defend the IWY completely failed to quell evangelical 
opposition. In response to the complaints of pro-family activists, Senator Helms 
convened a series of ‘Ad Hoc’ Congressional hearings into the federal funding of the 
IWY. Held over two days in July 1977 the hearings asked, “Who really represents 
the views of the majority of American women?” Helms cited discrimination by the 
IWY “against those women who do not agree with the narrow and negative ideology 
and partisan biases of the IWY organisers” including “rigged sessions, hand picked 
committees, stacked registration.” He accused IWY of using federal funds to lobby 
for ERA and abortion. The IWY, he said, was “controlled by an elitist group of 
radical feminists who refuse to allow women with different viewpoints to 
participate.” He held the President directly responsible, listing “11 Carter appointees 
that are militant feminists.”77 It was activities like the IWY that Helms clearly had in
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mind when he later wrote that the “liberal approach to government” was like “a 
boulder gaining speed as it heads towards to the bottom of a mountain,” its 
momentum “relentlessly escalated from offering small and fragile solutions to 
creating a pervasive reliance on the federal government.” This inevitably created a
78government that “pushes its control into every segment of society.” Contact 
between pro-family groups and Congressmen like Helms played an important role in 
politicising Christian conservative women. One woman who later became a pro- 
family administrator within the Reagan administration recalled:
There was the International Women’s Year meeting back in ’76...Jean 
Stapleton [President Carter’s sister] was on television and said here was this 
grassroots meeting for women to go and talk about their concerns. So I went. 
I mean, I have voted in elections but that was it. So I went down to the IWY 
meeting and heard all sorts of talk about this issue and that issue and the other 
issue. I just didn’t know anything. And I noticed that these people 
were very upset -  I shouldn’t say upset, but concerned. There was a whole 
slew of issues that people were just really -  I hate to use the word ‘violent’ -  
very enthusiastic about...There was one group of women taking A,B, C, and 
D position and another group of women taking X, Y, and Z position and I 
thought, “Well, now, why all this discussion, why all this controversy? So
7Qthen I started doing some studying.
The White House was well aware that the IWY was in danger of provoking a 
conservative Christian backlash against the administration. As early as mid- 
September 1977, Presidential aide Jan Peterson wrote to Costanza warning her of the 
“anger from groups opposing the IWY.” The issues of complaint were that “The 
Commission members were largely pro-ERA (49 to 1)”; “The state conferences were 
dominated by feminists who refused to allow others (housewives, religious women, 
anti-ERA women, abortion, lesbianism) in”; “The conferences were used to lobby for 
ERA”; and that “This was not proper use of federal monies.” The conservative 
women wanted “the funding to be stopped and the conference in Houston stopped,” 
and “The President not to see the women in Houston as representative of American 
Women.” By now the White House was also clearly aware of the need to combat the 
activities of anti-ERA activist Phyllis Schlafly and her movement. Peterson warned 
Costanza, “Phyllis Schlafly told her readers of Eagle Forum ahead of time to find 
irregularities in how the state meetings were run.”80 Such was the concern with the
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administration over opposition to the IWY that some aides warned against further 
Presidential involvement. Beth Abramowitz told Stuart Eizenstat that extreme 
factions such as “Right-to-Lifers, Gay liberation, Mormon Church, and anti-gay 
rights groups” were looking to force their views on the IWY conference in Houston. 
She noted that “several law suits have been filed against the state conventions” by 
conservative women’s groups who felt discriminated against and also warned “The 
state delegates to the Houston convention may not be representative of women 
within the states.” She wrote, for example, that Mississippi was to be represented in 
Houston by an “all-white delegation” that included “at least three acknowledged 
members of the Ku Klux Klan.” Because of these facts she recommended that the 
President “Not get involved in the convention plans.” A clearly concerned Eizenstat 
scrawled on her memorandum “I agree” that the IWY was a “can of worms.” Taking 
note of Abramowitz’s warning that the “President’s participation may seem to 
condone the way in which delegates and issues [were] decided,” Eizenstat wrote on 
the memorandum “It seems suicidal for him to go [to Houston].”81
The White House was aware that the religious make-up of the IWY delegates 
underrepresented the conservative Christian community, yet refused to get involved. 
Abramowitz wrote to Eizenstat concerning a briefing on the IWY by Commission 
members. She warned, “One matter which was disturbing and which may provoke 
some racial and religious minority backlash is the selection of delegates.” Despite 
the guidelines on representation for Houston delegates stipulating that they should 
“reflect the racial and religious composition of the population” the Commission had 
concluded, “all racial minorities and Jewish women were over-represented among 
the delegates.” The policy implications for Carter, wrote Abramowitz, were “very 
serious, especially in the light of Bakke.”82 She advised that the commission should 
“appoint three hundred delegates who were “white, Protestant, upper income 
women.” Crucially however, given the sensitivity of the issue, Abramowitz warned 
that the White House should remain detached and “take no direct action ourselves.” 
This time a clearly troubled Eizenstat wrote on the memorandum, “Beth, ok, but it 
appears everything about IWY is turning into a disaster.”83
The National Conference of the IWY finally took place in Houston in November 
1977. The first meeting of its type in the United States since the Women's Rights
202
Convention in Seneca Falls in 1848 it attracted over 20,000 women from across 
America. The conference was mandated by the federal government to “identify the 
barriers that prevent women from participating fully and equally in all aspects of 
national life.” It declared its intention to speak for “American women who 
throughout our Nation's life have been denied the opportunities, rights, privileges and 
responsibilities accorded to men.” To signal the Carter administration’s support for 
the IWY and the proposals of the National Plan First Lady Rosalynn Carter attended 
the Houston conference. The IWY commission made clear their expectation that the 
demands would be addressed by the federal government. “We are entitled to and
84expect serious attention to our proposals” declared the National Plan. One delegate 
from California demanded “more follow through on women’s issues from our
or
legislators.” As another delegate put it, “We are going to say to our elected 
officials that unless you listen to our demands we are going to get you out of 
office.”86 Janet Gray Hayes, the mayor of San Jose, California announced “The days 
of licking stamps and stuffing envelopes are over.”87 Midge Costanza, also attending 
the Houston conference to signal the Carter administration’s support, declared, “I felt 
more important being a woman than being an assistant to the President.”88 She went 
on to publicly link the resolutions of the conference with the policies of the Carter 
White House. “Anyone who doesn’t think the past four days were committed to
O Q
political action is crazy,” Costanza said. She promised delegates, “The response 
from Jimmy Carter will be substantive. And to use his phrase, “you can depend on 
that.””90 The passing of the liberal resolutions of the National Plan were widely 
cheered, especially those supporting lesbianism. Betty Friedan said, “I believe we 
must help the women who are lesbians to be protected in their own civil rights.”91 
Feminists supporting lesbian rights wore badges proclaiming, “It is fine to be
Q9straight, but gay is great” and “Anita Bryant sucks oranges.” Others waved pro­
lesbian placards. One read, “The Pope has Clitoris Envy -  He Wears Skirts, Doesn’t 
He?” 93 Another declared “Jesus was a homosexual.”94 When a resolution in support 
of lesbian rights was approved, pink and yellow balloons were released from the 
conference hall ceiling bearing the message “WE ARE EVERYWHERE.”95 The 
liberal women’s magazine Women’s Agenda declared “We Won!” on its front 
cover.96 Whitney observed the Houston conference to be “a rite of passage...a 
ceremony signifying that women were coming of age in their quest for a share of the
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nation’s political power.”97 It was, writes Schulman, “the crest of the women’s
g o
movement.”
Predictably, conservative Christians were appalled. For them, observe Kerber and 
Mathews, the Houston conference was “not a sign of achievement but of threat.”99 
Conservative delegates from Indiana and Mississippi turned their backs on the 
podium in protest when the lesbian rights resolution was passed. A sign brandished 
by a Christian delegate read “Woman’s libbers, ERA lesbians, REPENT Read the 
Bible while Your [sic] Able.”100 Protestors declaring themselves to belong to the 
Christian Defence League brandished signs reading, “Who needs Jews, Kikes, 
Abortian [sic.], Communism?”101 Pro-family groups warned their delegates to vote 
against any resolution that was written in neutral gender words like “spouse” or 
“person” instead of “man” or “wife.”102 When resolutions passed in favour of 
abortion pro-family delegates waved giant photographs of aborted foetuses. They 
chanted, “all we are saying is give life a chance.”103 One wept, “I never thought they 
would come to this! It’s murder!” Another said, “It will be old people next!” The 
Washington Post reported “sporadic” tussles between pro-life and pro-family 
delegates.104 One pro-family evangelical delegate from Nebraska declared “Wake up 
America, to the forces at work to destroy your family life, the private enterprise 
system, and everything you hold dear as a Christian.”105 South Carolina Senator 
Norma Russell, a delegate at IWY, called it “the closest thing to hell I can 
imagine.”106
In response to the National Plan of Action and the Houston meeting, conservative 
Christians organised their own counter-conference. Proposed by Lottie Beth Hobbs, 
founder of an anti-ERA organisation calling itself the Four Ws (Women Who Want 
to be Women), the ‘National Pro-Family Rally’ took place in Houston
i ryj
simultaneously with the IWY conference. It was attended mainly by middle-aged, 
white women from fundamentalist and evangelical churches.108 Addressing the 
15,000 pro-family activists proudly wearing “Stop ERA” buttons who crammed in to 
the Houston Astro Arena the keynote speaker Phyllis Schlafly, by now a major 
celebratory of the movement, opened with her favourite punch-line, thanking her 
husband for letting her be away from the home that day: “I always like to say that, 
because it makes the libs [women’s liberationists] so mad.”109 She assailed the
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feminists who “want to reconstruct us into a gender-free society, so there’s no
difference between men and women.”110 She warned that feminists wanted “to give
an equal right for women not to be pregnant, just like men.. .If you don’t like the fact
that women are the ones who have babies and nurse them, you will just have to take
it up with God.”111 “I have enough civil rights to choke a hungry goat,” raged Clay
Smothers, a black pro-family representative from Texas. He told the conference “I
ask for victory over the perverts of this country.” Dismissing gay assertions that
their struggle for equality was analogous to that of the black civil rights movement
112he declared, “I want the right to segregate my family from these misfits.” 
Delegates watched a film of a man who explained that he had been a homosexual for 
26 years until he had finally saved: “The Lord Jesus Christ is the only one who can 
deliver you from homosexuality,” he said.113 Anita Bryant appeared by videotape, 
and the conference passed a resolution supporting her anti-gay rights campaign. 
Bryant blamed gay activists for the IWY debacle. She declared that it had been “run 
by a political powerhouse within the feminist movement largely comprised of 
lesbians.” At both the state conventions and the national event in Houston she said,
“Straight women were subjected to Lesbian outrages so bad that they 
could not even be described....lesbian sex gadgets were hawked everywhere. 
[It was] anti-white, antifamily, antichristian and anti-American from start to 
finish.”114
Bryant was particularly angered by the support of the Carter White House for the 
IWY. Carter’s decision to validate the conference by sending the First Lady to 
represent him was, according to Bryant, “tragic.”115 She warned “what happened in 
Houston proved that these revolutionary women have one aim: destroy the social 
structure on which America rests.”116 One fundamentalist preacher at the pro-family 
rally denounced the “moral rottenness of the [Houston] agenda,” whilst conservative 
Congressman Robert Dornan urged those in attendance towards political 
involvement, telling them to “Let your voice be heard in Washington.”117 After the 
Houston conference evangelical Pastor Jim Brasher reported in his church bulletin,
The IWY conference opened its session without any recognition of God, and 
proceeded to push through its socialist Plan of Action and to wildly and
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enthusiastically place its stamp of approval upon the killing of unborn
children, lesbianism, ERA, and a host of other highly questionable
118resolutions.. .Moral rottenness filled the hall with the stench of death.
The resolutions passed at the Houston conference also appeared to be emblematic of 
an increased intervention by the Carter White House into the private affairs of the 
family, a primary concern of the evangelical community, and an upholding of which 
Carter had declared to be central to his spiritual and political philosophy during the 
1976 Presidential campaign. Evangelicals believed that the high cost of federal 
government programs, instituted by secular Democratic Party liberals, had violated 
the traditional family unit by making it impossible for women to stay at home and 
raise their children. The deficit spending and high taxation required to fund abortion 
programs, health and the welfare systems had necessitated two-income families, with 
drastic consequences for traditional family life. Children, they argued, were forced 
into federal child-care programs as their mothers re-entered the labour market to 
make ends meet. With one or more parent absent from the home, children were not 
receiving the correct gender role models. This was in direct violation of Proverbs 
22:6 which declared, “[t]rain up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, 
he will not depart from it.” James Robison observed that this was exactly what the 
gay community wanted, because in the absence of correct parental supervision 
children “sought to satisfy [their] needs through a homosexual relationship.”119 After 
the conference one delegate from Carter’s home-state of Georgia wrote to the 
President to protest,
The thrust of the recommendations is towards greater dependence on 
government -  primarily Federal...there is a trend towards transforming 
family relationships into employment relationships which would adapt to 
monetary equations for computing the Gross National Product! I urge you to 
look askance at proposals that place a dollar value on family relationships and 
on all recommendations which flow in the direction of governments 
restructuring society rather than society restructuring governments.120
Phyllis Schlafly foresaw an anti-feminist backlash against the resolutions passed at 
the Houston conference “because it showed the television audience that ERA and the 
feminist movement were outside the mainstream of America.” She predicted that the 
IWY would “finish off the women’s movement,” because it would “show them off
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for the radical, anti-family, pro-lesbian people they are.”121 Schlafly called the IWY 
the “boot camp” of the pro-family movement. Afterwards, Christian conservatives 
were, they said, “ready for the offensive in the battle for our families and our 
faith.”122
Schlafly was correct. The ERA was not ratified by a single state in the period after
the IWY conference in large part because its resolutions spurred evangelical activists
into a concerted campaign against the feminist resolutions passed at Houston. As
Klatch observes, the IWY conference “concretised the perception of Feminism as an
anti-family force” and as a result “gave birth to a network of activists and
organisations” that went on to play a key role in the Christian Right.”123 Similarly,
Conover and Gray note that the IWY “first awoke many conservative women to the
evils of feminism” and “invigorated the pro-family movement.”124 IWY was “the
high-water mark of...radical feminism” wrote Yale Pines, whilst the pro-family
counter conference was the “launching pad for a mass grass-roots traditionalist
12^campaign.. .catalysed by what they saw as the horrors at IWY.” One conservative 
Christian activist declared that the IWY was simply “the best recruitment tool I’ve 
ever had. I just spend twenty minutes reading the Houston resolutions to them. 
That’s all I have to do.”126
Carter’s difficulties over IWY did not end after the Houston conference. Costanza 
and Abzug pressured the President to extend the life of the National Commission for 
the Observance of International Women’s Year beyond the originally scheduled date 
of March 1978 to enable it to supervise implementation of the National Plan. “The 
Commission’s business can not possibly be completed,” Costanza wrote to the 
President, “failure to reappoint the Commission would result in a historic and 
catastrophic discontinuity in Presidential commitment to the concerns of women.”127 
Abzug also wrote to the President. She demanded that he “issue an Executive Order 
extending to the life of the National Commission, as President Ford routinely did.” 
If he refused to do so, she said, “it would be the first time since 1961 that this Nation 
would be without a federally-sponsored, quasi-independent agency expressly devoted 
to the needs and status of women.”128 Other members of the White House staff 
vehemently opposed Costanza’s and Abzug’s plan. Beth Abramowitz wrote to 
Stuart Eizenstat “I strongly recommend we not support this effort.” Eizenstat
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scrawled a query on the memo: “Beth, Why not? Political downside?” 
Abramowitz wrote again a week later. “The current commissioners have mounted a 
great deal of pressure to force the President to keep [the IWY commission] in its 
present form,” she warned. They had gone so far as to bring “400 women into town, 
who believe that if the President does not sign the Executive Order, he will be
130reneging on his commitment to IWY.” It was, she said, “a very messy situation.” 
Clearly agreeing with Abramowitz, Eizenstat wrote to Fran Voorde “I recommend 
that the President take no action to extend the IWY Commission.” He added a 
personal note to Voorde: “We should talk about this a.s.a.p” and warned that “I think 
he [Carter] has to see Bella.”131 Mindful of the need to retain the already lukewarm 
support of feminist women’s organisations, Carter chose to ignore the warnings of 
his staff and signed Executive Order 12135 that created the President’s National 
Advisory Committee for Women.132
Perhaps one reason why the White House was so keen to retain the support of 
feminist women was Carter’s failure to build support amongst other Democratic 
Party constituencies. One example of this was Carter’s standing amongst Jewish 
voters, which remained low throughout his Presidency. One interviewee of the 
Miller Centre Carter Presidential Oral History Project recalled that Carter “wasn’t all 
that popular at any point [during his Presidency] with the organised American Jewish 
lobby,” whilst White House counsel Robert Lipshutz observed that Carter “had a lot 
of fire” from “the American Jewish community leadership.”133 Their feelings of 
disquiet regarding Carter had first become apparent during the 1976 Presidential 
campaign when Robert Shrum, a disgruntled speechwriter resigned from Carter’s 
staff. According to Shrum Carter had ordered his speechwriter to ignore the Jewish 
vote and to focus on Christian voters, saying “I don’t get over four percent of the 
Jewish vote, so forget it. We get all the Christians.”134 Carter’s denial of Shrum’s 
claim “If I said all the things he claimed I had said, I wouldn’t vote for myself” did 
little to ease Jewish concerns.135 Unfortunately for Carter, his attempts to win their 
support only led him into further conflict with the Christian Right. For example, 
Carter had a personal interest in the fate of the state of the Middle-East, a focus that 
derived from his Christian faith. “As a biblical scholar” said one aide, Carter “had a
I ^6keen interest in the continuing disputes surrounding the state of Israel.” However, 
Jewish voters perceived Carter as critical of Israel and overly sympathetic to the
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concerns of the Palestinians. During the 1976 Presidential campaign he told U.S. 
News and World Report that “Some resolution of the Palestinian question is certainly 
inevitable.” There were “some very serious problems that would have to be
137addressed...One would be control of the Golan Heights and Jerusalem.” Once in 
office he observed that in order to achieve peace in the Middle-East there would have 
to be an adjustment of boundaries in the region to “satisfy the minimum requirements 
of [Israel’s] Arab neighbours,” and also a “solution to the question of the enormous 
numbers of Palestinian refugees who have been forced out of their homes and who 
want to have some fair treatment.”138 The perception of Carter as unsupportive of 
Israel was perpetuated by his negotiation of the Camp David peace accords between 
Israel and Egypt in 1978, his decision to sell F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt (the first time such a sale had been made to Arab nations), and a vote in the 
United Nations in which the United States called for the dismantling of Jewish 
settlements in occupied Arab territories. Once again this impacted upon his standing 
within the evangelical and fundamentalist Christian community for whom support of 
Israel was based upon Biblical covenant. Jerry Falwell told his supporters that the 
President “does not read Scripture carefully enough to understand the crucial place 
that Israel and the Jewish people have in God’s plan.”139
Carter was not helped in his efforts to reverse his anti-Israel public image by the 
activities of his family and his administration. Billy Carter’s comment that the 
government should focus on winning the support of Arabs, because there were a 
“hell of a lot more Arabs than there is Jews” aroused claims that the President’s 
brother was anti-Semitic. He also attacked the “Jewish media” which, he said, 
“tears up the Arab countries full time.”140 The remarks, recalled Hamilton Jordan, 
“bothered the hell out of [the President].”141 Moreover, Carter’s sister Ruth was 
linked to an organisation of Hebrew Christians who promoted the ‘conversion’ of 
Jews.142 When it was revealed that United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young had 
met with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Carter’s popularity 
amongst the Jewish community fell even further. In 1979 Robert Maddox wrote to 
Carter concerning a meeting he had held with Rabbi Bernard Mandelbaum, a New 
York Jewish leader. The Rabbi was “Most concerned about [the] President’s 
comments on Palestinians,” and Maddox advised “Quick work needs to be 
done...direct work with Jewish leaders,” because the President’s “Jewish problem”
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was a “pressing brushfire.”143 In another memorandum on the same subject Gerald 
Rafshoon wrote to the President to ask Carter to attend a dinner served at the 
National Conference of Christians and Jews. It would, he said, be “a good 
opportunity to make a strong denunciation of anti-Semitism,” necessary because of 
“lingering resentment” about “Billy [Carter’s] remarks.”144 In marked contrast to the 
response to Maddox’s frequent pleas for the President to attend evangelical Christian 
functions, Carter acted on Rafshoon’s advice, attending and addressing the 
conference.145
Carter’s attempts to win Jewish support simply led him into further conflict with 
Christian Right leaders and added to the suspicion amongst Bible-believing 
Protestants that Carter had abandoned his Southern Baptist faith. Although strongly 
supportive of the state of Israel, American evangelicalism, particularly 
fundamentalism, had long harboured “strong ambivalence about Judaism.”146 Some 
fundamentalist Christians, particularly in the South, saw the meddling of intrusive 
secular government in private affairs of faith and family as a product of a modern 
and liberal ‘cosmopolitan’ culture they believed to be exemplified by northern Jews. 
Bailey Smith, President of the Southern Baptist Convention openly enunciated this 
anti-Semitism. At the height of the 1980 Presidential election campaign Smith 
announced “It is interesting at great political rallies how you have a Protestant to 
pray, a Catholic to pray and then you have a Jew to pray. With all due respect...God 
Almighty does not hear the prayer of a Jew.” Smith asked “How in the world can 
God hear the prayer of a man who says that Jesus Christ is not the true Messiah? It is 
blasphemous. It may be politically expedient, but no one can pray unless he prays 
through the name of Jesus Christ.”147 Jerry Falwell subsequently added “I do not 
believe that God answers the prayer of any unredeemed Gentile or Jew.”148 David C. 
George, a more liberal Baptist pastor wrote to Maddox urging the President to 
respond.149 Carter did so, attempting to use the evangelists’ statements to scare 
Jewish voters into supporting him. At a campaign dinner in Chicago two days after 
Smith’s speech he told voters “You’ll determine whether or not this America will be 
unified, or, if I lose the election, whether Americans will be separated, black from 
white, Jew from Christian.”150 In contrast, Ronald Reagan increased his standing 
amongst the conservative Christian community by refusing to attack the evangelists’ 
statements. When asked whether he agreed with Falwell he said “No, since both the
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Christian and Judaic religions are based on the same God, the God of Moses, I’m 
quite sure those prayers are answered.” But crucially he went on to say “I guess 
everyone can make his own interpretation of the Bible, and many individuals have 
been making differing interpretations for a long time.”151 By doing so Reagan was 
astutely distancing himself from Smith and Falwell’s anti-Semitic message whilst 
simultaneously reaffirming the right of conservative Christians to interpret the Bible 
in whichever way they saw fit. Later, the Carter campaign aired a television 
commercial directly attacking Falwell and his organisation. It warned that “Dr Jerry 
Falwell has said that God doesn’t hear the prayers of Jews,” and that “if Reagan goes 
on to the White House, Falwell will come with him, and purify the land as someone 
else did some years ago.”152 Carter publicly declared that his Christian faith “was 
not that of the Jerry Falwells or the Gerald L. K. Smiths,” openly linking Falwell 
with the depression era far-right evangelist once branded “the Dean of American 
Anti-Semitism.” The Moral Majority filed an $11 million lawsuit for slander 
against the Carter campaign, forcing the withdrawal of the commercial.
The White House Conference on Families
A further schism between pro-family conservatives and the Carter administration 
centred around the President’s ill-conceived electoral pledge to convene a White 
House Conference on the Family (WHCF). This conference was created to address, 
as Carter put it, “specific ways that we can better support and strengthen our 
families.”154 The conference further solidified Carter’s image amongst Christian 
conservatives’ as a secular humanist, the philosophy evangelist Tim LaHaye 
dammed as “Family enemy number one.”155 New Right strategist Paul Weyrich, in 
particular notes that the WHCF was “very instrumental” in exacerbating anti-Carter 
feeling amongst the conservative Christian community. He recalls that Christians 
were “in total disbelief’ that Carter could support the WHCF and as a result “it lent 
credibility to those of us who insisted Carter was a real problem.”156 Hutcheson calls 
it a “symbolic turning point,” whilst Freedman notes that the conference became “a
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cause celebre for the religious right.”157 Ribuffo also singled out the conference as of 
special importance in catalysing conservative Christian politicisation. As he puts it, 
the White House conference “provided a convenient reason for mobilisation.”158 As 
a result of the conference, conservative political activists, theologically conservative 
preachers and television evangelists actively sought to mould evangelical and 
fundamentalist Christians into a political voting bloc in opposition to the Carter 
White House.
Tasked by Carter to “help stimulate a national discussion on the state of American 
families,” the WHCF derived directly from a pledge made by Carter during the 1976 
Presidential campaign and from a need to win the support of faith-based voters, 
particularly Catholics perturbed by Carter’s refusal to support their calls for a 
constitutional amendment restricting abortion.159 During the campaign Carter and 
his staff understood the need to placate these voters. In an August 1976 
memorandum written by his campaign staff to prepare the candidate for a 
forthcoming interview with the Catholic News Service, Carter scrawled a reminder 
to himself to “Repeat concerns for family” (along with a rather amusing note to 
remind himself to enunciate his “vowels” when pronouncing ethnic urban names that 
troubled his Georgian accent).160 Two months later in an address to the National 
Conference of Catholic Charities he promised that, if elected, he would call a “White 
House Conference on the American Family.” Carter told Catholic leaders that he 
proposed to “examine the strengths of American families, the difficulties they face 
and the ways in which family life is affected by public policies.” He called the 
conference “an important first step” toward “restoring the public and private 
partnership that must exist if we are going to provide adequate social services to the 
American people.”161 Once in office Carter remained highly committed to a pro­
active family policy. Asked by senior staff in May 1978 to list key areas of policy 
for the administration to focus upon during the second half of his Presidency Carter 
placed “Family” on a list his priorities equally alongside more obvious major policy 
matters as “Peace,” “Strong Defence,” “Inflation,” and “Bureaucracy.”162 Carter 
subsequently referred to the conference as a “noble purpose.”163
The family conference finally developed as a combination of White House sponsored 
state conferences scheduled for December 1979 (they did not take place until early
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1980) and three regional conferences in June and July 1980. The state conferences 
drew up the agenda for the larger regional meetings. More than 100,000 people 
participated, the delegates meeting to discuss how to alleviate the economic stress 
upon families, the need for quality, affordable child-care, education and the need for 
government to be more responsive to the challenges of modern family life. They 
called upon the government to better understand the impact that its policies had upon 
the family and include this perspective within the decision making and legislative 
writing process. The decentralised regional conference format was a deliberate 
decision by the Carter White House, says Stuart Eizenstat, with one eye on the 
increasingly belligerent pro-family movement. Eizenstat explained that the White 
House wanted to avoid a single conference that would focus “all of the energy” of 
pro-family activists, leading to the event “blowing up in the administration’s face 
rather than bringing some degree of honour to it for having brought these issues to 
the public fore.”164
Eizenstat was right to be worried, and Carter soon had great cause to regret his 
campaign pledge. In particular, conservative Christian activists saw the conference 
as further evidence of Carter’s betrayal of his religious principles. Already shocked 
both by the resolutions passed by the IWY Houston conference, and the support of 
the Carter White House for its National Plan, this time pro-family activists were 
neither prepared to concede resolutions to feminist activists, or indeed, as Eizenstat 
had hoped, award Carter with any political credit. “If the IWY gave birth to the pro- 
family movement,” writes Klatch, the White House conference “solidified the 
movement, deepening the wrath of pro-family activists and drawing in further 
supporters.”165 The WHCF was another step towards the politicisation of pro-family 
groups against Carter. As one activist explained,
The excesses of the feminist movement activated a lot of people who 
otherwise wouldn’t have noticed that anything was going on -  the IWY, et 
cetera. The White House Conference on Families activated a whole other 
group of people who had not been radicalised by IWY.... Most of the pro- 
family troops at the White House conference were new. That’s fascinating 
because that got a whole new different segment of the population; those 
people are remaining active. 166
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Carter’s conference campaign promise backfired spectacularly. The Washington 
Post recalled that at the time Carter had made the promise “the only foreseeable 
danger was that we might spend $3 million for an exercise in nostalgia and end with 
a report as meaningful as a Hallmark greeting card.” The pro-family lobby had 
changed that. By the time the conference finally took place, the Post wrote, “family” 
had “become a fighting word.”167 By 1980, as columnist Richard Cohen observed, 
“Family of course, does not strictly speaking, mean family. It means no Equal 
Rights Amendment and no abortion. It means no gays and no living together and no 
smooching and worse before marriage and no married ladies with hyphenated names 
and the prefix Ms. before it.”168 These complications over the meaning of the word 
“family” meant, Steiner writes, “defining a family policy turned out to be more 
trouble than the Carter administration ever anticipated.”169 Brigette and Peter Berger 
wrote “The meetings and discussions to prepare the agenda of the White House 
Conference became a veritable battlefield of competing interests and 
philosophies.”170 What generated this battle? “Revenge” after IWY, said one liberal. 
“Experience,” replied a conservative.171 John Carr, the Carter appointed executive 
director of the conference warned that the pro-family groups “all see this
] 72[conference] as a forum to pull their little red wagons across the stage.” Pro- 
family activists resented the accusation and in turn accused the Carter administration 
of liberal bias. They pointed out that Carr had been a board member of the 
“ultraliberal” Americans for Democratic Action.173 In organising opposition to the 
conference “We are doing exactly what the White House staff urged us to do” said 
Connaught Marshner, editor of the Christian conservative Family Protection 
Report.114
As with the IWY conference, evangelicals first began to oppose the WHCF at the 
state level. Indeed, conservative Christians questioned the right of the Carter White 
House to call a “family” conference in the first place. “We reject the propriety of 
government-sponsored conferences being called to decide what the government’s
175policy should be towards the family,” said V. Dallas Merrell, a Mormon. Even 
Joseph Giordano, vice chairman of the White House’s officially endorsed conference 
organisation, The National Coalition for the White House Conference on Families, 
admitted “The family is the last area of privacy, and people feel that the state is
11f\simply sticking its nose into their personal business.” Secondly, they strongly
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objected to the Carter White House’s choice of conference executive director. Once 
again displaying a total disregard for the sensibilities of ‘pro-family’ organisations 
the White House’s first choice to head the conference was a divorcee, Health, 
Education and Welfare official Patsy Fleming. Pro-family groups immediately 
demanded an executive with an “intact family,” the White House was forced to stand
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down, Fleming had no option but to resign, and Carr was appointed. Thirdly, they 
objected to the change in the name of the forum, from White House Conference on 
the Family to the plural “Families.” This change was made in part on the 
recommendation of HEW “Family Impact Group” which urged the White House to
1 78espouse an inclusive and “neutral” model of the family. The definition of the 
family adopted by the conference and endorsed by liberal organisations including the 
National Organisation of Women declared the family to be “Two or more persons 
who share values and goals and have a commitment to one another over 
time...regardless of blood, legal ties, adoption or marriage.”179 The White House 
accepted this inclusive definition of the family, as Carter made clear in his 
proclamation announcing the three regional conferences that would constitute the 
WHCF. “This conference will clearly recognise the pluralism of family life in 
America” he said, and “will respect this diversity.”180 In a letter to Washington, D.C. 
Mayor Marion Barry, Carter re-iterated that “It is my intention that this conference 
recognises the pluralism of family life in America.”181 A memorandum from the 
White House appointed conference chair Jim Guy Tucker, a liberal Democrat, to the 
conference national advisory committee reinforced this recognition of the pluralistic 
nature of the modern family. Tucker announced the intention of the conference to 
“focus national attention on the needs and strengths of American families in all their 
diversity,” and to “encourage diverse groups of families to work together.” To 
develop a format for the conference that would meet these purposes, Tucker listed a 
number of criteria, explicitly noting the need to “Respect diversity.”182 With one eye 
clearly on the Christian conservative pro-family community Tucker told the National 
Press Club in April 1980 that although “there are fears that politics and ideological 
extremism could overwhelm” proceedings, “no single point of view will be able to 
steamroller the conference.”183
Conservative Christians refused to adhere to Carter and Tucker’s concept of a 
diverse and pluralistic family. They feared that the use of the plural “families” in the
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conference title was a codeword intended to include unmarried partners living in sin, 
unwed mothers, illegitimate children and single-sex marriages. By doing so 
evangelicals accused the White House of abandoning the Biblical definition of the 
family. Recalling the dispute, Connie Marshner observed that bestowing the title 
“family” on a variant lifestyle demeaned the honour of the real Christian family. 
“Interesting living arrangements are just...interesting living arrangements. They are 
not families,” she said. Government recognition of these as families “was an affront 
against the traditional family.”184 “There were two diametrically opposed definitions 
working at the family conference,” recalled one pro-family activist. “One of them 
was the traditional family,” but the other definition was “what I call the ‘groupie’ or 
‘roofers’ definition...those people that think that the family is anyone living under 
the same roof ...regardless of blood, marriage or adoption.” These definitions were 
“irreconcilable.”185 For Christian conservatives defining what constituted a family 
was of central importance given that the definition would not only determine the 
direction of future family policy, but also eligibility for family focused government
I RAbenefits. “A family,” said Paul Weyrich was not “couple of lesbians who are 
bringing up a child.” Failure to define the family correctly, he said, “leads to the 
kind of perversion of thinking which has resulted in people trying to pass off as
1 87legitimate families, illegitimate lifestyles.” Of special concern was the fact that 
the pluralistic definition chosen by WHCF was, a Christian activist warned, one that
1 QQ
“a lot of the gay community uses.” Dr Ronald Goodwin, the Vice-President of the 
Moral Majority denounced this association of “responsible, respectable kinds of 
families” with “homosexual families and the lesbian families and all the perverse 
pollutions of the definition.”189 Furthermore Christian conservatives saw that the 
acceptance of homosexuality clearly appeared to be a part of the WHCF agenda. 
“We came to realise that this White House Conference was really geared up towards 
changing the definition of the family,” recalled Beverly LaHaye, wife of evangelist 
Tim LaHaye and a leader of Concerned Women for America. Carter’s conference 
“wanted to include any two people who chose to live together, regardless of their 
sexual orientation.” Homosexuals “wanted to be part of the whole definition of the 
family. And we objected to that.” LaHaye was determined “to hold onto the real 
true meaning of the genuine family, as God intended it to be.”190 The conservative 
Christian community blamed the federal government. “You cannot recreate what 
God has established. God did not make a mistake when He created Adam and Eve
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and brought them together to become one flesh,” raged Jerry Falwell. “Now our 
government is spending three million dollars on these White House family 
conferences, which are headed by antifamily people seeking to redefine what a 
family is.”191 In the end, the conference had to agree not to produce an official 
definition of the family, a decision that evangelicals like Tim LaHaye again blamed
] 92on the federal government’s “mental commitment to secular humanism.”
Angered by what they perceived as the unfair feminist domination of the 1977 IWY 
Houston Conference, this time pro-family groups strove to elect as many delegates 
who were sympathetic to their cause as possible to the White House Conference. A 
coalition of anti-ERA and Christian conservative groups formed the National Pro- 
Family Coalition as a rival to the official National Coalition for the WHCF. They 
were angered that membership of the latter organisation included such advocates of 
an un-Biblical lifestyle as the National Gay Task Force, Zero Population Growth and
1 QO
the American Association of Sex Educators, Counsellors and Therapists. The Pro- 
Family Coalition presented their own conservative agenda to the conference 
commission, proposing a vastly more restrictive definition of a family as “persons 
who are related by heterosexual marriage, blood or adoption.”194 The Coalition went 
on to declare, “We believe that the rights of parents to rear their children according 
to their religious beliefs is a fundamental order of God and nature. It must not be 
undermined or counteracted, directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly, by any 
government action.”195 The Pro-family Coalition was highly successful in getting 
conservative candidates elected to the state and regional conferences. In Virginia 
pro-family forces captured twenty-two of twenty-four delegate posts. “The people of 
Virginia rose up and defended their families against the legions of social mechanics 
and tax-financed intervention professionals,” said Congressman John Ashbrook. 
One frustrated liberal activist recalled of the Virginia conference,
Evangelicals came by the busloads. They all wore blue dots. People from 
Lynchburg [home of Jerry Falwell’s ministry] were very much involved. The 
buses had Lynchburg on them. They came in with their agenda and tried to 
‘X’ out most of the things we had formulated. They didn’t want anything 
about family planning, no family-life education in the schools. Their picture 
of the family was Mom, Dad, and kids, with Mom at home -  the ‘traditional 
family.’ 196
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Jerry Falwell told his supporters that conference chair Jim Guy Tucker had been 
“visibly upset” by the outcome of the Virginia conference and accused him of
197attempting to change the conference regulations to prevent it happening again. 
However, conservative Christians were similarly successful in other states. In 
Michigan, Eagle Forum, Concerned Women for America, Right to Life and, 
significantly, the Michigan office of Ronald Reagan’s Presidential campaign helped 
organise pro-family delegates to counter feminist activists. They were committed 
absolutely to seizing control of the state conferences. For example, in Oklahoma 
they took all eight conference posts. “We beat them at their own game” recalled one 
conservative.198 “When there’s an ice storm,” one frustrated liberal participant 
noted, “the liberals stay home,” but evangelicals “rent a bus.”199 Robert Maddox 
wrote to Anne Wexler to warn that the conference had become “a battleground” 
because of “poor management on the state level.”200
Congressmen across the country were inundated with mail from conservative 
Christian constituents asking them to pressure Carter to fire Jim Guy Tucker. Two 
pro-family activists from North Dakota wrote to their Senator “to urge you to write 
to the President asking him to dismiss Jim Tucker.” They wrote, “Recently Tucker 
criticised pro-family people who wanted the traditional family unit defended.” It was 
“tragic that people who want to defend the traditional family and to ward off 
attempts to redefine the family to include homosexual arrangements are criticised,” 
they said. The conference should “redraw its guidelines.” They pleaded, “We are 
striving to better our families. Please help us.” One anti-abortion activist from 
Minnesota who signed her letter “for 500 Catholic Women” warned her Senator that 
Tucker “hates the pro-life groups and calls them every name in the book.” It would 
be “better to cancel the whole conference” than have “pro-abortion delegates write 
polices governing American families, especially those detrimental to the rights and 
authority of parents over their children’s education.” It would be a “fiasco.” Mrs 
Dennis Atkinson wrote directly to the President to complain, “None of the 45 
members [on the Conference committee] represents the average American Judeo- 
Christian woman.” Instead of Tucker, “Phyllis Schlafly would have been a good 
choice” she wrote, “I hope that you will place her and others like her on the 
commission soon.”201 Another activist from Florida wrote that Tucker had criticised 
pro-family groups for “attempting to dominate these conferences at state level.” He
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wrote, “These pro-life people are to be commended for blocking attempts to redefine
the family to include homosexual arrangements,” and he demanded that Carter
202postpone the conference and the guidelines be redrawn.
Urged on by their constituents, Congressmen and state legislators joined in protesting 
against the conference. One New York state legislator threatened to block funding 
for his states’ delegation if the governor did not include more “pro-family, pro-life” 
members. The Governor of Alabama went one step further and announced that his 
state would be boycotting the conference altogether. His wife wrote to Jim Guy 
Tucker to complain “Terminology used in the White House guidelines,” namely the 
directive to choose delegates without regard to sexual preference, failed “to establish 
traditional Judeo-Christian values concerning the family,” which she called “the 
foundation of our Nation under God.”203 As such, it was “offensive” and did not 
reflect “the basic concepts of most Alabamians.” Robert Maddox contacted her to 
defend, as he put it, “at length” the administration’s position and to convince her to 
support her state’s conference. He failed and reported to Anne Wexler “she cannot 
tolerate the idea of diverse family forms” and selection of delegates “without regard 
to sexual orientation.”204 The Indiana state legislature joined Alabama in accusing 
the conference of “domination by those opposing traditional religious and family
90Svalues.” In Arkansas, fundamentalist Christian groups organised prayer meetings 
to protest against the conference. Republican Senator Gordon Humphrey of New 
Hampshire wrote to his constituents to ask them to sign a national petition to “stop 
Jimmy Carter’s assault on the American Family.” Humphrey specifically blamed 
Carter for having invited “militant homosexual activists to help draw up the program 
that all American families should follow.” As evidence he listed the appointments of 
Bella Abzug, Mrs. Andrew Young and Jean O’Leary to the conference organising 
committee. Abzug was described as an “ultra-liberal” who wanted to “push for job 
quotas for militant homosexuals and abortion on demand.” Young had spent $1.7 
million dollars of tax revenue on a national campaign to distribute contraceptives to 
minors.” O’Leary, Humphrey warned, “in simple words” was “a homosexual.” She 
was demanding “schools should set up lesbian study programs” and should “be 
provided with books that portray the joy of women loving women.” Lesbian clubs 
“should be established in schools” to teach students that “lesbianism is a right to be 
enjoyed.” “Imagine,” he wrote “the Department of Education could force your child
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or grandchild to sit in a classroom and hear that homosexuality is natural and 
decent.” Humphrey asserted, “I believe that you know what is best for your 
family... And not Jean 0 ‘Leary, Bella Abzug or Mrs Andrew Young.” The time had 
come he said, “for every believer in the American family to take a stand” and show 
“Jimmy Carter that your view of the American family is one shared by the majority 
of the American people.” The petition attached to Humphrey’s letter was addressed 
personally to the President. It declared,
WHEREAS the American Family has been under constant attack by militant 
homosexuals, radical feminists and hard core pornographers, and 
WHEREAS, in the American Family love, compassion and sexual morality 
are taught and honoured, and WHEREAS the survival of the American 
Family is crucial to America’s moral and spiritual well being: NOW,
THEREFORE, the undersigned citizens of the United States petitions 
President Carter to reject any and all calls by the President’s Commission on 
the Family to weaken traditional American Family values.206
Humphrey’s letter and petition were distributed to evangelical and fundamentalist 
church congregations. Two churchgoers forwarded the letter to the White House. “It 
seems incredible” they wrote. “Will you please confirm this information?” They 
pleaded with Carter to “use all your influence to prevent such people being allowed 
to serve in this manner.” In reply to the accusations, Frank Moore wrote that Abzug, 
Young and O’ Leary “have no relationship to the Conference.” Instead, Moore listed 
a number of Christians who were serving on the National Advisory Committee to the 
Conference. These included Barbara Smith, President of the Mormon Relief Society, 
and Reverend Harry Hollis, head of the family life ministry for the Southern Baptist 
Convention. Jim Guy Tucker wrote personally to Humphrey to complain that his 
letter “grossly distorts” and “misrepresents” the conference. Again re-iterating that 
Abzug, Young and O’Leary were not members of the conference committee, he 
wrote “Since our leaders do not seem like inviting targets, you have simply replaced 
them with people who have no relationship to the conference, but might be good 
fodder for a fundraising letter.” This might be “good tactics for raising money” but 
“such distortion hardly brings credit on the organisation seeking funds.” Tucker 
asked Humphrey “to seek an early opportunity to set the record straight on the false 
implications contained in your letter.”207 Jerry Falwell also contacted the White
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House to register his discontent. Robert Maddox wrote to Anne Wexler to warn her 
that “Jerry Falwell talked to me about the...conference.” The evangelist, he said, “is 
disturbed over what he perceived to be the leftward swing of the conference” and 
worryingly had “promised he would fight the conference if they continue their march 
to the left.”208 A month later Maddox again wrote to Wexler to warn “Fires continue 
to smoulder over the White House Conference.”209
After the state conferences Newsweek reported that Carter’s election pledge was in 
danger of becoming “a political powder keg” that might “turn into a major 
embarrassment” for the President.”210 In a letter to Phil Wise, Carter’s Appointment 
Secretary, Tucker had to admit that the President had personally “taken some ‘heat’ 
for the Conference.”211 Beth Abramowitz wrote to Stuart Eizenstat to warn of the 
embarrassment caused “by the bad press the state meetings received, especially over
919 ♦fringe issues, such as homosexuality.” With controversy over the WHCF raging 
Carter himself grew increasingly reluctant to attend the opening session of the 
Baltimore regional conference scheduled for early June 1980. Despite the concerns 
of some of his staff, concerted efforts by White House aides to persuade Carter to 
attend once again reveal the administration’s total underestimation of the strength of 
evangelical opposition to the conference. In November 1979, Stuart Eizenstat wrote 
to Fran Voorde confidently asserting that “after a flawed beginning” the conference 
was “turning out to be a successful venture.” Moreover, Carter’s attendance in
919Baltimore would be “an enormous plus for him.” Still receiving no commitment 
from the President, in April 1980 Eizenstat wrote again to Voorde, to say that the 
conference “Would be extremely beneficial for the President.” He pointed out that 
Carter “has spoken at all the White House conferences held during his term -  which 
were initiated either before he came [into office] or on the Hill.” Certainly, “he 
should speak at this White House conference, which he initiated.”214 In May 
Eizenstat wrote again, this time directly to the President, and once more urged him to 
attend. “I gather that a tentative decision not to go has been made,” he wrote. 
Although he admitted that by now conference had become “controversial” the failure 
to attend would be “widely noticed” and “taken as an indication of the 
Administration’s backing away from its commitment to resolving a number of the 
difficult issues facing families.” Eizenstat was concerned that non-attendance would 
hand initiative to the evangelicals. Carter should not abandon the conference
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because “our opponents on the extreme right will be given a much desired victory. 
They will retain the values, traditions and code words which revolve around ‘family’ 
for their political use,” and moreover “they may have stunted an important area of 
initiative for the Administration.” Because, he said, “the focus of the conference is 
not abortion or gay rights,” Eizenstat mistakenly dismissed the possibility of 
organised evangelical disruption because “extremists...have not been successful in 
their attempts to become delegates in significant numbers.” He wrote
In fact, demonstrators have been totally absent from the 13 days of hearings
conducted by the Conference and its 2-day Research Forum on Capitol Hill.
In the more than 200 State events, only two even had pickets. Whatever these
215risks may be, they could be minimised by effective planning.
Similarly, Robert Maddox wrote to Jody Powell to try and ensure that the President
did attend. “By not speaking it will look like he is trying to disassociate himself
from the conference,” said Maddox, “which he can not do at this stage of the game.”
However Maddox, with his understanding of the growth of evangelical politicisation,
warned that the conference was “a potential time-bomb” and as such Carter should
avoid further alienating them by not making a policy address in Baltimore. “Let him
talk about his own experience as a father and husband rearing a family in a small
town,” he said, a key theme that had garnered him support from evangelicals in 
2161976. Similarly, Sarah Weddington, with the forthcoming Presidential campaign 
clearly in mind, wrote to Fran Voorde and Phil Wise to warn that of the possible 
political fallout for Carter if he did not attend. “Some may try to indicate that we do 
not really care about the family” she warned, “but point out that Reagan does 
because of the various stands he has taken with the pro-family forces.” This was 
“the ONLY conference that the President has called,” she reminded them. Pro- 
family opponents would say “He’s not going to that but he did go to the Libraries 
Conference.” Her letter included an assurance from Jim Guy Tucker that “the 
conference will be a good one with no disasters.” Tucker “feels they will have 
control and the voting will be fine.”217 Convinced by his staff, Carter decided to 
attend the Baltimore regional conference in person.
2 2 2
President Carter personally opened the Baltimore conference on June 5, 1980 with a 
pledge that his government would support the institution of the family as a sound 
basis for a just society. “We do not want government in our kitchens, bedrooms and 
living rooms, monitoring and controlling family life” he said, but “we know that 
government does touch our families through the tax system, through public 
education, through Social security and through a whole range of health, housing and 
human service programs.”218 He announced his hope that the conference would help 
“transform our nation into a place where the hopes and the ideals and the spirit and 
the commitment and the love of America will all be made stronger.” Noting that 
“certain denominations, or certain religious faiths, concentrate specifically on 
families,” he encouraged religious groups that “if they deal with family life their 
ultimate goals are much more likely to be realised.” However, in a passage 
guaranteed to anger pro-family Christians, he described the traditional nuclear family 
as a standard that has been “held up by many traditions” of which the “Judeo- 
Christian tradition” was only one. “That same tradition” he said, “teaches us that 
there is really no such thing as a perfect family, or one that should be used as a 
standard for all other families.” He asserted that “A loving family can be found...in 
many different circumstances.” Directly contradicting the pro-family definition, he 
announced “Family ties are based on more than blood kinship. There are also 
kinships of shared experiences and shared dreams.” Carter also belittled the level of 
evangelical anger, making light of the animosity at the state conferences. He opened 
his address by joking, “I’m very pleased to see that there’s no violence in the 
audience.”219
Carter’s attempts at levity went unheeded by conservative Christians. Even as Carter 
attempted to reiterate his commitment to diversity, pro-family activists were 
picketing the convention centre. Connie Marshner damned the conference delegates 
as “a liberal stacked deck” and derided the “hidden -  agenda” that had “been there all 
along: guaranteed income, guaranteed jobs, national health insurance, federal 
involvement in child care, federal involvement in housing, and so on.” These all led 
to the “increase, increase, increase in federal programs, supposedly for families...and 
not helping families solve their own problems.”220 The conference, claimed one 
activist was “contaminated by the liberal Carter machine” and amounted to a 
“national pattern of secrecy, deception, and changing rules” directed against the pro­
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family position.221 Their fears were further confirmed when Phyllis Schlafly and her 
Eagle Forum were barred from taking part in the conference whilst Marian Wright 
Edelman of the liberal Children’s Defence Fund was allowed to participate. Schlafly 
declared that the WHCF was discredited because “it refused to accept a traditional
definition of the family, and then passed resolutions favouring abortion, homosexual
222lifestyles, and a long list of extravagant federal spending proposals.” She accused 
the state and regional conferences of the WHCF of being “run as forums promoting 
ERA and the feminist agenda.”223 In particular she attacked the “big government” 
ethos of the conference. “Pro-family groups don’t think the federal government has 
the competence to deal with the family” she said, because “It aggravates problems 
rather than solves them.”224 Evangelicals charged Carter with seeking to use the 
conference for partisan political purposes. Addressing a press conference called to 
coincide with Carter’s appearance in Baltimore, Paul Weyrich described Carter as 
having “the worst record for family issues of any President in history,” and accused 
him of having “stacked the conference” with liberal delegates who favoured his
22<5government programs. He predicted that the battle over family values would be 
“the most significant battle of the age-old conflict between good and evil, between 
the forces of God and the forces against God that we have seen in our country.”226 It 
would be, he said, “what the Vietnam War had been to the 1960s.”227
The report produced from the proceedings of the WHCF endorsed a number of 
proposals, to be implemented by the federal government, to help support families. 
Once again evangelicals were angered by the passage of resolutions in support of 
abortion rights and the ERA and a declaration that there should be no legal 
discrimination against single-sex marriages. In contrast, an attempt by pro-family 
activists in Baltimore to declare that only heterosexual marriages were worthy of the 
title “families” was defeated. A feminist agenda was clearly upheld by the 
conference. One conservative columnist observed, “The Baltimore Conference has 
been stacked, packed and rigged” by the feminists. 228 The Washington Star reported 
that the Baltimore conference was a “gaudy exercise,” a “charade” organised by “a 
gaggle of man eating females.” The conference had predictably passed “a laundry 
list of liberal resolutions” that had “Orwellian overtones.”229 In protest against the 
Baltimore Conference’s endorsement of pro-abortion, ERA and gay rights proposals 
Marshner led a walkout of pro-family delegates. She announced, “By walking out
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230now the point will be made that the conference does not have any credibility.” 
Martin notes that some liberal resolutions were only passed by the delegates at 
Baltimore by a single vote and had the pro-family activists remained the liberal 
resolutions would have been defeated.231 But by then the passage of resolutions was 
no longer the key issue. Instead, as Freedman observes, the aim of the pro-family 
lobby was now to “humiliate Carter.”232 Outside the convention demonstrators 
waved placards asking “Why are Jimmy and Rosalynn supporting this attack on 
God’s family plan?”233 Robert Maddox recalled the anti-Carter sentiment of the 
conference. “What he intended for good was turned against him,” he said, “and the 
very people that-we invited to come and help with the conference pulled out their 
long knives and began to slash at him and the conference.” They “had no 
compunction whatsoever about using every media outlet they could find, not only to 
trash the conference but to trash him, in a way that not only questioned his policy 
but,” said Maddox, “questioned his faith.”234 The strength of pro-family opposition 
to federal programs was revealed when the subsequent regional conference in 
Minneapolis denounced the control of public institutions by “secular humanism.”235 
The Minneapolis State conference voted to adopt the traditionalist Christian 
definition of the family. The Carter administration had, observed Heinemann, “yet 
again spun lead from straw.”236
The White House belatedly realised the damage that the conference had caused 
Carter amongst the pro-family movement and conservative Christian community. 
Phil Wise wrote to Jack Watson in late August 1980, “My sense is we managed to 
walk thru [sic] a minefield on this conference and survived.” As far as the 
implementation of the conference proposals, “I would like to down play any more 
involvement by the P [resident].”237 The sense of disenchantment with the 
conference amongst the evangelical community was made clear by the 
administration’s own research. Sarah Weddington’s office produced a chart that 
summarised the major concerns of the participants in the WHCF which revealed the 
depth of feeling on a number of issues central to the pro-family campaign. The most 
frequently expressed concern was the “Sensitivity of Government” to the family, 
including “religious differences,” the “appropriate role of government,” and “policies 
which hurt, help or ignore families.” Another common concern was “traditional 
families,” far outstripping concerns for single parent, extended or families listed as
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“others.” The “role of churches in child care,” “moral concerns” in education, 
“religious institutions” and “concern about abortion” were all listed as frequent 
concerns by delegates. In contrast, the key issues of liberal and feminist groups 
were far less frequently raised as issues of concern. For example, discrimination in 
housing, adoption, welfare reform and social security were generally listed as low 
priorities.238 The political consequences for Carter were clear, but it was too late. 
After the WHCF, evangelical groups did not cease in their activism against the 
Carter White House. The administration soon became aware of conservative 
Christian groups campaigning against the proposed White House Conference on 
Children and Youth for broadly similar reasons as had generated their opposition to 
WHCF.239
The WHCF also helped cement the partnership of conservative Christians and the 
Republican Party. The 1980 Republican platform specifically singled out the 
conference in a plank entitled “Family Protection.” “In view of the continuing 
efforts of the present administration to define and influence the family through such 
federally funded conferences as the White House Conference on Families” the plank 
committed the Republican Party to “protecting and defending the traditional 
American family against the ongoing erosion of its base in our society.”240 Further 
echoing the anti-government sentiment of many conservative Christians the platform 
also declared “We oppose any move which would give the federal government more 
power over families.”241 The commitment signalled the development of Bible- 
believing Protestants as a major force in the Republican electoral coalition that 
continued through the 1980s and 1990s. Marshner recalls that the conference “really 
lit the fuse” for partisan pro-family political activism.242 “It got our people involved 
in a process that they hadn’t been involved in before” because they realised ‘Wait a 
minute -  we can’t play by the old rules any more.” Christian conservatives came to 
see “That’s the way politics is played, and if you can’t get in there and inflict 
consequences for wrong votes, etc., you are not taken seriously. And the 
consequences that a politician pays attention to is something that compromises his
243re-election.” Carter’s old adversary, Republican Senator Jesse Helms, also singled 
out intrusive liberal government, exemplified by events like the IWY and WHCF, as 
a reason for Carter’s election defeat. In answer to a post election poll taken to
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analyse explanations for Carter’s defeat Helms wrote that the Carter years were 
significant in that they marked
the decline and fall of the public’s faith in statist liberalism...the idea that the 
solution to all our problems as a nation and as individuals can be found in 
some sort of intervention by [the] federal government. The New Deal, the 
New Frontier, the Great Society, the War on Poverty, all these milestones on 
the road to the welfare state led to a sort of moment of truth in the Carter 
years when the public began to perceive the costs of accumulated debt and 
deficit.244
The clash between Helms and Carter revealed the degree'to which, by 1980, Carter 
was unrepresentative of the majority of evangelicals, even Southern Baptists. By this 
time Carter was clearly atypical amongst his own faith. A fellow Southern Baptist, 
Helms recalled that many had assumed when Carter was elected “that two sons of the 
South would be mirror images” who “would do well together.” Yet he and Carter 
“rarely found ourselves in agreement.”245 Calling their differences “profound” 
Helms recalled that he “disagreed with the Carter administration’s policies as much 
as any man in public life.”246
By summer 1980, Carter’s stock amongst conservative faith-based voters was 
extremely low. In comparison, Ronald Reagan’s was soaring. “All kinds of anti- 
Jimmy Carter, pro- Reagan pieces of literature were being cranked out and mailed all 
over the country” by religious groups, said Robert Maddox. They were “supposedly 
bipartisan...but always painting Reagan as the paragon of Christian virtue and Carter 
as a kind of antichrist.” As a member of the administration, Maddox’s ability to 
campaign was limited by federal regulations and as a result the White House “had no 
effective way to combat it.” Finally, just one week before the election, the Carter 
campaign did manage to organise a mailing to some 250,000 ministers and layman. 
Once again, the newsletter betrayed a profound ignorance of the agenda of the 
evangelicals. It proclaimed that both Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell were 
Southern Baptists who attended church, that Stuart Eizenstat regularly worshipped at 
a synagogue and that Vice-President Mondale was a Minister’s son. This was not 
what the evangelicals wanted to hear. They wanted government policy to be based
227
upon specific Scriptural precepts and conservative evangelical or fundamentalist
247Christians to be named to high-ranking positions within the White House staff. 
By contrast to his last minute pro-Carter mailing, Maddox recalled, “many slick, 
sophisticated and all too often slanted pieces were mailed by supporters of Mr
248Reagan in the conservative religious community.”
Over the course of his Presidency conservative Christians came to see that a 
Southern Baptist in the Oval Office was no longer enough to ensure realisation of 
their goals. They now believed that only a President who was willing to politically 
advance the conservative evangelical agenda could save America. In 1980 
evangelical Christianity came of age politically and the WHCF had been pivotal in 
stimulating their involvement, and in turn, the formation of the Christian Right. 
Howard Philips, national director of one Christian Right organisation, the 
Conservative Caucus, observed that conservatives “owe President Carter a thank you 
for giving them such a good target.”249 As one Christian leader recalls, it was the 
“bizarre” suggestions of the conference that made it easy for evangelists to warn 
Christians that “government was desperately in need of repair.”250 Rosemary 
Thomson recalled the importance of the WHCF in convincing Christians that they 
were “engaged in a spiritual battle.” She wrote, “Somehow it was to the organisers
9 S 1of the White House Conference on Families as if the Lord had never spoken.” 
Jerry Regier, a member of Bill Bright’s Christian Embassy organisation explained 
that in the evangelical world,
Family seminars, marriage seminars, children’s seminars, parenting 
courses...were natural and normal, and speakers travelled all over and tapes 
were disseminated. It was just a natural part of our world. To see that a 
White House conference on the family was going to take place and that that 
these people weren’t even a part of it created a feeling that “Something’s 
wrong here.”
According to Regier, this feeling of disquiet was heightened by the fact that Carter 
professed to be a born-again Christian. “We had a President who initiated this 
conference, who said he was ‘born-again,’ and yet that whole [conservative
228
Christian] world was being left out. Had it been a President that wasn’t at all
252familiar with people in that world, it might have been a little different response.”
In 1976 Pat Robertson had supported the candidacy of Jimmy Carter in the spirit of 
Christian brotherhood. In contrast, during the 1980 Presidential election campaign 
he warned viewers of his Christian Broadcasting Network that unless Christians 
desired to see American society reordered by humanism, atheism and hedonism it 
was “absolutely vital that we take control of the United States government.”253 “We 
have enough votes to run the country” he threatened “and when people say ‘We’ve 
had enough’ we are going to take over.”254 The 1980 Presidential election was 
pivotal because, said Ed Dobson, the Vice-President of the Moral Majority, “for the 
first time the religious right bought into the idea that you can change values and 
culture beginning from the White House down.”255 In 1980, writes Tim LaHaye, 
“morality became the number-one burning issue in the hearts of millions of 
Americans,” and they “went to the polls in enormous numbers to vote out of office 
those who had favoured abortion, pornography, homosexuality, [and] the ERA.” In 
particular he singled out “government meddling in the family” as exemplified by the 
IWY and WHCF as reasons for “the rejection of the liberal (big government) 
administration of Jimmy Carter.”256 The election of Ronald Reagan over the “liberal 
humanist government” of Carter, he said, was “in part a fear that four more years of 
his socialist policies would make [George Orwell’s] 1984” with its “stifling control” 
over “individuals and families, a reality.”257
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TN CONCLUSION AND RECAPITULATION
Jimmy Carter was the first American President to place a forthright and sincere 
Biblical spirituality firmly at the centre of the political discourse. He was an 
unabashed believer in the salvation of the gospel, for he believed himself to have 
been ‘saved’ and ‘born-again.’ Carter placed his Southern Baptist spirituality at the 
very core of his personality. As Carter himself put it, “Religious faith has always 
been at the core of my existence.”1 Fellow Christians recognised Carter as an overtly 
religious leader. As Carter’s own pastor Dan Arial put it, “you can never adequately 
grasp Jimmy Carter himself unless you see that his Christian faith” was “the
framework on which the rest is built.”2 “If you don’t understand the Bible, the
Southern Baptist Convention and what it means to be saved by Jesus, you’ll be hard 
pressed to understand Jimmy Carter,” said Bill Lotz of the World Baptist Alliance.”3 
One revealing anecdote, recalled by White House aide Patricia Bario as part of the 
Miller Centre’s Oral History Project, touched on the primary role played in his 
Presidency by Carter’s faith, the “manner of the man” and his “relationship to God.”
I remember the very first time going to church with him...It’s the Sunday 
school that precedes the service and the teacher was asking some questions 
about why Christ didn’t heal everybody. He had this power, now if he was a 
merciful God why didn’t he heal everybody. Why did he leave some of these 
people still lame and all. And this fellow at the back put his hand up -  the
President of the United States, who thinks maybe he knows the answer to the
question. And his answer, of course, seemed to be right.4
“Obviously” said Bario regarding Carter’s religiosity, “you can’t judge this man 
without looking at that part of him.” It “set a moral tone in his own life” she said, 
and moreover, he “lived by it as President.”5 Another example of the centrality of 
the President’s Christian faith in his life was his personal involvement in the 
planning of a visit to the United States by Pope John Paul II. Carter planned every 
detail of the Papal visit, to the point of deciding which musician should sing the 
Lord’s Prayer in the Pope’s honour.6 National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski
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recalls that, after the meeting, the Pope told him “After a couple of hours with 
President Carter I had the feeling that two religious leaders were conversing.” 
According to Brzezinski, when he told Carter this the President was “immensely 
pleased.” Brzezinski recalls, “I thought that this too was in itself quite revealing.”7 
Carter subsequently confided in a letter to a Catholic friend that meeting the Pope 
was “one of the best days of my life.”8
Although a devout member of a Christian denomination whose historical roots lay in 
an espousal of church-state separation, Carter’s profound religious commitment, 
what he referred to as his “personal relationship to a living God,” consciously 
moulded the core of his political philosophy.9 No previous President has made it as 
clear that their faith was not only a dimension of their character but was so intimately 
married to their politics. Carter’s own White House staff was well placed to witness 
the conscious link between the President’s faith and his politics. Friend and adviser 
Peter Bourne wrote that Carter “conceptualised politics as a vehicle for advancing 
God’s kingdom on earth.”10 He “believed that government should aspire to the 
noblest ideals,” and for Carter, “that meant those taught by Jesus.”11 According to 
Bourne, Carter consciously sought the Presidency so as “to advance God’s work.”12 
Jody Powell was in agreement, declaring of Carter’s Presidency, “Almost everything 
he did was in a major way affected by his religious faith” because “it is such an 
integral part of who he is.”13 Powell called his former employer “more devoutly 
religious than any modern President,” whilst White House speechwriter Hendrik 
Hertzberg agreed that Carter’s leadership was “more religious than political.”14 
Carter himself openly admitted there “was no way to understand me and my political 
philosophy without understanding my faith.”15 Perhaps Carter himself best summed 
up his own attitude to the relationship between his faith and his politics with an 
anecdote from his campaign biography in which he recalled the “strong reaction” of 
a Baptist preacher who visited his family home after Carter had decided to run for his 
first political office in 1962. The evangelist was shocked that Carter would choose to 
enter what he called a “discredited profession.” He asked Carter “How can you, as a 
Christian, a deacon, and a Sunday school teacher become involved in politics? If 
you want to be of service to other people, why don’t you go into the ministry or into 
some honourable social service work?” After what Carter describes as a “heated 
argument” he asked the preacher, “I will have 75,000 people in my senate district.
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How would you like to have a congregation that big?”16 After he was elected to the 
White House Carter revealed the religious dimension to his concept of Presidential 
leadership when he publicly pondered the difficulty of translating the secular 
authority of the Presidency into that of a “genuine servant.”17 Clearly mindful of the 
Christian admonition to servitude, he told staff at the department of Health, 
Education and Welfare, “I’m no better than any of you.”18 The President’s 
relationship to the American people, he said, ought not to be that of “First Boss” but 
“First Servant.”19
In 1976 Carter’s election was heralded with both excitement and expectation 
amongst the evangelical community. A number of books from evangelical presses 
predicted that Carter’s Presidency would lead to the renewal of ‘Christ-centred’ 
government, with policy firmly grounded in the Christian principles of Holy 
Scripture. One, written by evangelicals, was entitled expectantly The Miracle of 
Jimmy Carter. Its authors announced the Georgian to be “one of the best things to 
happen to American evangelical Christianity in this century.”20 Evangelicals, they 
wrote, “sensed that the Baptist from Georgia might be moving under the direction of 
God himself.”21 One author called Carter the “Baptist in Babylon,” another 
predicted that Carter would act as a “pastor” who, as President, would see America 
“in theological colours,” whilst a third claimed that Carter “represented a new hope 
for the pious.”22 Pippert believed that “to Carter, politics [is] a ministry, and the 
voters a congregation,”23 whilst Nielsen lauded Carter for his unwillingness to 
“secularise his faith,” or “suppress his religious feelings,” despite holding a secular 
office. In deriving his understanding of right or wrong, he wrote, Carter “takes his 
cue from Jesus.”24 Reverend Robert Maddox recalled that evangelicals “were very 
excited” about a President who “would so clearly state his faith.” Christians, he 
declared, had “great hopes” that Carter would “leverage the country spiritually and 
morally in ways that we had not seen in a long time.”25 Kucharsky wrote that when 
Carter spoke fellow Christians “pinched themselves” because “many conservative
9 AProtestants had been praying all their lives for someone to speak up this way.” 
Washington Post reporter Michael Novak explained, “There is a hidden religious 
power base in American culture, which our secular biases prevent many of us of 
noticing.” In 1976 “Jimmy Carter...found it.” The “huge number” of evangelical
99Protestants were Carter’s “natural constituency,” he wrote. “Carter’s role for
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evangelical Christians may be rather like John F. Kennedy’s for Catholics,” wrote
Novak, “in his voice they heard their own accent, and in their hearts they saw
28themselves as they would like to be.”
Religion did far more than just inspire Carter’s Presidential rhetoric; Biblical 
allegory and the metalanguage of born-again Christianity was fundamental to his 
speeches. Unsurprisingly, the most memorable speech of his Presidency was also the 
one where religion was most evident. Carter delivered his infamous “Crisis of 
Confidence” address in the midst of a catastrophic oil and inflation crisis. Carter’s 
reaction to the urging of his staff to address both his faltering popularity and 
America’s worsening oil crisis clearly revealed the influence of his evangelical faith 
upon his vision of Presidential authority. Carter reacted not as a secular politician 
but as a Southern Baptist Christian. In doing so he gave what political scientist 
Robert Strong recalls as “one of the most unusual speeches ever given in the history 
of the modern Presidency.”29
In February 1979, White House communications director Gerald Rafshoon wrote to 
Carter regarding public concerns over his Presidency. “The perception among the 
public and the press is that you have so far failed to provide the country with the 
strong leadership necessary to overcome our major problems,” he warned. “A 
President,” Rafshoon wrote, “is not successful if he does not provide the country 
with strong, purposeful leadership. Unfortunately, that is, at this point, the public 
judgement on your Presidency.”30 In another memorandum written two months later 
Rafshoon again told Carter of the widespread perception that he had “failed the 
nation” and warned, “It’s time to come through.”31 In June Stuart Eizenstat also 
wrote to the President again alerting Carter of the political necessity of dealing with 
the energy crisis. “I do not need to detail for you the political damage we are 
suffering from all of this,” he wrote, “Nothing else has so frustrated, confused and 
angered the American people.”
Carter chose not to directly address the political concerns that vexed Rafshoon and 
Eizenstat. July 1979 saw him remove himself and his cabinet from Washington to 
the seclusion of the Presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland. In doing so Carter
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was motivated by another memorandum, this time from pollster Patrick Caddell. 
Entitled “Of Crisis and Opportunity,” it warned that America was “a nation deep in 
crisis,” a collective trauma that was “psychological more than material,” but was so 
serious that it contained “the seeds of disintegration of America.” This “crisis of 
confidence” was “marked by a dwindling faith in the future” that “threatens the 
social and political fabric of the nation.” Yet it “cannot be seen in ordinary ways— 
there are no armies of the night, no street demonstrations, no powerful lobbies,” but 
“it can be heard in the growing real despair of elites and ordinary citizens alike as 
they struggle to articulate in concepts the malaise which they themselves feel.” 
Caddell noted American’s “increasing cynicism, lack of belief in personal efficacy, 
and little belief or confidence in the motive or ability of government to address major 
problems.” The American people “feel the political/government system is unwilling 
or unable to solve problems.” The “natural result of historical forces and events 
which have been in motion for twenty years,” including the Kennedy and King 
assassinations, Vietnam, Watergate, and now the energy crisis, was that “the entire 
value/attitude foundation of America” had been “overturned....Personal gratification 
has replaced national involvement everywhere.” The ultimate issue for the American 
people, wrote Caddell, was “faith.” “As faith is broken with them” he wrote, “they 
too break faith.”33 Caddell’s thesis had been in part motivated by his reading of 
Christopher Lasch’s Culture of Narcissism. In May Lasch had himself written to 
Jody Powell, who forwarded the correspondence on to the President. Carter read 
Lasch’s letter and underlined three phrases -  “decline of the work ethic,” “lack of 
faith in the future” and “desire to enjoy life in the present.”34 He personally replied 
to Caddell with a note describing his memorandum as a “masterpiece.”35 Over the 
week in Camp David Carter invited leaders and advisers from a diverse cross-section 
of American society, including politicians, sociologists and economists, to discuss 
the issues raised by Caddell. Carter also met with religious leaders including Roman 
Catholic Cardinal Terrence Cooke, Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, Claire Randall of the 
National Council of Churches and Reverend Jimmy Allen of the Southern Baptist 
Convention. Carter began to formulate a speech to address Caddell’s warning of a 
growing spiritual malaise.
Stuart Eizenstat recalled that the Caddell thesis “sparked the most acrimonious 
debate by far that occurred in the four years of the administration.”37 Top ranking
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members of the administration urged the President to ignore Caddell’s warnings. 
Greg Schneiders went so far as to call it “bullshit.” In a memorandum marked 
strictly “EYES ONLY” he warned, “People don’t want to hear Jimmy Carter talk 
about our problems and they certainly don’t want to hear him whine about them.” 
Caddell’s memorandum was merely “an interesting academic treatise.” At a time 
when the American people were crying out for strong leadership, Caddell’s message, 
he said, “sends all the opposite signals.”38 Similarly, Eizenstat declared the problem 
to be caused not by any “spiritual shortcoming,” but by the fact that people could not 
get “any damn gas.”39 Caddell had “miss [ed] the point,” said Eizenstat. “People 
were not angry at themselves. They were angry at the government.”40 Most of all 
Vice-President Mondale strongly disagreed with Caddell’s memo. As Carter himself 
put it Mondale “went into a tizzy” and “almost lost control of himself.”41 Even 
fellow evangelical Robert Maddox desperately tried to convince Carter from publicly 
addressing Caddell’s warning. He wrote to the First Lady, emphatic in his 
opposition to the pessimistic tone of Carter’s message. “I am very uncomfortable 
with the President saying he has “failed” he wrote, “There are more oblique, more 
redemptive ways to admit Presidential shortcomings without stabbing the country 
with those bitter-to-take words.” Maddox even took time to write and present the 
President with an alternative speech, urging Carter to mirror the providential 
language of conservative Christendom. Carter, he said, should declare, “God and 
history are not done with us yet.” The phrase ‘“ In God we trust’ has been a guiding 
beacon for Americans” wrote Maddox, a belief “that there is a God, and that he 
shows us the way.” Carter should end the speech with an upbeat call of “May God 
Let it be!”42
Carter did not heed the advice. After ten days, he ended his soul-searching in the 
wilderness and addressed the nation, as one biographer put it, like Moses descending 
from Mount Sinai 43 America’s problem, Carter maintained, was not a shortage of 
fuel at all, but instead a failure of faith. Grim faced, he warned that the energy 
shortage was not the cause, only a symptom, of a “much deeper” problem: a 
paralysing “crisis of the American spirit.” It was observable he said, in the “growing 
doubt about the meaning of our own lives,” it crippled “the very heart and soul and 
spirit of our national will.” Carter chastised the American people for their “mistaken 
idea of freedom” that meant “too many” self-centred Americans searched for instant
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gratification “worshipping self-indulgence and consumption.” Addressing the 
emptiness of modern consumer materialism he warned, “Identity is no longer defined 
by what one does, but by what one owns.” However, “piling up material goods 
cannot fill the emptiness of lives which have no confidence or purpose.” America 
was at a point of “moral and spiritual” crisis and only a rekindling of faith could 
surmount it. “With God’s help...for the sake of our Nation, it is time for us to join 
hands in America...with our common faith we cannot fail.” “We are at a turning 
point in our history,” Carter said, and it was “time to stop cursing and start 
praying.”44 As Vice-President Mondale observed, he scolded the American people 
“like sinners in the hands of an angry God.”45 Revealingly, Carter called it “one of 
the best speeches.. .I’ve ever given.”46
Carter’s presentation of the energy crisis as a failure of the American spirit owed 
everything to his religious faith. The July 15th speech was an attempt to synthesise 
religion and Presidential leadership while his seclusion at Camp David signalled 
Carter’s disillusionment with the secular political process in Washington. Gillon 
observed that for Carter, “the people” were his flock and he was the shepherd.”47 
Windt called the address “more sermon than speech” whilst Ribuffo agreed that it 
was a “doleful lament” that “came as close to a call for a day of fasting and 
humiliation as any other modern Presidential speech.”48 According to Dan F. Hahn 
Carter’s conduct represented “the typical sequence of the born-again experience: 
identification of the problem, retreat to meditation, decision to commit, 
announcement of rebirth.”49 Similarly, biographers Mazlish and Diamond have 
found an unequivocal connection between Carter’s style of Presidential leadership 
and the perceptions of leadership typical of the Southern Baptist church where 
leadership “is built upon charismatic qualities that attract a following and win 
spontaneous support.” Baptists consider it vitally important “that a leader be seen to 
be worthy of the people’s trust and constantly reassure them of this.”50 It was this 
need for a revitalisation of trust in his Presidency that Carter was seeking to address. 
Motter concurs, observing that “Carter sought a symbiosis of people and leaders in 
which leaders drew strength from the organic goodness of people, and people 
demonstrated their goodness when leaders offered them ethical leadership.”51 
During his election campaign Carter had promised a government “as good as its 
people.”52 In effect, he was promising not only a moral renewal of the Presidency
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but also pledging to lead as a Baptist would, with a moral purity derived directly 
from those he led.53
Back in 1976, Carter’s profile as a man of sincere and serious faith held great 
currency for the growing American evangelical community. His candidacy and 
Presidency had galvanised the political mobilisation of evangelical Christians 
through articulation of his own, deeply held religious faith and his interjection of 
openly spiritual themes into the body politic. He had tapped into the rapidly 
expanding evangelical constituency, acting as a catalyst for their widespread re-entry 
into politics for the first time since the 1920s. Unfortunately for Carter, after having 
drawn them into politics, he failed to retain evangelicals’ support. Carter’s brand of 
Christianity led him to be far more politically liberal than many of his fellow 
evangelicals. Although a man of devout Christian faith, his Southern Baptist 
convictions led him to believe that, as a secular office holder, it was not his 
constitutional prerogative to legislate according to his own interpretations of 
Scripture. Evangelicals felt badly let down by his failure to appoint high-profile 
conservative Christians to his White House staff and angered by the activities of the 
liberal appointments that he made in their stead. It became apparent that Carter’s 
understanding of the relationship between Christianity and politics bore little 
resemblance to their own. By 1980 it was obvious to Christian conservatives that a 
Democratic President, whether a fellow evangelical or not, was not enough to ensure 
promotion of their agenda on the national political stage. The more the Carter 
administration had refused to reverse the liberal advances of the previous decade, the 
more the Christian Right as an organised force mustered political strength.
Conservative Christians fully embraced political activism in the 1980 Presidential 
election. Even Jerry Falwell declared his previous abstention from politics to be 
“false prophecy.”54 He announced “The American people had allowed a vocal 
minority of non-godly men and women to lead the nation to the brink of death.”55 
Now it was time “for Fundamentalists and Evangelicals to return our nation to its 
spiritual and moral roots.”56 Pentecostal Pat Robertson also declared that the time 
had come for evangelicals to disavow their political separatism. “We used to think 
that if we stayed home and prayed it would be enough,” said the evangelist. “Well, 
we are fed up” he said.57 Electing a Southern Baptist in the Oval Office was no
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longer enough, observed Robertson, it was now “absolutely vital that we take control 
of the United States government.”58 “Evangelicals” he said, were “on the move.”59 
Robertson subsequently called the constitutional separation of church and state, the 
very principle that Carter vigorously upheld as central to his interpretation of the 
demands of his faith and his office, “a lie.” As he put it, there was “no such thing in 
the Constitution.”60 Another conservative Christian leader who abandoned church- 
state separation was James Robison who called the 1980 Presidential election “the 
most important in the nation’s history.”61 As he saw it, the right to vote was “God 
given,” and he warned that a “Silent Majority” was “a lazy majority.”62 Failure to 
elect a Bible-believing man to the White House would mean, simply, “the death of 
America.”63 In mobilising faith-based voters, Christian Voice proclaimed “We Want 
Our Country Back.”64 Evangelical leaders energised their congregations against the 
Carter White House and the transformation of conservative religious groups into a 
key constituent of the Republican Party electoral constituency had begun. As a 
Democrat, Dinesh D’Souza writes, the conservative Christian community now 
viewed Carter as “a dangerous apostate.”65
Most significant of all, whereas Carter admonished the American people for their 
lack of faith, Ronald Reagan did the opposite and rekindled American optimism in 
the moral certitude of its providential mission. Carter’s religious philosophy 
mirrored that of theologian Paul Tillich who held that once man stopped searching 
for a greater commitment to Christ he lost his religion and became proud, self- 
satisfied and superior. Thus Carter focused on pride as the greatest sin and suggested 
that it led to American hubris and overconfidence. By comparison, Reagan 
displayed none of Carter’s doubts over America’s ordination as the New Jerusalem. 
Unlike Carter, he placed no emphasis upon the effort required from the American 
people to live up to God’s message. It worked. In the 1980 election, a disaffected 
conservative evangelical community deserted Carter in droves, even in the South, 
once the home of his strongest support. As the Washington Post put it, he was 
“Belted in the Bible Belt.”66
Reagan was not elected solely by the religious conservative vote and of course, no 
single reason cost the Democrats the White House in 1980. The faltering American
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economy and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan hampered Carter’s re-election 
campaign and Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and the ensuing hostage crisis were 
crucial to Carter’s re-election failure. Yet the desertion of the Christian vote was a 
major factor in the Democrats defeat, and evangelicals knew it. They did not hide 
their glee. Falwell called the 1980 election “my finest hour,” whilst James Dobson, 
another Moral Majority leader recalled that “Had we not been Baptists we would 
have danced in the streets.”67 Dionne points out that the same white born-again 
Christians who had supported Carter in 1976 went nearly two to one for Reagan in
zr q
1980. Christian conservatives made “an enormous difference,” according to 
Phillips, who cites pollster Louis Harris’ estimate that white, fundamentalist, moral 
Majority-type voters accounted for two thirds of Reagan’s surprise 10-point margin 
over Carter with the same thing happening with county-level electoral data.69 
Secondary analyses have suggested that such initial conclusions were over-estimates, 
however a third, extended round of analyses re-emphasised the importance of 
Christian conservatives in the 1980 election and prioritised their “unique impact.”70 
Arguably, Reagan could have won in 1980 even if he had not had Christian 
conservative votes, but as William Martin in his recent analysis of the American 
Religious Right makes clear, “their enthusiastic support was part of the wave that 
bore him upward and moved other voters to take him seriously.”71 “If the 
evangelicals were really looking for a born-again Christian candidate in the 1980 
campaign, they had only one choice” said Christian Century editor and evangelical 
James Wall. But, “If they were looking for ideology, their choice was Reagan.”72 
One evangelical crowed “It was Jesus that gave us victory.”73
Presidential politics today reflects the change in the American political discourse 
caused by Carter’s unprecedented insertion of religiosity into the electoral process. 
Prior to 1976, Christian evangelicalism had been patronised as obscurantist and 
parochial. As Clecak observed, in 1976 political commentators critics had tried to 
explain Jimmy Carter’s born-again religion to each other as if it “were as alien to 
American culture as a Balinese cockfight.” They addressed it with “an almost 
anthropological detachment.” Evangelicals like Carter were derided as “ignorant, 
anti-intellectual and uncultured” whose spirituality was “some kind of occult 
cipher.”74 The old-time faith was merely “the last cry of the still backwaters of the 
South against the modern world.”75 Similarly, Wolfe observed that “Ten years ago,
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if anyone of wealth, power, or renown had publicly ‘announced for Christ,’ people
76would have looked at him as if his nose had been eaten away be weevils.” Back 
then, one campaign adviser had even warned that Carter’s faith leant his candidacy a 
“weirdo factor” that risked alienating voters.77 But today the opposite is true. By 
altering the secular political media’s stereotype of evangelicalism, Carter has brought 
the vocabulary of born-again salvation permanently into America’s political 
consciousness. Moreover, far from a political liability, a devout faith has become an 
asset to be exploited. A public profession of a sincere Christian faith has now 
become almost a requirement for public office. Hertzberg observes that after Carter, 
“every politician seems to feel obligated to talk about being born again, just as in 
decades past politicians seemed to feel obligated to have themselves photographed 
wearing an Indian chief’s war bonnet.”78 For example, in 2000 George W. Bush 
unabashedly declared his favourite political philosopher to be Jesus Christ while his 
Democratic opponent A1 Gore confided that he decided important policy questions 
by asking himself W.W.J.D? shorthand for “What would Jesus do?'”79 It was as if, 
Ted Olsen reported in Christianity Today, the two candidates were trying to “out 
Jimmy Carter each other.”80 Since Carter’s Presidency, the social agenda of the 
American evangelical Christian community has had to be addressed by successive 
Presidents. However, none of his successors have asked so much of the American 
people in Christian terms. Rather than simply invoking the rhetoric of 
evangelicalism, Carter actively confronted America with the fundamental demands at 
the heart of most interpretations of the Christian faith: demands for social justice, 
humility and moral action that require personal and collective sacrifice. Carter’s 
successors have emphasised Christian rectitude and moral certainty but they have 
proved unwilling to impose or even articulate the humble and self-sacrificing 
demands at Christianity’s core.
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